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This thesis studies the performance, performance persistence, survival and ow of Com-
modity Trading Advisors, also known as CTAs or Managed Futures Funds. One of the
main contributions of this thesis is the novel classication of CTA strategies. This is
obtained by hand-collecting information frequently by directly contacting the funds in
the database. I thus identify two main trading styles: Systematic and Discretionary
CTAs which are the main focus of this thesis. I further separate Systematic CTAs
into trend-followers with diering trading horizon. This novel dataset allows me to re-
consider many hitherto studied issues in the CTA space with an application to these
sub-strategies.
The rst section investigates the dierences in mortality between Systematic and
Discretionary CTAs, over the longest horizon than of any in the literature. A detailed
survival analysis over the full range of CTA strategies is provided. Systematic CTAs
have a higher median survival than Discretionary CTAs, 12 vs. 8 years. I hand collect
information on reasons for exit from the database. I propose new lters that will bet-
ter identify real failures among funds in the graveyard database. Separating graveyard
funds into real failure I re-examine the attrition rate of CTAs. The real failure rate
is 11.1%, lower than the average yearly attrition rate of 17.3% of CTAs. The eect of
various covariates including several downside risk measures is investigated in predicting
CTA failure. Controlling for performance, HWM, minimum investment, fund age and
lockup, funds with higher downside risk measures have a higher hazard rate. Compared
to other downside risk measures, the volatility of returns is less able to predict failure.
Funds that receive larger inows are able to survive longer than funds that do not. Large
3
4Systematic CTAs have the highest probability of survival.
The second part studies the performance and performance persistence of Systematic
and Discretionary CTAs. Controlling for biases, after fees the average CTA is able to
add value. These results are strongest for large Systematic CTAs. I extend the seven-
factor model of Fung-Hsieh (2004a) and nd that this model is better able to explain the
returns of Systematic rather than Discretionary CTAs. I nd three structural breaks in
the risk loadings of CTAs dierent to hedge fund breaks: September 1998, March 2003
and July 2007. Using these breaks I show that systematic CTAs were able to deliver
signicant alpha in every sub-period. I also nd evidence of signicant performance per-
sistence. However, these ndings are heavily contingent on the strategy followed: the
persistence of Discretionary CTAs is driven by small funds whereas large funds drive the
performance persistence of Systematic funds. These results have important implications
for institutional investors who face capital allocation constraints. They also suggest that
contrary to the previous ndings, the CTA industry does not appear to be heading to-
wards zero alpha.
The nal section looks at the relationship between fund-ows and performance. In-
vestors chase past performance, the fund- ow -performance is signicant and concave for
some strategies. Although there is some long-term performance persistence of System-
atic funds with the highest inows, there is no smart money eect in the CTA literature.
I nd no evidence of capacity constraints among Systematic CTAs. Investors are thus
not able to smartly allocate funds to future best performers and take full advantage of
the liquidity that CTAs oer.
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Introduction
This thesis focuses on CTAs, also known as Commodity Trading Advisors or Managed
Futures Funds, a subgroup of hedge funds which accounts for approximately 10% of all
hedge funds1, with a total AUM as of December 2012 of US$329.6B2. The term CTA
represents an industry of money managers who accept compensation for trading on be-
half of their clients in the global futures and forwards markets. Originally these funds
operated predominantly in the commodities markets but today they trade in liquid fu-
tures, forwards and other nancial derivatives. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2004) nd
that the risk premium on commodity futures is the same as equities, but commodity
futures are negatively correlated with equity and bond returns. Assets held in CTAs
have been growing steadily, notwithstanding the recent nancial crisis of 2008, and their
double digit performance has attracted deserved attention. CTAs have also received at-
tention from academics, who have documented several interesting facts: Firstly, CTAs
dier from hedge funds in terms of trading strategies (see for example Fung and Hsieh
(1997b) who show that CTAs follow trend-following strategies). Secondly CTAs dif-
fer from hedge funds in terms of attrition rates and survivorship bias, Liang (2004)
and liquidities, Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004). Some studies have suggested that
1Joenvaara et al. (2012)
2Assets reported from BarclayHedge CTA database.
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CTAs have nonlinear correlations with traditional assets, stocks and bonds, and have
positive skewness (Vuille and Crisan (2004)). Thus CTAs also dier from hedge funds
in terms of correlation structures in dierent market environments and are therefore a
good diversication tool for portfolios of stocks, bonds and hedge funds (see earlier work
by Lintner (1983), Edwards and Park (1996) and Billingsley and Chance (1996)). Kat
(2002) and Edwards and Caglayan (2001) documented that adding CTAs to a portfolio
would allow investors to achieve a substantial reduction in volatility whilst providing
protection during bear markets. This could be attributed to the strategies employed
by CTAs. Most CTAs describe themselves as trend-followers. Fung and Hsieh (1997b)
show that the returns of the trend-following funds can be replicated using portfolios of
lookback straddles. Kazemi and Li (2010) further document that CTAs have market-
timing ability rather security selection and systematic CTAs are more skilled at market
timing than their discretionary counter parts.
Given the growing interest in this asset class, this thesis builds on earlier CTA lit-
erature, by analysing the performance, performance persistence, survival and asset ow
of CTAs. However, unlike earlier literature that mainly treats CTAs as one group of
funds, this thesis identies and analyses the dierences between the two main CTA
trading styles: systematic and discretionary. A recent Financial Times article3 high-
lights the dierences between systematic and discretionary CTAs: \Should investors
favour the systematic approach, sometimes known as the black box approach, that re-
lies on computers responding to the asset selection instructions programmed into it and
removes any element of panic in attempting to ride changes in market conditions? Or
should they favour the discretionary approach that relies on the instinct and experience
3The Financial Times, June 9, 2012, \A true CTA will stick to chosen path." by Brian Bollen.
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of humans who can smell a signicant change in markets and take the necessary steps
to avoid unwanted volatility?" The systematic approach relies heavily on quantitative
models that generate buy and sell signals. These funds are fully automated and are ne
tuned over time to adapt to changing market environments. Discretionary funds, on the
other hand, base their strategies on fundamental or technical indicators or both and rely
heavily on a single manager. Thus the experience of the manager becomes key. Most
of the systems used by both types of funds are either trend-following, counter-trend
or some may engage in spread/relative value strategies. Trend-followers do not predict
trends but rather jump on them once they are identied by the system, following moving
averages or momentum indicators.
Given the dierences in trading approach between systematic and discretionary
funds, there is much debate among practitioners between the advantages of the two
systems. The above mentioned article from the Financial Times addresses some points:
\Systematic trading takes the emotional element out of trading. Systematic allows for
historical back and forward testing of the trading model. Systematic allows the CTA to
trade in multiple markets simultaneously. It also removes some of the key personnel risk.
If a trader or portfolio manager leaves the rm, the CTA can still use the same model.
Advantages of the discretionary approach include the ability to move quickly to put on
or take o positions." However, the article notes that discretionary trading has some
limitations: \It can be dicult to remove emotional elements from trading. It can be
dicult for one person to trade multiple markets simultaneously. If the decision-making
person leaves the rm, it could be tricky to maintain the same trading methods or ideas."
Thus the arguments point to some advantages of systematic trading over discretionary.
Does the evidence support this view? In this thesis I aim to answer this question by
18
addressing the dierences in survival, performance and performance persistence and the
eect of ows on performance between systematic and discretionary CTAs.
The rst part of this thesis addresses the dierences in mortality between systematic
and discretionary CTAs. If discretionary CTAs are more aected by the behavioral ele-
ments of human trading as well as key man risk then this will likely have an impact on
the survival of discretionary funds. Risk management is key to the success and survival
of a CTA over the long-term. CTAs will try and jump on every possible trend, with the
success of the strategy dependent on a successful stop-loss policy. Algorithmic trading
may provide a more reliable exit to unprotable trades, rather than human judgement
impaired by emotions which could lower fund survival rates. With this hypothesis I look
at at the survival rates of the two trading systems.
Literature on CTA survival is rather sparse. This study makes several contributions
to the literature on CTA failure. Firstly, unlike previous research on CTA survival
(Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001), Rouah (2005) and Gregoriou, Hubner, Papageor-
giou and Rouah (2005)) this study distinguishes the \real failure rate" from the attrition
rate of CTAs. This is not the rst study to distinguish failure rate from attrition rate.
Previous studies have addressed this issue in the hedge fund literature only, Liang and
Park (2010). Dening failure in the hedge fund and CTA literature is a signicant chal-
lenge as information on the reasons for exit from the database is rarely available. To
circumvent this problem I hand collected information on liquidation by directly con-
tacting many of the funds in the database, searching extensively on the internet and
collecting information from private sources. I am able to show that the lters proposed
in the previous hedge fund studies to distinguish failure rate are incomplete or at least
are not entirely appropriate for CTA data and provide extensions that allow one to
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discriminate between truly failed funds and those that liquidated for other reasons or
are in the graveyard because they simply stopped reporting to a database. Using this
information I re-examine attrition in the CTA industry. I nd that the real failure rate
is in fact 11.1% lower than the average attrition rate of 17.3% and much lower than
previously documented levels. I also show that the failure rate of systematic CTAs is
lower than that of discretionary funds, 10.4% vs. 12.2% with an even larger dierence
in the attrition rates. I further study fund survival and nd that the median survival
of systematic CTAs is signicantly higher than the previously reported median survival
for the entire CTA industry, 12 years vs. 2 years reported in Brown, Goetzmann and
Park (2001).
To pursue the survival issue further, I investigate the factors that determine man-
ager exit from the industry. Unlike previous studies on CTA survival, I use Cox (1972)
proportional hazards (PH) model with time-varying coecients rather than xed coe-
cients and incorporate various downside risk measures. I implement a survival analysis
for each of the three denitions: i) attrition, ii) liquidation and iii) failure. Explicitly
separating real failure from discretionary closures in the survival model avoids blurring
the eect of predictor variables on survival, Rouah (2005). The results of this analy-
sis show that CTA survival is heavily contingent on the strategy followed by the fund.
Secondly, size and fund-ows have a positive eect on CTA survival. Furthermore, with
the addition of other downside risk measures, standard deviation loses its explanatory
power. Finally, systematic and in particular large systematic CTAs have the lowest
probability of failure.
In the second part of the thesis, I present new stylized facts about CTA data biases,
performance and performance persistence. Before using data on CTAs one must address
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and minimize data biases. These according to Fung and Hsieh (2009), although well
documented in the literature, need to be updated in light of the recent nancial crisis.
I nd that despite an increase in the attrition rate during 2008 and 2009, the eect on
survivorship bias is negligible and results remain consistent with earlier literature: Sur-
vivorship bias for CTAs for the period 1993 to 2010 remains at 3.92% similar to the 3%
reported by Fung and Hsieh (1997b). The eect of instant history bias is also shown to
be in line with earlier results in the literature4. Using this bias-adjusted data, I provide
evidence suggesting that the average CTA is able to deliver positive and economically
as well as statistically signicant risk-adjusted performance. More specically, the ag-
gregate equally-weighted index of excess returns of all CTAs earns 0.55% per month in
excess of T-Bills. This is higher than documented by Bhardwaj (2008) and contrary to
his arguments and the negative publicity of Elton et al. (1991) is suggestive that CTAs
on average do add value. Secondly, I show the average performance is sensitive to the
CTA strategy employed. In particular, the excess return of a value-weighted portfolio of
systematic CTAs delivers an annualized return of 7.08% whilst for discretionary CTAs it
is 4.68%. The highest Sharpe ratio is achieved by systematic short-term trend-followers.
This points to the fact that unlike hedge funds, the performance of systematic CTAs
is driven by large funds rather than small funds. The annualized excess return of an
equally-weighted portfolio of discretionary funds is higher than the annualised excess
return of an equally-weighted portfolio of systematic funds, indicating that the perfor-
mance of discretionary funds is driven by small funds. The performance of discretionary
CTAs has thus similar characteristics to that of hedge funds, Joenvaara et al. (2012),
Teo (2010).
4Fung and Hsieh (2000), Bhardwaj (2008).
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I further evaluate the risk attributions of CTAs and examine whether the average
CTA is able to deliver alpha. To that end, I recognise that the risk exposures are
likely to change over time, see Bollen and Whaley (2009) and Patton and Ramadorai
(2011), hence a static analysis will not be appropriate. Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramado-
rai (2008) identify structural breaks in the hedge fund risk exposures. I extend their
results to the CTA data and show that the structural breaks for systematic CTAs are
not the same as for hedge funds and discretionary CTAs. In particular I show that these
breaks appear to be inuenced by the changes in interest rates regimes as well as stock
market events. Using these breaks, I apply the seven factor Fung-Hsieh (2004) model,
extended with additional trend-following factors and the GSCI index and show that this
model together with structural breaks is better suited to systematic CTAs rather than
discretionary funds: The adjusted R2 for systematic CTAs is 51.2% and 29.3% for discre-
tionary CTAs. This indicates that systematic funds use trend-following strategies more
consistently than discretionary funds. This resonates with the results of Kazemi and Li
(2009) and points to momentum strategies being pursued by systematic CTAs. I also
show that trend-following systematic CTAs were able to deliver statistically signicant
alpha in every sub-period and that contrary to the results of Fung et al. (2008) for hedge
funds, alpha does not appear to be heading towards zero. This poses a challenge to the
Berk and Green (2004) rational model of active portfolio management. To that end, I
also investigate the issue of performance persistence. Previous studies on hedge funds
found evidence of short-term performance persistence, Agarwal and Naik (2000a) and
(2000b) and Baquero et al. (2005). Others using more robust econometric techniques
found evidence of long-term persistence, Kosowski et al. (2007), Jaganathan, Novikov
and Malakov (2010) and Boyson (2008). Sorting on the t-statistics of alpha, I nd evi-
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dence of short-term performance persistence for discretionary funds and only long-term
performance persistence for systematic funds. Furthermore, these results appear to be
sensitive to rebalancing frequency, fund strategy and fund size. In particular, contrary
to the results in the hedge fund literature, Teo (2010), the performance persistence of
systematic CTAs is driven by large funds. These results lead to another question: In
light of the recent increase in assets ows to the CTA industry, is there evidence of a
fund ow-performance relationship and are there any capacity constraints.
In the last part of this thesis, I analyse the fund ow-performance relationship of
systematic and discretionary CTAs. To the best of my knowledge, the ow-performance
relationship as well as the hypothesis of capacity constraints among CTA strategies
has not been examined rigorously in the academic literature. The only analysis which
concentrates on CTAs exclusively is by Do, Fa, Lajbcygier and Veeraraghavan (2010),
however their study treats CTAs as one group. To study the fund ow-performance
relationship I use yearly (used in most hedge fund studies5) as well as quarterly data. I
employ piecewise linear regression to model the non-linearity of the relationship. I nd
that contrary to the conclusions of Ding, Getmansky, Liang and Wermers (2009), the
shape of the relationship is not driven by the presence of share restrictions. Instead, time
horizon, fund size and strategy have an eect on the fund ow-performance relationship.
In particular, using quarterly rather than annual data I nd a linear relationship for all
CTAs, but concave relationship for small discretionary CTAs. I nd that the relation-
ship of systematic CTAs remains linear and is driven by large funds.
I further analyse the eect of fund inows on performance persistence. For discre-
tionary CTAs, I nd no evidence of long-term performance persistence, but there is
5See Ding, Getmansky, Liang and Wermers (2009).
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some evidence on a quarterly horizon when inows are taken into account. I document
evidence of long-term performance persistence for systematic CTAs even in the pres-
ence of inows. Furthermore, consistent with earlier ndings this is driven by large
funds. This points to a lack of capacity constraints among these funds. To that end, I
rigorously test for the presence of capacity constraints in the CTA sub-strategies using
two methodologies. I nd no evidence of capacity constraints among systematic CTAs
despite the large inows into these funds. I show that over the period 1993 to Decem-
ber 2010, systematic CTAs received more asset inows than discretionary funds. This
shows that investors are able to discriminate between the two types of funds and are
thus aware of the advantages and disadvantages of the two strategies. I therefore test for
the smart-money eect in the CTA industry. Smart-money being dened as the ability
of investors to infer the skill of a fund manager and consequently allocate more money
to those managers, subsequently receiving superior returns in the next period than the
remaining universe of investors. Applying various methodologies and consistent with
the earlier results in the literature, I am unable to nd any smart-money eect either
for systematic or discretionary CTAs: Investors do not appear to be able to fully exploit
the liquidity that CTAs provide.
Chapter 1
Survival of Commodity Trading
Advisors
1.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the CTA and hedge fund industry has more than doubled in both
size and number of funds. Estimates indicate that, at its peak in the summer of 2008,
the entire industry managed around US$2.5 trillion. The impact of the nancial crisis
of 2008-2009, however, has clearly been felt by the hedge fund and CTA industries. The
crisis is arguably the largest in modern nancial history and has led assets under man-
agement to fall sharply via a combination of trading losses and investor withdrawals.
Although assets under management have decreased in the hedge fund industry as a
whole, they have increased slightly in the CTA industry over the course of this crisis.
BarclayHedge reports a level of assets under management for CTAs of over US$200
billion for the end of 2009. In addition, around 50% of funds have less than US$10
million in assets, suggesting a high number of new entrants into the industry. The rapid
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growth of the CTA and hedge fund industries has also been accompanied by a growth
in the number and severity of failures, however. Investors recognize that whilst hedge
funds and CTAs may produce high expected returns they may also expose investors to
potentially large downside risks.
The term CTA represents an industry of money managers known as Commodity
Trading Advisors who accept compensation for trading on behalf of their clients in the
global futures and forwards markets. These funds originally operated predominantly
in commodities markets but today they invest in liquid futures and forwards markets
in commodities, currencies, xed income and equity indices. CTAs are usually self-
regulated and registered with the National Futures Association (NFA), a self-regulatory
organization for futures and options markets. CTAs are known to have unique risks
and nonlinear returns. Fung and Hsieh (1997b) documented CTAs to have nonlinear
and non-normal payos due to their dynamic trading strategies and use of derivatives.
Some of the previous research suggests that CTAs demonstrate positive skewness and
excess kurtosis and a rejection of the Jarque-Bera (1980) test for normality.1 Like hedge
funds, CTAs charge a management fee and, in particular, an incentive fee which some
have argued may create an incentive for excessive risk taking.
An important issue for both private and institutional investors is how to best achieve
a targeted return with an acceptable level of risk. A possible solution would be a di-
versied portfolio with a certain portion allocated to managed futures. Lintner (1983)
showed that the risk-adjusted return of a portfolio of stocks and bonds exhibits sub-
stantially less variance at every level of expected return when combined with managed
futures. Yet a much debated issue remains whether managed futures have done well
1See Liang (2004), Park (1995), Edwards and Park (1996), Gregoriou and Rouah (2004), Schneeweis
and Georgiev (2002).
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enough on a stand alone basis to justify the high fees that they charge, Amin and
Kat (2004), Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007), Liang (1999), Liang (2001) and Bhardwaj,
Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2008). In order to properly address the performance issue
one needs to rst account for the mortality and survivorship bias associated with these
funds. Moreover, while historically most of the money held by CTAs and hedge funds
was from high-net-worth individuals, recent growth in assets under management has
been from institutional investors such as pension plans and insurance companies. Un-
like private high-net-worth individuals, to meet their obligations institutional investors
need to allocate capital on a long-term basis with reliable return streams. Selecting al-
ternative investments that are likely to produce stable returns and remain in operation
is, therefore, of particular interest to these investors. Survival analysis can be useful as
it can provide additional due diligence and aid the selection of funds that are less likely
to liquidate.
The study of survival in the CTA industry is sparse and in its virtual infancy. Al-
though previous literature points to a higher attrition rate for CTAs relative to hedge
funds, Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001), these studies do not take into account ex-
treme market events, simply due to their limited data sample. A few studies, however,
have shown that CTAs provide downside protection during bear market conditions.2
Analyzing survival during the recent nancial crisis is of particular interest to investors
who have become ever more cautious investing in hedge funds. This thesis provides a
detailed survival analysis over a new range of CTA classications and encompasses the
longest time horizon of any examined in the literature, including the recent nancial
2Edwards and Caglayan (2001), Fung and Hsieh (1997b) and Liang (2004).
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crisis of 2008.3 In doing so, it makes several contributions. The rst is to distinguish
the real failure rate from the attrition rate of CTAs. By clarifying the denition of real
failure, despite the fact that to date all CTA studies have deemed the two concepts as
one, it is possible to estimate a real failure rate of the CTA industry over the longest
period so far studied. Secondly, it nds that CTA survival is heavily dependent on the
strategy of CTAs. Whilst Baquero et al. (2005) and Liang and Park (2010) nd that
hedge fund style is a factor in explaining hedge fund survival, Gregoriou et al. (2005)
examine survival over a range of CTA classications and nd that survival is heavily
related to the strategy of the CTA. Whilst these authors use the CTA classications
directly provided by the BarclayHedge database, this study makes an important contri-
bution by reclassifying CTAs into two main trading styles: systematic and discretionary,
and shows how survival is related to these styles. The life expectancy of CTAs is in-
vestigated at the aggregate level and for all classications, whilst the impact of various
variables on survival is analyzed.
Hedge fund databases provide information on live and dead funds. Funds no longer
reporting to the database are moved into the \Graveyard". Fung and Hsieh (2002),
however, point out that not all funds listed in the graveyard database have in fact
liquidated. Many stopped reporting for a variety of other reasons, including merging
with another fund, name change, etc. Earlier studies on hedge funds and CTAs have
regarded moving to the graveyard as representing liquidation and failure and the at-
trition rates estimated by previous research have all been based on this classication.
Dening failure is particularly challenging as it is dicult to obtain information on the
3Fung and Hsieh (2009) note that as capital ows out of the hedge fund and CTA industry at an
unprecedented rate, the attrition rate is likely to rise. The full impact of the contraction of the assets
may take some time to manifest itself however. \Consequently the liquidation statistics from the second
half of 2009 are likely to be important in estimating survivorship bias."
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reasons for exit in respect to the defunct funds, although a few databases do provide
such information. In this regard, an important contribution oered by Rouah (2005)
was explicitly to examine fundamental dierences between dierent types of exits in
hedge fund data. His study was implemented using the HFR database which provides
three drop reason categories: liquidated, stopped reporting and closed to new invest-
ment. As such, Rouah (2005) study was able to examine the eect of dierent exit types
on attrition statistics, survivorship bias and the survival analysis of hedge funds. When
liquidation only was considered the average annualized attrition rate dropped to 3-5%
and the bias associated with using only live funds and funds that stopped reporting,
the survivorship bias, increased to 4.6%.4 A recent study by Liang and Park (2010) on
hedge funds also accounts for the potential shortcomings of using the entire Graveyard
database, or even just liquidated funds, as failures. Even though some databases pro-
vide information on liquidated funds, the authors argue that even liquidation does not
necessarily mean failure, as some funds may liquidate for other reasons. The authors,
therefore, propose a ltering system based on fund past performance and past asset ow
analysis to distinguish failed funds from those that had voluntary closures. Using this
new dataset, the authors reexamine the eects that contribute to real failure. To date,
there are no comparative studies for CTAs exclusively, however. Furthermore, Liang
and Park (2010) explicitly exclude managed futures from their hedge fund sample.
Early studies on CTAs regarded the entire graveyard as an indication of failure be-
cause on average such funds had poor performance, Gregoriou (2002). The attrition
4The biases present in the hedge fund and CTA data and its eects on performance are well docu-
mented in the literature (Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2000b), Diz
(1999a), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992), Fung and Hsieh (1997b) and Carpenter and
Lynch (1999)), however none of the previous studies have accounted for the dierent exit types. As
such, Rouah (2005) is the rst to demonstrate the eect of dierent exit types on survivorship bias.
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rate results estimated by previous studies are all based on such a classication. Thus
previous literature on CTAs suggest that they experience lower survival than hedge
funds (see Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001), Liang (2004)). Brown et al. (2001)
determine that the attrition of CTAs is 20% versus 15% for hedge funds. Liang (2004)
uses HFR data for the period 1994-2003 and estimates that hedge funds have an attri-
tion of 13.23% in bull markets and 16.7% in bear markets, whilst CTAs have an average
attrition of 23.5%. Getmansky, Lo and Mei (2004) also nd that managed futures have
the highest average annualized attrition rate, compared to other hedge fund strategies,
with a rate of 14.4%. Fung and Hsieh (1997b) and Capocci (2005) also nd an attrition
of 19%. Spurgin (1999) notes that the mortality of CTAs reached 22% in 1994. Two
recent studies however nd conicting rates. Bhardwaj et al. (2008) found an attrition
rate of 27.8% whilst Xu, Liu and Loviscek (2010) found a substantially lower rate of
11.96%. Both studies covered the latest period but used dierent databases. This could
account for the dierence in results. As stressed by Xu et al. (2010), however, it is
important to account for attrition rates in light of the eect of the recent crisis on the
industry.
This study extends the most recent advances in survival analysis in the hedge fund
literature to CTAs, whilst encompassing the longest time period so far studied for CTAs.
To date there appears to have been no study that has analyzed CTA attrition and sur-
vival using dierent exit types. The most recent CTA survival study by Gregoriou,
Hubner, Papageorgiou and Rouah (2005) treats all funds in the graveyard as liquidated
possibly due to the limitations of their database. In fact the authors explicitly make a
strong assumption that all funds in the database that have stopped reporting did so due
to poor returns. The authors use the BarclayHedge database for the period 1990-2003.
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Unfortunately, BarclayHedge does not provide exit reasons for many funds in the grave-
yard. While, this study also employs BarclayHedge, since it provides the most extensive
database of CTAs, it builds on the methodology of Liang and Park (2010) to identify
failures in the CTA graveyard. One of the key contributions of this study is to extend
the failure lters proposed by Liang and Park (2010); it shows that their two return and
AUM lters are incomplete and applies extended lters to the BarclayHedge database
to reclassify the exit types of the graveyard into those that liquidated and those that are
alive but no longer report. It also separates real failures from liquidated funds. These
new criteria are based on an examination of all available information on defunct funds.
Many of the funds in the database have been contacted to conrm their liquidation
status and reason for exit. Certain information was obtained from private commercial
sources and extensive internet searches.
The second contribution of this study is to reclassify the entire CTA database into in-
vestment styles that are more commonly used in the industry. Unlike previous research,
therefore, CTAs are separated into two distinct styles: Systematic and Discretionary.
Systematic CTAs base their trading on technical models devised through rigorous statis-
tical and historical analysis. Investment decisions are made algorithmically and thus all
the rules are applied consistently and there is limited uncertainty as to their application.
The last decade has witnessed an increase in the complexity and breadth of quantitative
nancial research; an increase that has been fueled by the greater availability of nancial
and economic data as a result of the relentless increase in computing power. Systematic
trading that requires intensive quantitative research and the use of sophisticated com-
puter models has thus become more prevalent. Most of the entrants into this eld are
trained scientists and engineers. Park, Tanrikulu and Wang (2009) argue that system-
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atic traders may hold signicant advantages over discretionary traders. Even though
discretionary traders may also follow trends they still base their trading decisions on
manager discretion. Thus one of the challenges facing discretionary traders is the control
of human emotion in reacting to dicult market conditions. Systematic programs do
not have this weakness as all the trades are executed by the program. In addition there
is a lesser \key man risk" which tends to be associated with discretionary traders. Due
to their automated nature, systematic funds have the further advantage of scalability
across a multitude of markets and they can thus accept more capital whilst allowing for
more diversication across markets, strategies employed and number of trades. In light
of these dierences, it is of interest to test empirically the survival rates associated with
the two strategies. A recent study by Kazemi and Li (2010) also classies CTAs into
these two manager categories and nds that there are dierences in the market timing
abilities of systematic and discretionary CTAs, notably that systematic CTAs are gen-
erally better at market timing than discretionary CTAs. This study however, further
breaks systematic funds into sub-strategies. Park, Tanrikulu and Wang (2009) note that
systematic CTAs are comprised of multiple strategies most of which can be classied
as either trend-following or relative value. Others employ trading models that fall into
neither of these categories, e.g. pattern recognition and counter trend. Trend-following
strategies are also split into programs that primarily use short-term, medium-term or
long-term signals or holding periods. Based on the previous research, one would expect
the ndings of this study to indicate that systematic CTAs have better performance and
higher survival than discretionary funds, since the lack of the human emotion element
allows for better risk control and a consequent reduction in the risk of failure.
Using the classication of investment styles and the failure ltering system discussed
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above, the average annual attrition rate of the entire CTA database is found to be 17.3%
for the 1994-2009 period, i.e. similar to previous studies. The failure rate, however, is
signicantly lower at 11.1%. There are also dierences between systematic and discre-
tionary funds, with systematic funds having lower attrition and failure rates of 16.0%
and 10.4% versus 21.6% and 12.6% respectively. The BarclayHedge database contains
a signicant number of funds with less than US$10 million under management. After
removing such funds, the average attrition and failure rates drop to 7.8% and 4.1% for
systematic and 10.8% and 5.9% for discretionary funds. These are lower than previously
estimated but comparable to the ndings of Rouah (2005) and Liang and Park (2010)
for hedge funds. The results suggest that the attrition rate of CTAs may not be as high
as previously suggested and in particular systematic CTAs have a lower attrition rate
than discretionary CTAs.
Survival analysis is then implemented to determine factors aecting CTA failure.
There are a few studies in the hedge fund literature analyzing the eect of various
variables on survival, including: Liang (2000), Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001),
Gregoriou (2002), Baquero, Horst and Verbeek (2005), Rouah (2005), Ng (2008) and
Baba and Goko (2009). In particular Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) nd that
hedge fund survival depends on absolute as well as relative performance, seasoning and
volatility. Recently, Brown, Goetzmann, Liang and Schwarz (2009) estimated the eect
of operational risk on hedge fund survival. Using novel data from SEC lings (Form
ADV) in combination with the TASS database, the study developed a quantitative
model, the !-score, to quantify operational risk and use it as a predictor in the Cox
(1972) proportional hazards model to predict its eect on hedge fund survival. The
study included managed futures as a sub-strategy but found that the coecient of op-
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erational risk was insignicant for managed futures and the direction of its eect was
blurred. The score was related to conict-of-interest issues, concentrated ownership and
reduced leverage, none of which seem to explain CTA survival. Other studies on CTA
survival are rather sparse, Diz (1999a), (1999b), Spurgin (1999) and Gregoriou et al.
(2005) each analysed CTA survival separately from hedge funds. The most recent of
these analyses is that of Gregoriou et al. (2005) who nd that performance, size and
management fees have an eect on CTA survival. The inuence of volatility appears
rather limited.
The particular contribution of this study is to employ downside risk measures that
incorporate higher return moments in predicting CTA failure. In doing so it incorpo-
rates time varying as well as xed covariates. The methodology closely follows that
of Liang and Park (2010), who show that these measures are better able to capture
the non-normality of hedge fund returns. Incorporating additional risk measures is of
particular interest in respect to CTAs who have positive skewness yet can experience
large losses. Drawdown as a risk measure is also considered since this can be useful
in predicting failure. Lang, Gupta and Prestbo (2006), in fact, argue that drawdowns
are the single most signicant factor that determines the likelihood of hedge fund sur-
vival. Another contribution of this study is to employ Cox (1972) proportional hazard's
model with time-varying covariates. This is an improvement to the Gregoriou et al.
(2005) model for CTAs who employ Cox's (1972) proportional hazard model with xed
covariates only. By using time dependent covariates new risk measures as well as other
covariates are allowed to change with time. Finally, the aim of the study is to build a
forecasting model with better warning signals for possible fund liquidations. In order
to do this as accurately as possible, the survival analysis for three dierent denitions
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of failure is compared: i) attrition, ii) liquidation and iii) real failure. The results show
that standard deviation is not an appropriate risk measure in predicting the type of
failure and that downside risk measures are better able to explain real failure. As a
result, this study nds that systematic CTAs should be favoured by investors due to
their signicantly higher survival than their discretionary counterparts.
The rest of chapter one of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes
the data. Section 1.3 explains the methods. Section 1.4 provides the empirical results
and robustness tests and section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Data
There are several databases that collect data on CTAs. The most commonly used
databases in academic studies are TASS, CISDM and BarclayHedge. To analyze the
attrition and survival of CTAs properly this study uses monthly net-of-fees returns from
live and dead CTAs that reported to the BarclayHedge database, proprietor of one of the
most comprehensive commercially available databases of CTAs and CTA performance.
The sample period under examination in this study is from January 1994 to December
2009, a total of 192 months: a time period that spans both bull (pre 2000 and 2003-
2007) and bear markets, such as the bursting of the tech bubble in the spring of 2000
and, importantly, the nancial crisis of 2007-2009. This constitutes the longest period
used to date to examine CTA survival. BarclayHedge provides a variety of information
other than performance. It collects fund names, management company, AUM, minimum
investment, start and ending dates, investment style, management and incentive fees,
HWM, leverage, fund status, share restrictions, and others. It is important to note that
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all the information contained in these databases is reported on a strictly voluntary basis
only.
The BarclayHedge database consists of both active \Live" and \Defunct" funds. The
database is divided into two separate parts: \Live" and \Graveyard" funds. Funds that
are in the live database are ones that are still operating and continue to provide updates
on their performance. Once a fund stops reporting for three consecutive months, the
fund is moved into the Graveyard. A fund can only be in a Graveyard once it has been
listed in the live database. As of the end of December 2009, there were 3436 funds
in the combined database. Out of these, 1,016 were live funds and 2,420 were defunct
funds. The majority of the funds report their returns net of management and incen-
tive fees. I eliminate from my sample funds that report quarterly or gross returns, a
total of 15 funds. I also remove various long only funds and index trackers, duplicate
entries due to multiple share classes, onshore and oshore vehicles, leveraged versions
and various feeder structures and funds born prior to 1994.5 This leaves 696 live funds
and 1750 defunct funds. I also remove all multi-manager funds. In words of Liang
(2005), \Combining CTAs with funds that manage several CTAs would not only cause
double counting problem but would also hide the dierences in fee structures between
CTAs and fund-of-funds." To eliminate backll bias, for the empirical analysis I impose
an additional lter in which I require funds to have at least 24 months of non-missing
returns.
5Figure 1.1 was constructed using all the share classes and onshore and oshore vehicles so as to
capture total assets under management accurately across the industry.
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1.2.1 Style Classication
Hedge funds are not allowed to solicit the general public, therefore detailed strategy in-
formation is not included in the databases. In addition, several data vendors like TASS
do not include fund identities in their academic versions making it impossible to collect
information on funds from other sources. In this study, however, I had access to fund
identities that allowed me to access information through fund websites, other sources
such as Alphametrix, as well as private sources, to get a fuller understanding of each
fund's strategy. Narang (2009) and Rami (2009) also provided a basis to understand
the complexities of the dierent CTA strategies. This has allowed me to segregate CTA
funds into various strategies. I therefore used funds' self-reported strategy description
in addition to BarclayHedge categories and hand collected information and am therefore
the rst to classify CTAs in this manner.
BarclayHedge classies funds into several investment styles. There is currently no
universally accepted form with which to classify CTAs into dierent strategy classes.
There is some form of consensus emerging in the literature as to how best to classify
various hedge fund strategies, however nothing similar yet exists for CTAs. In fact, most
of the earlier literature treated CTAs as a single group. Recently, some studies classied
CTAs into dierent investment styles but these have all done so in a dierent manner.
Gregoriou et al. (2005) grouped the BarclayHedge classications into ve categories,
yet in their 2010 paper the same authors arrived at twelve classications from the same
database. Capocci (2005), meanwhile, grouped the same dataset into ten classications.
All of these authors have used the BarclayHedge database yet have created dierent
strategy classes. It is also unclear how previous studies arrived at their classications
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since most funds in BarclayHedge would frequently fall into several categories represent-
ing trading style and asset class utilized. For example, a fund may select itself to be
both systematic and technical diversied, yet the authors would have both of these as a
separate category. In this study therefore, I propose a dierent CTA style classication
based on the one used in the industry.
Firstly, I note that almost all funds fall into one of the three main categories based on
their self-reported trading strategies: i.e. systematic, discretionary and options strate-
gies. Systematic traders systematically apply an alpha-seeking investment strategy that
is specied based on exhaustive research. This research is the rst step in the creation
of a systematic trading strategy. As a result, most new entrants into the industry are
trained scientists and engineers. Market phenomena are uncovered with statistical analy-
sis of historical data. Trading algorithms are then constructed to exploit the markets and
these are applied consistently. Discretionary CTAs, on the other hand, base their mod-
els on manager's discretion. There are several advantages of systematic trading over the
discretionary style. Firstly, the emotional element of discretionary trading is removed.
Discretionary traders may frequently suer from disposition eect, as documented by
Shefrin and Statman (1985): they are quick to realize gains and are slow to realize losses.
In essence the main dierence between the two always lies in how an investment strat-
egy is conceived and implemented rather than what the strategy actually is. Systematic
trading takes emotion out of investing and imposes a disciplined approach. Additional
benets are reduction of key man risk, scalability and more diversication in terms of
the number of markets analyzed and the types of strategies employed. I separate options
strategies into a separate group as I believe they follow substantially dierent trading
strategies compared to systematic and discretionary funds. In particular, options funds
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engage in either selling options or exploiting arbitrage opportunities using options. My
nal three main category classication therefore has systematic, discretionary and op-
tions CTAs. My classication is in line with recent work of Kazemi and Li (2010) who
break their CISDM database into systematic and discretionary CTAs. However, I fur-
ther their work by breaking systematic funds into several categories: trend-following,
pattern recognition and relative value. Trend-following funds are further broken into
short-term, medium-term and long-term traders. Billingsley and Chance (1996) also
separate CTAs into technical and non-technical funds, where technical funds essentially
mirror the systematic funds classied in this study. The authors further note that among
those technical funds, the majority are indeed trend-followers.6 About ten percent of
the funds in our database have no BarclayHedge classication, yet when reading their
detailed strategy description it is apparent that they still fall into one of the three main
categories.
The nal count and description for the dierent investment styles are shown in the
Appendix. It is clear from the table that the representation of the investment style is
not evenly distributed. Systematic CTAs account for 60% of all CTAs. This is a lower
number than the one reported by BarclayHedge, which cites that approximately 80%
of all CTAs are systematic. I have employed a more stringent approach to qualify the
funds as being systematic, however, and this explains the lower gure in my study. My
classication results should still be treated with caution. Due to the nature of the in-
dustry and the lack of full information, it is impossible to arrive at strategy assessments
with absolute certainty since one is relying on the managers' statements. I also note
that among systematic funds, trend-following is the most dominant strategy with 87%
6Fung and Hsieh (2001) show that a simple trend following strategy can be modeled using look-back
straddles that generate a non-linear payo structure.
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of the funds. The vast majority of trend-followers employ a medium-term frame in a
variety of markets. I dene short-term as anything between high frequency trading to
trades within one week. Indeed high frequency trading has become a popular strategy
in the last few years. Medium-term trend-followers are dened as those that use two
weeks up to one month trading signals and long-term trend-followers as anything above
one month. Among discretionary funds, most utilize either technical or a combination
of technical and fundamental approaches. In addition, most funds trade in diversied
markets. The Appendix provides a detailed description of strategies.
1.2.2 Distinguishing Discontinuation from Death and Failure
Within those funds assigned to the graveyard database, distinguishing between liqui-
dated funds and those that are in fact still in operation is complicated by the lack of
detailed information available on defunct hedge funds. Early studies on hedge funds
regarded moving funds to the graveyard as a de facto indication of failure. Attrition
rate calculations and survival analysis done by previous research is based on just such
a broad classication. Recently, however, data vendors began to provide information
on reasons for exit. Thus, the TASS database has seven distinct exit classications:
fund liquidated, no longer reporting, unable to contact the manager, closed to new in-
vestment, merged into another entity, dormant, unknown. HFR, meanwhile, has only
three categories. BarclayHedge only began collecting this information very recently. As
a result, this information is only available for a small proportion of funds, the rest are
classied as unknown.7 This is in sharp contrast to other databases such as TASS or
HFR. For example, Baquero, Horst and Verbeek (2005) used the TASS database and
7Out of 2076 funds in the graveyard, only 435 funds have a recorded reason for not reporting.
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had only a small number of funds with an unknown disappearance reason. Rouah (2005)
used the HFR database and was able to report exit information for most funds. In this
study I employ the BarclayHedge database, however, as it has the advantage of having
the widest coverage of CTAs available. The limited nature of its information on exit
types, however, renders any meaningful survival analysis all but impossible. To circum-
vent this problem several studies have proposed various methods to lter for liquidated
funds in other databases as well. Baquero, Horst and Verbeek (2005) follow Agarwal,
Daniel and Naik's (2004) quarterly ow analysis to make an assessment of the death
reason in the TASS database. Their analysis, however, concentrates on liquidation only.
Liang and Park (2010), (henceforth, LP) further make a distinction between liquida-
tion and real failure and argue that the classication provided by the databases is not
sucient. Not all liquidated funds fail. Some funds may choose to liquidate based on
the market expectations of managers, funds merging, or simply the manager retiring.
As a consequence, LP reclassify the database using a performance and fund ow lter
system. Utilizing only failed funds they are able to examine the eects that contribute
to hedge fund failure.
Survival analysis necessitates clear denition of failure. Rouah (2005) argues that
including all the graveyard funds in the database can blur the eect of predictor vari-
ables in a survival analysis. I lter all the funds following the three criteria used by
LP: all funds in the graveyard, funds with negative average rate of return in the last 6
months, funds with a decrease in assets under management (henceforth, AUM) for the
last 12 months. This study nds that these lters would miss some of the liquidated and
failed funds. In particular it failed for many small funds in our sample and for many
funds that had experienced large losses more than 12 months before the end of data.
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Case 1. A failed fund with small AUM.
I found that my sample contained a lot of funds with assets under management of less
than US$20 million. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of AUM in the CTA industry.
[Please insert Figure 1.1 here]
In fact, on average 96% of the total AUM of the industry is managed by funds with
assets above US$20 million, yet funds with less than US$20 million under management
comprise almost 70% of the total number of funds in our database. Kosowski et al.
(2007) argue that funds with less than US$20 million AUM should be excluded from the
analysis due to concerns that such funds may be too small for institutional investors.
Given the large proportion of these funds in the sample, removing them would greatly
reduce the available data. In addition, this study is concerned with establishing attrition
and failure rate which necessitates inclusion of all the available data. For the survival
model, however, it would be sensible to remove all the funds below the US$20 million
threshold.
Figure 1.2 shows an example of Fund A, a liquidated fund with small AUM. The
AUM of Fund A remained stable during the twelve months prior to dissolution yet, in
terms of downside risk measures, the fund has failed: it had negative average return in
the last six and twelve months. Liquidation for small funds is likely to happen quickly
without noticeable decline in assets, therefore it would be impossible to lter for these
funds using AUM criteria.
[Please insert Figure 1.2 here]
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Case 2. Assets lost more than 12 months before end of data.
LP's lters assume very recent failures. Some funds. however, may experience large
drawdown followed by loss of assets as investor condence fails. Still, some funds would
continue to report to the database with virtually no assets and good returns until they
nally exit. Fund B in Figure 2 is an example of a liquidated fund that continued
to report after a large drawdown and loss of assets. LP's criteria would be unable to
identify this failure as it happened prior to 12 months before dissolution.
[Please insert Figure 1.3 here]
Case 3. Failure with positive average return in the last six months.
Some funds fail and liquidate yet in the last six months may report a positive average
return as they reduce volatility in expectation of liquidation. There is an indication that
these funds still continue to report to the database before they eventually shut down.
Figure 1.4 shows an example of fund C with a negative annualized compound rate of
return, with a loss in AUM, yet it has an positive average rate of return in the last six
months.
Case 4. Failure due to a large drawdown 24 months before liquidation.
Fund C is an example of a large fund that suered a 78% drawdown and lost a majority
of its assets, yet it had a positive average return in the last six months. Such a fund
would not be picked up by LP's criteria yet it is a clear failure and should be included
in the survival model.
[Please insert Figure 1.4 here]
Ng(2008) proposes more a extensive range of lters to identify failures among hedge
funds, including the change in AUM 24 months prior to dissolution and the average
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return in the last 12 months. As has already been mentioned, data in this study is
more limited than that used in previous survival analyses since BarclayHedge does not
provide reasons for exit for most funds. This study, therefore, separates the graveyard
into funds that are still alive but stopped reporting and liquidated funds. It then sorts
liquidated funds into those that failed and funds with various discretionary closures.
This study follows Agarwal, Daniel and Naik's (2004) AUM ow analysis to make an
assessment of the liquidation. Fung et al. (2008), meanwhile, group liquidated funds
based on the relative AUM at the end of the fund's life, compared to maximum AUM.
I used several lters as it is clear from looking at the previous studies that it is unlikely
that one lter can capture all the liquidated funds. In particular I lter for liquidated
funds using either of the following criteria:
 Funds with decreased AUM in the last 12 months
 Funds with decreased AUM in the last 24 months
 Funds with very low nal AUM relative to the maximum AUM over the fund's
lifetime - I use a 70% drop as well as a 60% drop for robustness check
 Funds with AUM equal to 0 in the last month
From the above I obtain two groups of funds; liquidated and not liquidated. Funds that
are classied as liquidated by the rst set of lters are further sorted into failures or
discretionary closures. In particular I calculate the following statistics for all funds and
apply them to the \liquidated" set:
 CUM, Annualized cumulative rate of return
 Average return in the last 6, 8, 12 and 24 months
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 Annualized standard deviation over entire fund history
 Drawdown in the last 12 and 24 months
Funds that had either negative average returns in the last 6, 8, 12 or 24 months, or
negative annualized cumulative returns or a drawdown in the last 12 or 24 months that
was signicantly higher than annualized standard deviation were classied as Liquidated
Failure. The rest of the funds were classied as Liquidated Discretionary Closures. These
are the funds that liquidated for other reasons than bad performance as described in
Liang and Park (2010). To test my ltering I contacted many of the funds either by
phone or email. The majority of the funds that liquidated but did not experience
bad returns were funds that were merging into another fund in the same management
company, funds that were going through restructuring or simply a name change, or
even retirement of the principal. Hence, these funds would aect the calculation of the
liquidation rate but they would not enter into the failure rate. I also checked funds
that did not pass the liquidation lters. In many cases these were the funds that had
too small an asset base to show a drop in assets but upon contacting them and looking
at their returns it was still apparent that they liquidated. There were also some funds
that showed no decline in assets nor passed any of the return lter criteria - these were
funds that were still active but stopped reporting to the database. Compared to the
hedge fund industry the proportion of such funds is not as large, possibly because CTAs
would not suer from the same capacity issues as many hedge funds do: a topic that is
thoroughly discussed in the third chapter.
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1.2.3 Covariates & Basic Data Description
The covariates used in the survival model include average millions managed, perfor-
mance, fund age, size, lock-up provision, size volatility, and risk measures as proposed
by Liang and Park (2010). This study also adds drawdown to the risk measures. Table
1.1 presents the statistical summary of the data for 2446 funds. The average monthly
rate of return is 1.01% with a standard deviation of 6.09%. At the same time the average
skewness is positive at 0.33 and average kurtosis is 2.61. This is in contrast to the re-
ported statistics for hedge funds found in Liang and Park (2010) where the mean hedge
fund return was 0.62%, negative skewness (-0.04) and kurtosis 5.57. Consistent with
previous literature, Table 1.1 shows that live funds outperform defunct funds (\Grave-
yard funds") with a higher standard deviation on average. The graveyard funds also
have slightly higher maximum and lower minimum returns than live funds, consistent
with higher volatility of the defunct funds. In addition, Table 1.1 shows the need to
separate the exit types. Graveyard funds are further broken into liquidated funds and
funds that are alive but stopped reporting: \Not reporting funds". Liquidated funds
have signicantly lower mean monthly returns than funds that simply stopped reporting
to the database. This underlines the fact that not all funds exit due to liquidation. The
not reporting funds are also more positively skewed with lower kurtosis than liquidated
funds. In turn, as underlined earlier, not all liquidations are indeed failures as reported
in the literature. In line with this, Table 1.1 also reports descriptive statistics for fail-
ures and discretionary closures. Real failures have the lowest mean monthly return of
0.50% with the largest standard deviation of 6.91% and lowest skewness of 0.25. The
discretionary failures have a mean return that is higher than that of the live funds of
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1.52% but lower than funds that simply stop reporting. I nd that on average 41.9% of
CTAs reject the null hypothesis of normality at the 5% level. Malkiel and Saha (2005)
nd that both managed futures funds and global macro hedge funds do not reject the
Jarque-Bera test of normality.8
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Risk Measures
Standard Deviation. For each month starting January 1994, I estimate standard devia-
tion using 60 month rolling windows of previous returns. Where 60-month data is not
available a minimum of 24 months is used.
In what follows the discussion here follows closely that in Liang and Park (2010).
SEM - Semi-deviation - this measure is similar to standard deviation except that it
considers deviation from the mean only when it is negative.
SEM 
p
Efmin[(R  ); 0]2g; (1.1)
where  is the average return of the fund. SEM has been found to be a more accurate
measure for assets with non-symmetric distributions, Estrada (2001).
8See Jarque and Bera(1980).
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VaR - Value-at-Risk - is a risk measure widely used by portfolio managers which
provides a single number for the risk of loss on a portfolio. This measure allows one
to make a statement of the following form: We are (1-) percent certain that we will
not lose more than VaR(,) dollars in  days. Thus VaR uses two parameters: the
horizon (), and the condence level, (1-). I use a 95% condence level (=0.05). The
frequency of the data dictates the time horizon, which is monthly in this case. In par-
ticular, the VaR statistic can be dened as a one-sided condence interval on a portfolio
loss:
Prob[ eP (t;~x) > V aR] = 1  ; (1.2)
where  eP (t;~x) is the change in the market value of the portfolio, as a function of the
time horizon t and the vector of changes of random variables. This formulation shows
that the distribution of the portfolio returns is key. Calculation of the true distribution
is generally not feasible. VaR can be estimated using parametric techniques, however
most assume normally distributed returns. The VaR measure under this normality
assumption becomes:
VaR Normal() =  (+ z() ) (1.3)
VaR CF - The Cornish-Fisher (1973) expansion (V aR CF ) considers higher mo-
ments in the return distribution such as skewness and kurtosis. It is possible to obtain
an approximate representation of any distribution with known moments in terms of any
known distribution, for example normal distribution. Thus the Cornish-Fisher expan-
sion explicitly incorporates skewness and kurtosis, making it particularly suitable for use




() = z() +
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(z()2   1)S + 1
24
(z(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))K   1
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(2z()3   5z())S2 (1.4)
V aR CF () =  (+ 
() ) (1.5)
where  is the average return,  is the standard deviation, S is the skewness, K is the
excess kurtosis of the past 24   60 monthly returns of CTAs, (1   ) is the condence
level, and z() is the critical value from the standard normal distribution.
ES - Expected Shortfall - Another measure of risk that is included in the analy-
sis is the expected shortfall, ES. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1999) argue that
ES has superior mathematical properties to VaR. Liang and Park (2007) formally test
this for hedge funds and conrm that expected shortfall is better able to explain the
cross-section of hedge funds. Unlike VaR, ES tells us how big the expected loss could be
once VaR is breached. It is therefore more sensitive to the shape of the loss distribution
in the tail of the distribution. ES is the conditional expected loss greater or equal to
VaR, sometimes called conditional value at risk. It can be dened in terms of portfolio
return instead of notional amount and is dened as follows:













where Rt+ denotes portfolio return during periods t and t+ , and fR;t is the condi-
tional probability density function (PDF) of Rt+ . Here, FR;t denotes the conditional
CDF of Rt+ conditional on the information available at time t, F
 1R;t, and 1  is the
condence level. To compute 95% ES using the Cornish-Fisher expansion, one needs to
compute 95% VaR CF based on equation (1.4) and (1.5) and then search through the
60-month returns window to nd all the returns that are below the calculated 95% VaR.
The average of the obtained returns is ES CF with a 95% condence level. Alternative
way is to use the analytical solution due to Christoersen and Goncalves (2005). How-
ever, Liang and Park (2010) show that due to extreme skewness of some of the hedge
funds the analytical solution is not very applicable.
TR - Tail Risk - Tail Risk is known as the possibility that an investment will move
more than three standard deviations from the mean and this probability is greater than
that shown by normal distribution. Tail risk arises for assets that do not follow normal
distribution. In this context, tail risk is the standard deviation of the losses greater than
VaR from the mean, or, more formally:
TRt(; ) =
p
Et[(Rt+   Et(Rt+ ))2jRt+   V aRt(; )] (1.7)
Note that TR CF denotes Tail Risk estimated using VaR CF as a cut-o criteria.
Maximum Drawdown - Drawdown is any losing period during an investment record.
It is dened as the percent retrenchment from an equity peak to an equity valley. A
drawdown is in eect from the time an equity retrenchment begins until a new equity
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high is reached (i.e. In terms of time, a drawdown encompasses both the period from
equity peak to equity valley (Length) and the time from the equity valley to a new eq-
uity high (Recovery). Maximum Drawdown is simply the largest percentage drawdown
that has occurred in any investment data record. Diz (1999b) analyses the eect of var-
ious variables on the probability of survival of CTAs and includes maximum monthly
drawdown as one of the covariates. He nds that the maximum monthly drawdown
and the maximum time to recover from a drawdown as a percentage of a program's life
is negatively related to survival. Baba and Goko (2009) explicitly model time varying
drawdown in their survival model of hedge funds only and come to the same conclusion.
Maximum Drawdown relative to Standard Deviation - I also calculate drawdown
relative to annualized standard deviation. Annualized standard deviation is given by:
St:Dev:Annualised =
0@

















Survival analysis is concerned with analyzing the probability and time until some event
occurs. Such events are typically referred to as failures. In this context, failures are
dened as nancial distress of CTAs. In the literature the problem of hedge fund survival
and variables that aect it is addressed by the use of hazard models. The underlying
setting of these is as follows. If we denote T as a nonnegative continuous random
variable representing time to failure of a CTA. The cumulative probability distribution
is given by:
F (t) = Pr(T  t) (1.10)
F(t) is also known in the literature as the failure function. An alternative formulation,
which is at the core of the survival analysis, is the survivor function: an elapsed time
since the entry to the state at time 0. This is given as:
S(t) = 1  F (t) = Pr(T > t) (1.11)
where t is time and the survival function represents the probability of a CTA surviving
beyond time t.
The pdf is the slope of the failure function, F(t):
f(t) = lim
t!0








Both the survivor function and failure function are probabilities. In particular, the
survivor function, S(t) is a non-increasing continuous function of t with S(0)=1 and
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limt!1F(t)=0. The survivor function increases toward zero as t goes to innity. As
such, the density function, f(t) is strictly non-negative but may be greater than one.
f(t)  0 (1.13)
The hazard function h(t), known as the conditional failure rate, species the in-
stantaneous rate at which failures occur in a given interval, conditional upon the fund
surviving to the beginning of that interval. The hazard function is dened as:
h(t) = lim
t!0













where P (j) denotes the conditional probability that an event will occur and f(t) de-
notes the probability density function associated with F(t). The hazard function, there-
fore, fully species the distribution of t and subsequently the density and survivor
functions. The only restriction on the hazard rate implied by the properties of these
functions is that:
h(t)  0 (1.15)
Thus (t) may be greater than one, in the similar way that f(t) may be greater than
one. In fact there is a key relationship between these functions that underpins much of
the survival analysis. Whatever the functional form for the hazard rate, (t), one can
derive the survivor function S(t), failure function F(t) and integrated hazard rate H(t)
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Integrating both sides with respect to t and using F(0) = 1,
Z t
0
h(u)du =  ln[1  F (t)]jt0
=  ln[S(t)]
(1.17)










The term H(t) is called cumulative hazard function and measures the total amount
of risk that has accumulated up to time t whereas the hazard rate has units of 1/t.
Hazard functions have an advantage in that they have a convenient interpretation in
the regression models of survival data of the eect of the coecients. Once hazard rate is
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estimated, it is possible to then derive the survivor function using (1.18). Fundamental
to this is an appropriate estimation of the hazard rate.
There are two types of model that can be used to analyze the survival data: duration
models and discrete-time models. This study employs duration type models as they are
better able to deal with the problem of right censoring. Right censoring is the term
used to describe funds in the sample that have not failed during the observation period.
These funds are the live funds of the database and funds that have been identied as
having stopped reporting. Excluding such funds would lead to a downward bias of the
survival time since live funds are also at risk during the sample and thus contribute
information about the survival experience, Rouah (2005). Censoring, therefore occurs
because there is no information on funds that do not experience failure during the
period. An underlying assumption is that censoring is independent of the failure rates,
and observations that have been censored do not have systematically higher or lower
hazard rates that could essentially lead to biased coecient estimates, Kalbeisch and
Prentice (2002). Also included in the censoring are the funds that have dropped out of
the sample during the examination period for reasons other than failure, e.g. funds that
have merged or restructured and thus ceased to report to the database, Ng (2008).
The survival function S(t) and the hazard function h(t) can be estimated with the
use of nonparametric univariate methods as well as parametric and semiparametric
multivariate methods. Semiparametric methods are still parametric since the covariates
are still assumed to take a certain form. The nonparametric methods, on the other hand,
make no distributional assumptions and can handle right censoring. The Kaplan-Meier
(1958) or the product limit estimate is an entirely nonparametric approach. Under the
assumption of right censoring, let t1 < t2 < t3 < ::: < tj < ::: < tk < 1 represent
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observed sample survival times. Let dj denote the number of funds that exit at each tj
and let mj denote the number of censored funds at the same time interval. The risk set




(mj + dj) (1.19)
The proportion of funds that have survived to the rst observed survival time, S^(t1)
is simply one minus the number of failed funds divided by the total number at risk.









The earlier discussion has shown how one can easily derive from S(t), the hazard rate
(t) and the cumulative hazard rate H(t). These estimates, however, can only be derived
at the dates at which failures occur and therefore the resulting survivor and integrated
hazard functions are step functions. Since these are not easily dierentiable, a smoothing
kernel is used to derive the estimated hazard function. For the hazard curves, however,










The most commonly used semiparametric model is Cox's (1972) model. This focuses
on estimating the hazard function, (t) and assumes that all the funds have a common
baseline hazard rate 0(t), but the method also assumes that the covariates have multi-
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plicative eect and are able to shift the baseline hazard function. The method is widely
used due to its computational feasibility. In its basic form the Cox (1972) function is:
i(t; zi) = 0(t)e
zTi ; (1.22)
where zT is the vector of the covariates for the ith CTA, and  is a vector of regression
parameters. The model relates the eect of covariates on the hazard ratios. Cox (1972)
proposed the use of partial likelihood to estimate the model which also eliminates the
unknown baseline hazard rate and at the same time accounts for censored observations.9
The rst to apply Cox's (1972) model to hedge funds were Brown, Goetzman and
Park (2001). They found that funds with poor past performance and young funds
have an increased risk of failure. Gregoriou (2002) nds that, apart from past returns,
AUM and minimum investment also aect survival. For CTAs, the only study to apply
Cox's (1972) model is that of Gregoriou, Hubner, Papageorgiou and Rouah (2005). In
addition to past performance, volatility and assets under management, the authors also
investigate the eect of minimum investment and management fees on survival. They
nd that management fees, in particular, have a negative eect on survival. The eect
of risk, represented by standard deviation is particularly strong in their results and they
document that Cox (1972) provides a good t for their CTA data. Rouah (2005) analyses
the survival of HFR hedge funds by using various exit types provided in the graveyard.
Extending the Brown, Goetzman and Park (2001) model to multiple exit types allows
the eect of the predictor variable to be assessed for each exit type separately. Rouah
9In this context censored observations are live funds in the database.
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(2005) makes another contribution by allowing the covariates to be time dependent:
j(t; j; Z(t)) = j0(t)e
z(t)T j (1.23)
Treating explanatory variables as time dependent allows one to evaluate their impact
on survival at each instant in the lifetime of funds, rather than just the last month.
Thus Rouah (2005) nds that when volatility is treated as time dependent it increases
the risk of liquidation and, furthermore, that persistent volatility is more important in
predicting failure than short-term volatility. Brown, Goetzman and Park (2001) nd
that losing managers increases volatility in an attempt to bolster returns and this in
turn may hasten funds' liquidation. Systematic funds are unlikely to increase volatility
as the trading algorithms have set parameters and no human emotion. They are likely
to be less volatile or have a more steady volatility. If systematic funds have controlled
volatility the inclusion of risk measures is of particular interest as it may shed some light
on the dierences in survival between discretionary and systematic funds. Liang and
Park (2010) incorporate calendar time into the analysis by using the counting process
style input (CPSI) of Anderson and Gill (1982), which has a known importance for risk
measures.
The following is a list of variables used in this study:
 Risk measures
 Style eect - I use several investment styles to control for variation in liquidation
across various CTA styles. These are summarized in the appendix.
 Performance - The monthly average rate of return for the last year is used.
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 Size - The monthly average AUM during the previous year is used.
 Age - The number of months a fund has been in existence.
 Management fee
 Incentive fee
 HWM - A dummy variable is used for funds with high watermark.
I do not include a lock-up provision as most CTAs rarely use them due to the liquidity
of futures markets.
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 CTA Attrition, Liquidation and Failure Rates
Earlier literature suggests that the survival of CTAs is lower than that of hedge funds.
For example, both Liang (2004) and Getmansky, Lo and Mei (2004) found CTAs to have
higher attrition rates than hedge funds (23.5% for CTAs versus 17% for hedge funds
in Liang (2004), and 14.4% and 8.7% respectively in Getmansky, Lo and Mei (2004)).
Brown, Goetzman and Park (2001) also found that CTAs had an average annual at-
trition of 20% for the 1990-2001 period, whereas hedge funds had a rate of only 15%.
Other studies on CTAs only also support these results: Capocci (2005) and Fung and
Hsieh (1997b) document attrition rates of 19.2% and 19% respectively. Although a lot
of the previous literature indicates that CTAs have high attrition, Gregoriou et al.(2005)
suggest that these studies do not take into account the extreme market events of August
1998 and September 2001 during which CTAs provided investors with downside protec-
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tion since CTAs are found to have low correlation to equity portfolios, see Schneeweis,
Spurgin and McCarthy (1996). A recent study by Xu et al. (2010) used a longer time
frame to study attrition of both hedge funds and CTAs and found CTAs to have lower
attrition than hedge funds. Looking at a longer time period that spans multiple crisis
appears to even out and lower the attrition of CTAs.
Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 report annual frequency counts for funds entering and exit-
ing the Live database and moving into the Graveyard. Table 1.2 shows attrition rate,
liquidation and failure rates for all CTAs together whilst Tables 1.3 and 1.4 report the
same information for systematic and discretionary funds respectively. Fung and Hsieh
(1997b) do not include funds that enter and exit in the same year but this creates a
downward bias in the estimated attrition rate. Truly liquidated funds are now separated
from funds that are alive but stopped reporting which allows to calculate liquidation
rate. Since investors are negatively aected by the failed funds rather than discretionary
closures failure rate is of more interest to investors.
The average annual attrition rate across all funds for the period 1994-2009 is found to
be 17.3%. There is evidence of variation across styles: systematic funds have an average
attrition rate of 16.0%, discretionary 20.0% and options 18.6%. The options category
should be treated with caution, however, as the sample is very small. Systematic funds
appear to have the lowest attrition. The table below provides a brief summary compar-
ing the results for attrition, liquidation and failure rates.
Attrition Rate (%) Liquidation Rate (%) Failure Rate (%)
All funds: 17.3% 14.6% 11.1%
Systematic: 16.0% 13.8% 10.4%
Discretionary: 21.0% 16.3% 12.6%
Options: 18.5% 14.7% 10.6%
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The attrition rate of all the funds is consistent with the previous literature Capocci
(2005), Fung and Hsieh (1997b). The lower liquidation rates are intuitive because liqui-
dation is a subset of attrition rate and excludes funds that are alive but have discontinued
reporting to the database. Failure rate is a further subset of liquidation. The failure
rates shown above are signicantly lower than the attrition rates, but are not as low as
the 3.1% reported for hedge funds in Liang and Park (2010) and the 3-5% reported in
Rouah (2005). Interestingly, CTAs have a lower birth rate compared to hedge funds.
The birth rate in this dataset across all CTAs is 17.8%, whilst Getmansky, Lo and Mei
(2004) report a birth rate of 20.4% for hedge funds. On the other hand, discretionary
funds have a birth rate of 19.0% which is close to the one reported for hedge funds. This
is possibly because discretionary funds are similar to global macro hedge funds and are
quite dierent to systematic CTAs. To set up a proper systematic CTA requires a lot
of intensive research and model developing which serves as a signicant barrier to entry
to systematic CTAs, a feature that contributes to their lower liquidation rate.
The year-to-year attrition rates exhibit dierent patters within each category of
funds. Across all CTAs the lowest attrition rate was 11.7% in 2003, with a failure rate
of 7.9% in the same year. There is considerable variation in the attrition across the
years, however. Attrition and failure rates start to decline at the beginning of 2000 until
they rise again to an unprecedented levels (24.3%) in 2009. Discretionary CTAs have
considerably larger attrition and failure rates, with levels climbing to 30.4% for attrition
and 12.2% failure in 2009. This is much higher than the rates across systematic funds
where both attrition and failure rates are fairly stable across the years with the highest
rates, in 2009, of 21.4% and 8.3% respectively. Of note is that, contrary to the ndings
of Getmansky, Lo and Mei (2004) for hedge funds, the attrition and failure rates are
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lowest for systematic funds from 2000 to 2003. This period represents the bursting of the
technology bubble, when many hedge funds experienced bad performance. CTAs have
been documented by several studies to have performed particularly well during market
downturns, hence the decline in their failure rates Fung and Hsieh (1997b), Edwards
and Caglayan (2001).
Although the data shows relatively high attrition rates for CTAs, these estimates
are inated by the number of very small funds in the database. As shown in Figure
1.1, whereas 80% of CTA funds have assets below US$20 million, most of the assets
of the CTA industry are managed by a very small number of funds. Table 1.5 shows
attrition, liquidation and failure rates after excluding all funds with assets below US$1
million, US$10 million, US$20 million. As smaller funds are excluded, attrition, liq-
uidation and failure rates drop, to the extent that, for systematic CTAs in particular,
the failure rate approaches the 3% gure reported in Liang and Park (2010) for hedge
funds. Yet this study used more extensive lters and included a larger number of fail-
ures than in Liang and Park's (2010) study. Excluding funds with assets less than
US$20 million reduces the attrition rate to less than 10% with an even lower rate for
systematic CTAs. Given that most hedge fund studies exclude funds with less than two
years of data, which would exclude a lot of funds with small AUM, it is not surprising
that previous research on hedge funds documented low attrition rates. Capocci (2005)
included all the CTAs in his attrition analysis, hence a large attrition rate. It is likely
that funds with assets below US$1 million are traders trading their own capital and
do not constitute proper funds, yet the large number of these in the database tends to
inate the attrition rate. The results of this analysis suggest that the attrition of CTAs
is not as high as previously thought: if small funds are excluded and, in particular, if
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funds with assets below US$1 million are excluded, the attrition rate drops to 11.7%.
Liquidation and failure rates are even lower, with a failure rate approaching 3.4% for
systematic CTAs, consistent with the practitioners' view as presented in Derman (2006).
1.4.2 Non-parametric Approach: The Kaplan-Meier Analysis
of CTA Survival
This study begins its empirical analysis by measuring median survival times of CTAs
for the period 1994-2009 using the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric approach. Such anal-
ysis can help prospective investors to select funds that are more likely to survive a long
time and thus avoid liquidation. Panel A of Table 1.6 reports median survival times in
months for the unltered database across the three main CTA categories: systematic,
discretionary and options, as well as for three denitions of exit: all funds in the grave-
yard database, liquidated funds and failed funds only. Panel B shows the same results
but for data that has been ltered to exclude funds than never reached US$5 million
assets under management. This is a very basic lter that attempts to remove the large
number of very small CTAs, a problem that was discussed in section 4.1. The table
also shows the median survival times for large and small funds in each category and the
respective p-value of the Log Rank test of equality between the two groups.
The results of Table 1.6 highlight an important dierence between exit type; com-
pared to the results for other exits, median survival is longest for failed funds. In fact,
median survival also increases for liquidated funds, compared to using the entire grave-
yard, and further increases for failed funds. All exits comprises liquidated funds, merged
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funds, fraud, not reporting funds and funds that self-selected. Self-selected funds are
dened as alive funds that no longer wish to report as they are closed to new investors.
Not reporting funds are funds that are also alive but had to stop reporting for other
reasons than capacity. For example, such funds may have stopped reporting because
they now manage their own assets only, have not achieved NFA registration, are exempt,
or other reasons not related to capacity. These funds, however, comprise only a tiny
fraction of the total funds, namely just 60. Similarly, unlike hedge fund databases, the
number of the self-selected funds is rather small, just 4% compared to 11% in Liang and
Park (2010) and 10.7% in Fung et al. (2008), possibly because CTAs are unlikely to
be as aected by capacity constraints as the other hedge fund strategies.10 This study
also nds a few fraudulent funds from various website lings. Table 1.6 Panel A shows
that funds in the group \All exits" have a median survival of 4.17 years (50 months),
a result similar to the 4.42 years found in Gregoriou et al. (2005), who used the entire
graveyard in their analysis without applying any lters. For liquidated funds, median
survival drops to 4.75 years across all funds and to 5.75 years for all failed funds. This
suggests that CTAs can experience other types of exit besides failure and liquidation.
Baba and Goko (2009) show dierent survival curves for dierent exit types of hedge
funds which underlines the importance of sorting graveyard into various exits. Panel C
gives an insight into these other types of exit and their eect on median survival times.
Fraudulent funds have the shortest median survival of 2.33 years. Also, funds that are
still alive but stop reporting due to capacity constraints or other reasons have a short
median survival of 3 years, which has a downward impact on the median survival of
all exits compared to liquidated funds only. This demonstrates that funds close fairly
1099 out of 2446 funds are self selected.
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quickly once they reach enough assets. The results are further conrmed in Figure 1.5
which shows survival curves by graveyard status together with corresponding smoothed
hazard curves. Although Figure 1.5 does not include failed funds, since they form part
of the liquidated funds, it clearly demonstrates that survival and hazard curves dier
substantially across dierent exit types, with fraudulent funds having the lowest survival
curve, a result that is consistent with Brown et al. (2009) who found that funds with
high operational risks at the extreme have a half-life of less than 3.5 years.
Table 1.6 also indicates that ltering the database for very small funds that comprise
a large share of the total number of funds has an eect on funds' half-life. The median
survival across all exits is larger in Panel B than in Panel A: the median survival for
all funds and all exit types increases to 5.7 years, to 6.4 years for all liquidated funds
and to 8.9 years for all failed funds. Table 1.6 also reports on how survival time relates
to strategy variation. Systematic funds have the longest survival compared to discre-
tionary funds and options funds. This is invariant to the database used or exit type. In
particular, the median survival of failed systematic funds that are above US$5 million
is 9.5 years. For discretionary funds the median survival is 6.8 years. The superiority of
systematic funds is invariant to whether the entire or the ltered database is used and
persists across all exit types, liquidated and failed funds.
There are also signicant dierences between large and small funds. Large and small
CTAs are dened as those with mean assets in the period 1994-2009 that are above and
below the mean assets of all CTAs in the same strategy. Across all strategies, choosing
a larger fund increases the survival of a CTA. For example, the median survival of sys-
tematic liquidated funds above US$5 million is 221 months for large funds and only 72
months for small funds. The dierence is statistically signicant at the 1% signicance
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level. The dierence between large and small funds is statistically signicant across all
strategies and all funds apart from options funds in the failed and liquidated category
(Panel B). This is consistent with the ndings in Table 1.5 that shows the attrition of
larger funds dropping. Larger asset base is therefore associated with longevity.
Table 1.7 compares median survival across various strategies and two exit types, all
exits and failures only, for 892 CTAs that were ltered using a dynamic AUM lter as
proposed in Avramov, Barras and Kosowski (2010). The authors argue that few institu-
tional investors wish to represent more than 10% of a fund's assets under management.
According to the practitioner side, reported in L'habitant (2006), a typical number of
funds held by a fund of funds is about 40. Therefore the dynamic AUM cuto lter
is equal to the minimum fund size such that a \typical" fund of funds does not breach
the 10%-threshold.11 Applying this lter, the resulting cuto rises from $13 million in
1994 to $54 million in 2009. In comparison to Table 1.6, with a dynamic AUM lter
applied, the median survival increases, reinforcing the contention that larger assets are
associated with longevity. The p-value for the Log-Rank test is still signicant across
all funds and all exit types, indicating that there are still signicant dierences between
large and small funds, despite the fact that the funds have been ltered by asset size.
The median survival of all funds for all exits increased to 77 months (6.4 years) and
to 130 months (10.8 years) for failed funds. Systematic funds again have the longest
half-life across both exit types: 144 months for failed funds and 105 months for all exits,
indicating that this is the strategy with the longest longevity. This result is further
demonstrated in Figure 1.6 which shows a plot of survival and hazard curves for sys-
tematic and discretionary funds. The result also supports the earlier nding of Table 1.5
11The typical fund of funds is dened as a fund with an average AUM as measured by the fund of
funds AUM in the database which on average invests into 50 CTAs.
1.4. Empirical Results 66
where systematic CTAs were shown to have the lowest attrition and failure rates. This
points to dierences within dierent types of CTAs and supports the earlier argument
that, contrary to previous studies that grouped all CTAs, it is better to analyze these
funds by separating systematic and discretionary funds.
There are some variations with sub-strategies. Systematic trend-followers, led by
short-term trend-followers have the highest median survival; a result further supported
in Figure 1.7 which shows survival and hazard curves across dierent sub-strategies of
CTAs for 892 failed funds. This result is consistent with Capocci (2005) and Gregriou
et al. (2005) who argue that there are signicant dierence across CTA styles. Panel B
demonstrates that an investor randomly selecting a newly launching systematic short-
term trend-following fund can expect the fund to survive 12.7 years before liquidation
and failure. Choosing a large fund in this category will further increase the survival to
14.3 years (172 months), whilst a small fund will survive 9.5 years. The dierence is sta-
tistically and economically signicant at 1%. On the other hand, an investor investing
into a newly launching discretionary fundamental fund can expect the fund to survive for
7.8 years (93 months) before failing. These results are in sharp contrast to the median
survival times reported in Gregoriou et al. (2005). There the authors report survival
times that are signicantly lower than in this study, with overall survival times of just
4.42 years. This is because their study used the entire graveyard as their denition of
failure and therefore their results are only directly comparable to the results of Panel
A in Table 1.6. Neither does their study lter out small funds from the sample which
could further inuence the results. Furthermore, unlike this study, the authors follow
the strategy classication of BarclayHedge and therefore obtain very dierent results
across CTA classications. Accordingly, they nd that systematic funds have the lowest
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median survival of only 3.33 years, whereas this study nds that systematic funds have
the highest survival of 4.42 years,12 even when using the unltered database and treating
all exits as failures. The median survival time changes signicantly with dynamic AUM
ltering and using only failed funds, raising the median survival of systematic funds
to 12 years (144 months). In fact, on this approach the entire ranking is reversed. In
contrast to the approach of Gregoriou et al., Diz (1999b) uses Barclay Trading Group
for the period 1975 to 1995 and nds that systematic traders have a greater probability
of survival than discretionary. These results highlight the importance of dierent types
of exits that need to be carefully accounted for together with the need for clear strat-
egy denition that is yet to be conclusively established in the CTA space. Furthermore,
they show that using the entire graveyard as denition of failure can impart a signicant
downward bias on medial survival. Standard deviation has no impact on media survival
of CTAs which resonates with the results of Liang and Park (2010) for hedge funds.
Finally, Table 1.8 reports results of several Log-Rank tests for equality of survival
functions for each sample stratied by the covariates of interest. This table is compa-
rable to the one in Gregoriou et al. (2005) but is applied to the sample with a dynamic
AUM lter and with failure only as the exit type. Similarly to Gregoriou et al. (2005)
the results indicate that CTAs with above average mean return ( 0.95%) survive longer
as well as those with above average assets under management ( $103 million). Gre-
goriou et al. (2005), however, report lower survival times of 5.33 years and 6.16 years
respectively in comparison to 14.67 years and 12.17 years for ltered failed funds in
this study. Table 1.8 also reports that while funds with higher management fees and
incentive fees survive longer, the dierence in survival time is only statistically signi-
1253 months, from Panel A in Table VII
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cant for performance fees. This is in contrast to Gregoriou et al. (2005) who nd that
management fees positively impact survival times. Similarly to Gregoriou et al. (2005),
however, Table 1.8 reports no dierence in survival when the sample is grouped by the
standard deviation. Minimum purchase also has a very weak eect on survival times.
The results indicate that the monthly return, average funds managed and performance
fees have an important implication on the survival.
1.4.3 Cox Proportional Hazards Model
A Survival Analysis to Predict Attrition
In the remainder of the analysis the sample consisted of funds that were selected with
a dynamic AUM lter - thus reducing the sample to 892 CTAs. Table 1.9 presents the
results of tting the Cox proportional hazards model of Gregoriou et al. (2005) and fol-
lows a conventional classication that denes failure as all exits to the graveyard. The
rst column is a parameter estimate and the second reports the associated hazard ratio,
which is e for the covariate. Hazard ratio provides an easier interpretation of the level
of a covariate's inuence. For binary variables with values of 1 or 0, the hazard ratio
can be interpreted as the ratio of hazard for those with a value of 1 to the estimated
hazard for those with a value of 0, after controlling for other covariates. For quantitative
variables, the hazard ratio estimate needs to subtract 1 and multiply by 100 which gives
a percentage change in the hazard for each unit increase in the covariate, controlling for
other variables. According to Allison (1995) a simple interpretation of the estimated
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hazard ratio is that a hazard ratio greater than one implies a negative eect of the co-
variate on survival, while a hazard ratio less than one indicates a protective eect of the
covariate. The corresponding p-value reports the p-value for the Wald test of the null
hypothesis that each coecient is equal to zero. The results indicate that only three
variables have a signicant eect on survival: mean monthly return over the entire life
of the fund, average millions managed and management fees. It is found that higher
average monthly returns as well as assets under management are protective whereas
higher management fees are not. The results closely mirror the ndings of Gregoriou et
al. (2005) even though the sample in this study was ltered by asset size. Specically,
the hazard ratio of the mean return is 0.838, indicating that an increase in the monthly
return of 1% leads to 16.2% reduction in the likelihood of failure. The protective eect
of the AUM is marginal. However, every percentage point increase in the management
fee increases the likelihood of failure by 15.2%. The goodness of t provided by the
Likelihood ratio test and the Global Wald test, both are signicant, and lends support
to the accuracy of the functional form of the model.
For comparison, Table 1.10 reports the results of the Liang and Park (2010) LP
model, with failure dened as exit to the graveyard. Compared to the LP model, where
all risk measures are signicant when they are the only explanatory variables, Panel A
shows that only standard deviation and expected shortfall are signicant risk measures.
When other explanatory variables are added to the model, Panel B, standard deviation
loses its signicance but value at risk becomes signicant at 10%. This supports the
earlier results of Table 1.9 that standard deviation is not a useful measure of CTA sur-
vival. The hazard ratios of the VAR and ES are below one, which is not intuitive since
it implies that higher risk funds have lower hazards. This strengthens the argument of
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Rouah (2005) that the eect of the covariates becomes blurred when all the graveyard
funds are regarded as failures. With regard to the impact of the other variables, Table
1.10 shows that only standard deviation of the AUM, leverage, HWM and a dummy
variable for discretionary style are signicant at the 1% signicance level. Interestingly,
the hazard ratio of leverage is protective. Baba and Goko (2009) conducted a Tobit
analysis with mean leverage as the dependent variable. They found that funds with
high mean leverage also tended to have a larger AUM, a high water mark and a longer
redemption period. These factors alone can lower the hazard ratios. The hazard ratio of
high water mark in Table 1.10 is above one, indicating that CTAs with high water mark
have increased risk of failure by as much as 60%, which is contrary to the results in Liang
and Park (2010) who nd HWM to be protective. Rouah (2005) also nds that HWM
increases the risk of failure. The eect of high watermark on hedge fund survival remains
unclear with dierent authors presenting dierent results. Rouah (2005), Ng (2008) and
Lee (2010) all used the HFR database to study hedge fund survival and each found that
HWM tended to increase failure, whereas Liang and Park (2010) and Baba and Goko
(2010) analysed hedge fund survival using the TASS database and found that HWM is
protective. The authors argue that the HWM facilitates more stable fund management
as well as serves a signal quality for good managers. Liang and Park (2010) also cite
Aragon and Qian (2005) who argue that HWM lowers existing investors' marginal cost
of staying in the fund following its poor performance and hence allows fund managers
to avoid liquidation by keeping its investors. Liang (2000), Brown, Goetzmann and Ib-
botson (1999) and Rouah (2005), on the other hand, suggest that once the fund incurs
large losses it is dicult for the manager to recuperate them and attain its high water
mark and that this increases the incentive to liquidate. Gregoriou et al. (2005) do not
1.4. Empirical Results 71
include HWM in their model therefore it is impossible to obtain a direct comparison
for this study. It is more likely, however, that the eect of HWM on CTA survival is
negative, given the signicance and the size of the hazard ratio.
Table 1.10 also shows that there are some style eects: discretionary funds have a
higher hazard rate relative to systematic funds. Investing into a discretionary fund en-
tails a hazard rate 37% higher than in systematic CTAs. The explanatory power of the
mean return and mean AUM in the last year of a fund's life is weak, indicating the need
for separating exit types. In addition to reporting the signicance of the hazard ratios,
Table 1.10 also reports \Rho", which is a slope estimate for each variable of the scaled
Schoenfeld (1982) residuals against time. Under the null hypothesis of proportional
hazards, the curve is expected to have a zero slope, thus rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates a deviation from the proportional-hazards assumption. The Global Ph Wald
test is a Wald statistic that tests whether all the covariates jointly satisfy the propor-
tional hazard assumption, i.e. model specication. Apart from the model with ES as
the risk measure, the global Wald test shows that the proportional hazards assumption
is rejected as a whole at the 1% signicance level, whilst only one variable, standard
deviation of AUM, violates it.
A Survival Analysis to Predict Liquidation
The graveyard contains dierent types of exits, as reported in Table 1.6: liquidated
funds, funds that are alive but stopped reporting due to capacity constraints or simply
self-selected funds. Rouah (2005) argues that only liquidated funds should be used in
the survival analysis in order to avoid blurring the eect of predictor variables. Table
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1.11 reports the results of tting the LP Cox proportional hazards model on liquidated
funds only, that is the number of failed funds reduces to 441 from 529 and other types
of exit are treated as censored. This model shows a marginal improvement in that
both mean return and mean AUM become signicant at 1%, however neither satisfy
the proportional hazards assumption. The eect of risk measures in the univariate and
multivariate models remains unchanged. This is similar to the results of Liang and Park
(2010) who nd that a model with liquidated funds produced misleading estimates. In
what follows, therefore, the analysis concentrates only on failed funds identied with
performance and AUM lters as discussed previously.
A Survival Analysis to Predict Failure
As discussed above, using liquidated funds is still not very informative in dening fail-
ure since many funds liquidate for reasons other than bad performance, e.g. merging
with another fund. The remainder of the analysis, therefore, concentrates on the failed
funds only. Table 1.12 shows several model specications for failed funds with xed
covariates only. For comparison purposes, specication (i) includes the same variables
as in the Gregoriou et al. (2005) model but applied to failed funds only. In contrast to
Table 1.6, where all exits were treated as failure, Table 1.12 shows that the standard
deviation over the entire life of the fund is now signicant at 1% with a hazard ratio
above one. Management fee is still signicant and increases the likelihood of failure.
The second specication adds skewness, kurtosis, winning ratio,13 standard deviation of
AUM over entire life of the fund, whether the fund has a hurdle rate, employs leverage,
13The number of months with a positive return to the total number months.
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HWM and dummy variables for investment style. Skewness and kurtosis are signicant
at 5% and 10% respectively as well as the volatility of assets, leverage and the dummy
for discretionary style.14 The eect of skewness is protective: a unit increase in the
skewness decreases the hazard rate of the fund by 14%. One would expect the survival
to be positively related to the rst and third moments and negatively to the second and
fourth moments. Contrary to this expectation, however, the coecient on kurtosis is
negative indicating that it aids in survival. The eect is, however, marginal and the
covariate is not signicant in specication (iii). The eect of the winning ratio is to
decrease the hazard rate of the fund whilst management fee increases the hazard rate.
Similar to previous results, leverage is protective and discretionary funds are 57% more
likely to fail than systematic ones. The hurdle rate is insignicant and is not included
in the remaining specications due to its incomplete data.
Specication (iii) further adds maximum drawdown over the entire life of the fund.
Similar to the nding of Diz (1999b), this variable is highly signicant and increases the
hazard rate by 5% for every percentage increase in the drawdown. The hazard ratio of
the winning ratio decreases to 0.08 at 1% signicance level. The interpretation needs
care, however, as the win ratio is the number of positive returns over the total number
of returns and is therefore between 0 and 1, hence even a slight increase in this number
can dramatically increase the estimated survival. In the nal specication in Table 1.12
maximum drawdown is replaced by maximum drawdown relative to standard deviation.
It shows that once maximum drawdown reaches three times annualized standard de-
viation the hazard rate increases by as much as 213%. If the drawdown is within two
14The dummy variable for systematic style was removed to avoid perfect multicollinearity in the
estimation process. The coecient of the other two strategy dummies represents the incremental
change in hazard as compared to the default case.
1.4. Empirical Results 74
standard deviations, the eect is protective, but above two standard deviations the fund
is at risk of failure. The eect of HWM is signicant in this model - funds with high
water mark provision have an increased risk of failure by as much as 51% relative to
funds without it. The eect of discretionary funds is unchanged, but the hazard ratio
of the options funds becomes signicant at 5% and demonstrates an increased hazard
rate of the options funds relative to systematic ones.
Table 1.13 compares the ve risk measures in terms of predicting the \real failure"
of CTAs by using Liang and Park's (2010) model. Standard deviation remains an in-
signicant risk measure but semideviation, ES and TR each become signicant. In
particular, the eect of semideviation is to increase the hazard rate by 5%, whilst TR
increases the hazard rate by 2%. The eect of ES remains unclear, however, since the
hazard ratio is marginally below one. Mean return is found to be a highly signicant
covariate at the 1% level with a hazard ratio of 0.84, implying that high return funds
have a lower hazard rate of failure. The fund size, as represented by the mean assets
under management over the entire life of the fund, is signicant at 1%, however the
eect on survival is negligible. In addition this variable has a signicant Rho, indicating
that it violates the proportionality assumption. In fact both mean AUM and standard
deviation of AUM violate the proportionality assumption. The previous studies of Ng
(2008) and Lee (2010) included fund size as the natural logarithm of the fund's assets
under management at the last month. The authors argue that the eect of the fund size
on the duration is non-linear. One way to test this is to use the Martingale residuals
to test for the best functional form of the covariate. The goal is to determine the best
functional form that will result in an approximately straight curve of the martingale
residuals against the covariate. In unreported tests I plot mean AUM against martin-
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gale residuals and log AUM against martingale residuals. The log transformation of
the recent AUM yields a linear plot against martingale residuals, indicating a better t.
Given this result, I use natural logarithm of fund's assets under management at the last
month rather than just assets under management in the survival model.
Table 1.14 extends Liang and Park's (2010) model by including a larger set of co-
variates than were previously tested in the base model as well as replacing mean AUM
with the log of the last month AUM. In addition, Drawdown/STD is added as another
risk measure. The most signicant covariates, at 1% level, are mean return, fund size
represented by the log of last month AUM, standard deviation of the AUM, a dummy
for discretionary strategy and leverage. The protective eect of the mean return relative
to previous models increases with an increase in mean return over the entire life of the
fund resulting in a decrease in the hazard rate of 43%. The eect of fund size is also
much stronger now with one unit increase in size reducing the hazard rate by 15%. The
eect of standard deviation of AUM is negligible and both variables still show the rejec-
tion of the proportionality assumption with signicant Rho. The way to circumvent this
issue is by introducing these variables as time varying. Table 1.15 introduces AUM as a
time-varying variable. I also introduce another variable, asset ow, Flow(t). Following
Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2009) monthly ow is dened as:
DollarF lowi;m = AUMi;m   AUMi;m 1 (1 +Returni;m) (1.24)
which is then scaled by the previous month's assets under management as in Sirri and
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Baba and Goko (2009) are the rst to include a ow variable in the survival analysis
which they justify by the return-chasing behaviour of investors, where investors ock to
funds with good recent performance and withdraw funds from poorly performing funds
(Chan et al. 2006). Agarwal et al. (2009) also document that money ows chase good
recent performance and nd that this relationship is in fact convex. However, they also
nd that larger funds with greater inows are associated with poorer future performance
underlining that hedge funds face diminishing returns to scale. Baba and Goko (2009)
nd the eect of Flow to be protective, i.e. recent inows contribute to lower liquidation
probabilities. Table 1.15 shows that whilst the eect of time-varying AUM is signicant,
the eect on survival is marginal whereas the protective eect of Flow is signicant at
1% and is indeed much stronger than documented in Baba and Goko (2009), with a
hazard ratio of 0.12. The eect of other variables seems to be unchanged: mean return,
skewness, winning ratio, management fee and leverage all remain signicant. HWM
is no longer signicant, whilst the incentive fee and minimum investment also remain
insignicant. With the inclusion of time-varying AUM and Flow, SEM, ES and TR
remain signicant and VAR gains signicance at 10%. The Likelihood ratio increases
to 289.10 compared to 199.02 in Table 1.14 indicating an overall improvement in the
model. Finally Table 1.16 adds ten dummy variables of which the eleven's strategy,
Fundamental and Technical, was removed to avoid perfect multicollinearity in the esti-
mation process.15 The coecient of the other ten strategies represent the incremental
change in the hazard as compared to the default case, the fundamental and technical
strategy. For example, the hazard ratio of short-term trend followers is 0.41, meaning it
is 59% less likely to fail than discretionary CTAs employing a fundamental and technical
15Table 1.16 presents only the results for standard deviation, TR and drawdown/STD. The results
of the model with the remaining risk measures are omitted to save space.
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approach. The results indicate that only a few strategies are signicant at the 1% level:
short-term and medium-term trend followers. The coecient on discretionary CTAs
with a fundamental approach is signicant in the models with TR and Drawdown/STD
as risk measures, and systematic counter trend funds are 150% more likely fail than
the default strategy. This is easy to understand since it is a rather dicult strategy to
implement, as evidenced by the small number of counter trend funds.
Of particular interest in the above is the negative relationship between management
fee and survival. The results across all tables demonstrate that, on average, an increase
in management fee leads to an approximately 15% increase in the hazard rate. This
is similar to the result in Gregoriou et al. (2005) but the eect is stronger for failed
funds only. Baba and Goko (2009), however, nd that the eect is reversed for hedge
funds where management fee is protective whilst incentive fee is not. HWM becomes
insignicant when time-varying AUM and Flow are added to the model.
1.4.4 Robustness Checks
In unreported results I test to see if my results are aected by changes in the condence
level of the risk measures or the use of dierent estimation models.
Changing the condence level of the risk measures
The results above are further examined to determine if they are aected by the con-
dence level chosen to calculate VAR, ES and TR. Current results present a 95% con-
dence level. The results at the 99% condence level are not much dierent to the results
presented earlier. Standard deviation still appears to be insignicant in predicting real
failure whilst SEM, ES and TR are signicant at the 5% level.
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The Probit Model
Malkiel and Saha (2005) and Brown et al. (2001) use a probit model to estimate the
eect of variables on hedge fund survival. Using a probit model on the 817 funds for
failure and attrition shows that results are not dissimilar to the Cox (1972) model. Stan-
dard deviation is still less ecient at predicting survival than other risk measures.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed the factors aecting CTA survival. It included a wide range
of variables with particular emphasis on various downside risk measures as well as AUM
and capital ows. In addition, it has oered an improvement in methodology when com-
pared to previous studies on CTA survival. In contrast to previous survival analyses that
incorporated only xed covariates, this study included time varying covariates which al-
lowed to evaluate their impact at each instant of a fund's lifetime rather than during
the entire lifetime or the last 12 months. This study also adopted a novel CTA strategy
classication that allowed for interesting comparisons between discretionary and sys-
tematic CTAs. Finally, it has taken into account the dierent exit types that CTAs can
experience. It used a combination of various lters and hand-collected information to
determine exit types. Further, an updated ltering methodology was proposed to screen
for failed funds among CTAs. Based on this extensive data collection, the attrition rate
and factors aecting CTA survival are investigated.
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The main results demonstrate that the entire graveyard is a poor measure of CTA
failure and it is therefore important to account for dierent exit types. Whilst attrition
of CTAs is as high as 17.8%, similar to the rate for all hedge funds, the average per-
centage of liquidated funds is lower at 14.6%. However, once the real failures among
the liquidated funds are distinguished, the rate drops to 11.1% suggesting that there
are many discretionary liquidations that are not damaging to investors. As such this
study develops lters to discriminate between failed funds. It also nds that the CTA
database contains a large number of small funds with assets that are less than US$20
million. Institutional investors are unlikely to invest into such small funds and if they
are removed from the sample the real failure rate drops to 3.9%, which is comparable to
the failure rate reported for hedge funds. The failure rate for CTAs is therefore not as
high as previously thought. Systematic CTAs are also found to have a lower failure rate
than discretionary ones, 3.4% vs. 5.8%. This study also demonstrates that the attrition
rate during the 2008 nancial crisis climbed to an unprecedented level.
Further, the median survival time of large failed funds is found to be 10.8 years,
which is higher than the previously reported median survival of 4.42 years in Gregoriou
et al. (2005) and of 2 years reported in Brown et al. (2001). Spurgin (1999) has used the
MAR CTA database over a shorter period and reports a survival time of approximately
5 years. My results show that an average systematic CTA has a median survival of 12
years compared to 8.33 years for a failed discretionary fund. Assets under management
have an eect on survival as well, with larger funds having signicantly higher median
survival times when compared to smaller funds.
Using Cox's (1972) model with time-varying covariates the results show that stan-
dard deviation is not a good risk measure in terms of predicting CTA failure. Measures
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such as SEM and TR as well as maximum drawdown are better able to account for
non-normality of CTA returns. Apart from variables such as performance and assets
under management, asset ows into the funds have a positive eect on CTA survival.
Funds that experience signicant asset outows have a higher chance of liquidation.
Contrary to the ndings of Liang and Park (2010) for hedge funds, the presence of a
high water mark has a negative eect on CTA survival. Management fees increase the
probability of failure whilst leverage has a protective eect. The eect of leverage could
possibly be explained by the ndings of Brown et al. (2009) as further discussed in
Brown, Goetzmann, Liang and Schwarz (forthcoming), who nd that funds with higher
operational risks are less able to raise leverage since prime brokers and lenders are less
willing to lend to funds that they perceive as risky. Conversely, funds that are more
able to borrow may have less operational risk and thus lower liquidation probabilities.
The results also show that funds with lower skewness, lower winning ratio and higher
maximum drawdown have higher failure rates. Finally, there are important dierences
across CTA styles, with systematic CTAs and in particular systematic trend-followers




SYSTEMATIC - funds that employ purely systematic approach to trading, utiliz-
ing computer models that are mainly based on technical analysis of the market
data and fundamental economic data. Trading can be diversied across many
markets, including foreign exchange, interest rates, commodity, bond and equity
markets. Manager intervention is limited. The core of systematic trading lies in
strict management of volatility. \Diversied program is a diversied portfolio of
more than 120 international futures and forwards markets employing a computer
based system. The system has been developed based on the basis of a sophisticated
statistical analysis of past price movements and seeks to prot from the tendency
of the markets to trend." Winton Capital Management, Ltd.
Trend-following - by far the most represented strategy among systematic funds.
This is a strategy that tries to take advantage of price movements in a systematic
way and aims to work on the market trend, taking benet from both up markets
and down markets. \Bluetrend fund is a systematic, trend-following black box
fund, which trades on a 24 hour cycle and seeks to successfully identify trends."
BlueCrest Capital Mgmt, LLP.
Trend-following - Short-term - Systematic trend-follower with a short-term
time frame of anything from intra-day trading up to one week.
Trend-following - Medium-term - Systematic trend-follower with a medium-
term time frame of anything from one week to 30 days. \Rotella Sirius Fund,
LLC utilizes a multi-model approach targeting medium-term and long-term trends
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in global commodity, interest rate, currency and equity index markets. Sirius's
average holding period is 25-50 days."
Trend-following - Long-term - Systematic trend-follower with a long-term
time frame from one month to several months.
Pattern Recognition - Systematic trading that bases its approach on statistical
pattern recognition in a variety of markets, utilizing a particular eld of computer
science concerned with recognizing patterns. \The trader exploits non-random
price behaviour by quantitative analysis of price patterns. Its approach is en-
tirely systematic. The systems are applied to more than 100 dierent product-
market-combinations. Advanced correlation analysis safeguards portfolio balance."
Transtrend.
Spread/Relative Value - a systematic approach to arbitrage and relative value
trading. Relative Value Arbitrage is a market neutral strategy that seeks to exploit
pricing ineciencies between related securities and markets, including equities, op-
tions, debt and futures. Managers tend to use mathematical models and technical
analysis.
Counter Trend - systematic trading that takes advantage of price movements by
adopting a contrarian approach to the trends. \The Financials Program employs
a quantitative, primarily contrarian, short-term strategy. RGNCM'S method cap-
tures changes in the psychology of market participants and has been particularly
successful during volatile and declining equity and xed income markets" R.G.
Niederhoer Capital Management.
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DISCRETIONARY - whereas systematic trading uses a xed set of rules to deter-
mine trade entries and direction, the discretionary trader is not bound by any
rules. In essence the trader uses his own judgement and evaluation of the market
indicators, fundamental information, etc. to determine the value of the indicator
and decides the point of entry, size of investment and level of risk taking.
Fundamental - discretionary trading that focuses on the analysis of fundamentals
to inform investment decisions. Programs may focus on one market only or di-
versied markets. \Albion utilizes a fundamental based discretionary approach to
trade the major currencies." Albion Currency Advisors, Ltd
Technical - discretionary trading that uses technical analysis, such as charts and
price patterns, with most trading executed by the manager. Some funds may
utilize computer based systems to look for price patterns but ultimately all the
trading is executed by the manager.
Fundamental and Technical - a mixture of fundamental and technical analyses
with manager discretion.
Discretionary Spread/RV - exploiting arbitrage opportunities with manager dis-
cretion.
OPTIONS STRATEGIES
Options Writing - programs that rely on selling or writing options.
Options Other - programs that utilize options trading other than selling. \Re-
ects the performance of the Options Program - an intermediate term market neu-
tral anti-trend following approach combining 60% fundamental and 40% technical
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Table 1.2: Attrition, Liquidation and Failure Rate of CTAs
Table 1.2 compares attrition, liquidation and failure rates across all CTAs. The data is from
the BarclayHedge database for the sample period from January 1994 to December 2009.
Attrition means all funds that are moved from the Live database into the Graveyard database.
Liquidation rate includes all the funds that have liquidated as dened using several criteria.
Failure is the real failure of those liquidated funds that have not experienced liquidation for
discretionary reasons.
Year Year Entry Exit Stopped Liquidated Failure Year Birth Liquidation Failure Attrition
Start Reporting End Rate Rate Rate Rate
1993 663
1994 663 113 111 8 103 84 665 17.0% 15.5% 12.7% 16.7%
1995 665 113 131 14 117 92 647 17.0% 17.6% 13.8% 19.7%
1996 647 101 133 13 120 92 615 15.6% 18.5% 14.2% 20.6%
1997 615 89 120 12 107 78 584 14.5% 17.4% 12.7% 19.5%
1998 584 91 104 11 93 63 571 15.6% 15.9% 10.8% 17.8%
1999 571 116 102 9 93 72 585 20.3% 16.3% 12.6% 17.9%
2000 585 83 103 7 96 68 565 14.2% 16.4% 11.6% 17.6%
2001 565 85 84 11 72 56 566 15.0% 12.7% 9.9% 14.9%
2002 566 126 69 5 63 50 623 22.3% 11.1% 8.8% 12.2%
2003 623 135 73 10 63 49 685 21.7% 10.1% 7.9% 11.7%
2004 685 162 86 7 79 57 761 23.6% 11.5% 8.3% 12.6%
2005 761 187 119 13 106 87 829 24.6% 13.9% 11.4% 15.6%
2006 829 178 147 28 119 99 860 21.5% 14.4% 11.9% 17.7%
2007 860 161 147 27 120 97 874 18.7% 14.0% 11.3% 17.1%
2008 874 131 179 40 138 85 826 15.0% 15.8% 9.7% 20.5%
2009 826 64 201 46 107 83 689 7.7% 13.0% 10.0% 24.3%
Total 1935 1909 261 1596 1212 Average 17.8% 14.6% 11.1% 17.3%
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Table 1.3: Attrition, Liquidation and Failure Rate of Systematic CTAs
Table 1.3 compares attrition, liquidation and failure rates across Systematic CTAs. The data
is from the BarclayHedge database for the sample period from January 1994 to December
2009. Attrition means all funds that are moved from the Live database into the Graveyard
database. Liquidation rate includes all the funds that have liquidated as dened using several
criteria. Failure is the real failure of the liquidated funds that have not experienced liquidation
for discretionary reasons.
Year Year Entry Exit Stopped Liquidated Failure Year Birth Liquidation Failure Attrition
Start Reporting End Rate Rate Rate Rate
1993 410
1994 410 60 55 5 50 42 415 14.6% 12.2% 10.2% 13.4%
1995 415 74 81 8 73 58 408 17.8% 17.6% 14.0% 19.5%
1996 408 64 73 8 65 50 399 15.7% 15.9% 12.3% 17.9%
1997 399 65 62 6 56 42 402 16.3% 14.0% 10.5% 15.5%
1998 402 67 68 9 59 38 401 16.7% 14.7% 9.5% 16.9%
1999 401 84 73 7 66 52 412 20.9% 16.5% 13.0% 18.2%
2000 412 47 66 1 65 45 393 11.4% 15.8% 10.9% 16.0%
2001 393 69 50 3 47 34 412 17.6% 12.0% 8.7% 12.7%
2002 412 82 48 1 46 36 446 19.9% 11.2% 8.7% 11.7%
2003 446 88 55 8 47 37 479 19.7% 10.5% 8.3% 12.3%
2004 479 110 56 2 54 40 533 23.0% 11.3% 8.4% 11.7%
2005 533 124 87 8 79 65 570 23.3% 14.8% 12.2% 16.3%
2006 570 97 111 21 90 74 556 17.0% 15.8% 13.0% 19.5%
2007 556 83 85 12 73 57 554 14.9% 13.1% 10.3% 15.3%
2008 554 62 97 22 75 50 519 11.2% 13.5% 9.0% 17.5%
2009 519 26 111 19 60 43 434 5.0% 11.6% 8.3% 21.4%
Total 1202 1178 140 1005 763 Average 16.6% 13.8% 10.4% 16.0%
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Table 1.4: Attrition, Liquidation and Failure Rate of Discretionary CTAs
Table 1.4 compares attrition, liquidation and failure rates across Discretionary CTAs. The
data is from the BarclayHedge database for the sample period from January 1994 to December
2009. Attrition means all funds that are moved from the Live database into the Graveyard
database. Liquidation rate includes all the funds that have liquidated as dened using several
criteria. Failure is the real failure of the liquidated funds that have not experienced liquidation
for discretionary reasons.
Year Year Entry Exit Stopped Liquidated Failure Year Birth Liquidation Failure Attrition
Start Reporting End Rate Rate Rate Rate
1993 244
1994 244 49 54 3 51 40 239 20.1% 20.9% 16.4% 22.1%
1995 239 37 49 6 43 34 227 15.5% 18.0% 14.2% 20.5%
1996 227 31 55 4 51 38 203 13.7% 22.5% 16.7% 24.2%
1997 203 20 53 4 48 34 170 9.9% 23.6% 16.7% 26.1%
1998 170 20 33 2 31 24 157 11.8% 18.2% 14.1% 19.4%
1999 157 26 29 2 27 20 154 16.6% 17.2% 12.7% 18.5%
2000 154 25 34 5 29 21 145 16.2% 18.8% 13.6% 22.1%
2001 145 9 31 7 23 20 123 6.2% 15.9% 13.8% 21.4%
2002 123 39 19 4 15 12 143 31.7% 12.2% 9.8% 15.4%
2003 143 34 12 1 11 8 165 23.8% 7.7% 5.6% 8.4%
2004 165 40 25 4 21 16 180 24.2% 12.7% 9.7% 15.2%
2005 180 41 30 5 25 21 191 22.8% 13.9% 11.7% 16.7%
2006 191 66 27 5 22 21 230 34.6% 11.5% 11.0% 14.1%
2007 230 60 52 14 38 33 238 26.1% 16.5% 14.3% 22.6%
2008 238 49 50 11 38 20 237 20.6% 16.0% 8.4% 21.0%
2009 237 25 72 24 35 29 190 10.5% 14.8% 12.2% 30.4%
Total 571 625 101 508 391 Average 19.0% 16.3% 12.6% 21.0%
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Table 1.5: Attrition, Liquidation and Failure Rate Across Styles by AUM
Table 1.5 compares attrition, liquidation and failure rates across CTA styles. The data is
from the BarclayHedge database for the sample period from January 1994 to December 2009.
Attrition means all funds that are moved from the Live database into the Graveyard database.
Liquidation rate includes all the funds that have liquidated as dened using several criteria.
Failure is the real failure of the liquidated funds that have not experienced liquidation for
discretionary reasons.
CTA Style Birth Rate Attrition Rate Liquidation Rate Failure Rate
All funds
All CTAs 17.8% 17.3% 14.6% 11.1%
Discretionary 19.0% 19.9% 16.3% 12.6%
Systematic 17.8% 16.0% 13.8% 10.4%
Excluding funds with AUM less than US$1 million.
All CTAs 16.4% 14.1% 11.7% 8.6%
Discretionary 17.5% 16.6% 13.4% 10.3%
Systematic 15.4% 13.1% 11.0% 8.0%
Excluding funds with AUM less than US$10 million.
All CTAs 14.7% 8.5% 6.8% 4.6%
Discretionary 16.5% 10.8% 8.3% 5.9%
Systematic 13.4% 7.8% 6.3% 4.1%
Excluding funds with AUM less than US$20 million.
All CTAs 14.6% 8.2% 6.5% 3.9%
Discretionary 16.3% 10.3% 7.9% 5.8%


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7: Kaplan-Meier Estimated Median Survival Times (Half-Life) by
Strategy and Exit Type for 892 Funds Filtered by Dynamic AUM
Table 1.7 reports Kaplan-Meier median survival time in months along with the standard error
(S.E.) for 892 funds selected with a dynamic AUM lter. Large and small funds are those
CTAs that had mean assets for the period January 1994 to December 2009 that were above
or below the mean assets of all funds in the same strategy. The Log-Rank p-value is for the
Log-Rank test for equality of the survival functions of the large funds and small funds groups.
In Panel A survival time is dened as time until exit into the graveyard whilst Panel B shows
the survival times for the funds ltered for failure. Cells marked n/a denote strata with
insucient liquidations to obtain estimates. Counter Trend and Vol. Arb. are not included
due to insucient data.
Panel A: All Exits All Funds Large Funds Small Funds Log Rank
Median S.E. Median S.E. Median S.E. p-Value
Options 98 19.19 66 4.9 98 13.21 0.7633
Short-Term Trend 97 9.39 204 30.72 68 8.51 <0.0001
Medium-Term Trend 92 6.01 n/a n/a 83 5.67 <0.0001
Long-Term Trend 90 12.63 165 9.86 77 10.6 0.0719
Pattern Recognition 89 16.11 n/a n/a 84 15.87 0.1457
Fundamental 75 4.00 162 45.24 71 5.83 0.0752
Discretionary Spread/RV 67 11.19 83 13.15 52 10.01 0.7817
Systematic Spread/RV 63 10.43 106 18.06 60 3.07 0.0336
Fundamental and Technical 62 4.97 98 6.56 59 4.83 0.201
Technical 57 4.04 52 12.25 58 6.36 0.9045
Systematic 105 19.56 204 22.78 77 3.09 <0.0001
Discretionary 65 4.00 98 15.26 60 3.93 0.0238
Options 98 19.19 66 4.90 98 13.21 0.7633
All Funds 77 2.89 162 16.78 71 2.40 <0.0001
Panel B: Failed Funds All Funds Large Funds Small Funds Log Rank
Median S.E. Median S.E. Median S.E. p-Value
Short-Term Trend 152 16.98 160 20.5 128 16.07 <0.0001
Medium-Term Trend 145 11.18 n/a n/a 119 11.16 <0.0001
Long-Term Trend 141 12.57 n/a n/a 124 21.38 0.0307
Pattern Recognition 127 15.38 n/a n/a 109 14.51 0.1056
Discretionary Spread/RV 125 2.93 n/a n/a 125 2.94 0.6224
Systematic Spread/RV 106 18.58 130 24.73 76 16.24 0.1038
Options 105 n/a n/a n/a 105 n/a n/a
Technical 97 16.56 52 n/a 97 16.65 0.9698
Fundamental and Technical 96 34.39 176 6.73 81 23.37 0.4396
Fundamental 93 28.99 162 14.76 77 11.44 0.2979
Systematic 144 8.44 172 9.61 114 8.79 <0.0001
Discretionary 100 11.14 163 6.01 93 12.57 0.0714
Options 105 10.11 98 11.2 105 9.58 0.5873
All Funds 130 7.67 136 8.78 109 6.30 <0.0001
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Table 1.8: Log Rank Test for CTAs Above and Below the Median for 892
funds ltered by dynamic AUM
Table 1.8 reports median values of the covariates together with median survival times for
funds above and below median covariate values for the period January 1994 to December
2009. The Log-Rank p-value is for the Log-Rank test for equality of the survival functions of
the two groups.
50% Survival in Years
Variable Median Value Above Below Chi-Square p-Value
Mean Monthly Return 0.95% 14.67 8.25 37.87 <0.0001
Average Millions Managed $103.00 12.17 9.08 48.25 <0.0001
Standard Deviation 4.53% 10.33 12.00 0.64 0.4227
Performance Fees 20.06% 13.42 10.42 3.21 0.0732
Management Fees 2.00% 10.83 6.42 0.1 0.7535
Minimum Purchase $1,922,391 12.08 10.75 2.91 0.088
Table 1.9: Hazard ratios for the GHPR (2005) Cox PH Model for Attrition
Table 1.9 reports results for the Gregoriou, Hubner, Papageorgiou and Rouah (2005) Cox
proportional hazards model for the period January 1994 to December 2009. Included are
the coecient estimates, , hazard ratios, condence intervals, Chi-square and corresponding
p-values for the two-tailed test of a regression coecient equal to zero. Also included are the
Likelihood ratio test and the Wald test, both measuring the goodness of t of the model.
Variable Coecient Hazard Ratio Condence Intervals Chi-square p-Value
Mean monthly return -0.177 0.838 (.709, .990) -2.07 0.038
Average millions -0.003 0.997 (.996, .998) -5.77 <0.0001
Standard deviation 0.001 1.001 (.999, 1.001) -0.43 0.669
Incentive fees -0.016 0.984 (.959, 1.010) -1.22 0.222
Management fees 0.142 1.152 (1.052, 1.263) 3.04 0.002
Minimum purchase -0.001 0.999 (.996, 1.001) -0.98 0.328
Likelihood ratio test (21) 91.53***











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.16: Survival Analysis for All Strategies
Table 1.16 reports coecient estimates,  and hazard ratios from the Cox (1972) PH model
for the period January 1994 to December 2009. The table includes models with xed and time
varying covariates and includes 12 strategies. Failure is dened based on the performance
and size criteria dened previously. ***, **, and * denote that the coecient estimate and
the hazard ratios are statistically signicant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Also
included are tests measuring the goodness of t of the model. The Global Ph test is a Wald
test that tests if all the variables jointly satisfy the proportional hazard assumption. Rho is
a slope coecient estimate of Schoenfeld residuals of each variable against time and tests if
each variable satises the proportional hazard assumption.
Variable Hazard Rho Hazard Rho Hazard Rho
Ratio Ratio Ratio
Model STD TR Drawdown/
STD
Risk measure 1.03 -0.05 1.06*** -0.01
D1 (drawdown/STD >1) 0.51*** -0.06
D2 (drawdown/STD >2) 1.01** 0.10*
D3 (drawdown/STD >3) 1.00* 0.05
Mean return 0.50*** 0.10** 0.46*** 0.07* 0.52*** 0.12***
Skewness 0.84** 0.01 0.90 0.03 0.76*** 0.05
Kurtosis 0.98 0.07 0.97** 0.08 0.98 0.02
Winning ratio 0.20* -0.06 0.31 -0.04 0.05*** -0.03
AUM(t) 0.99*** 0.01 0.99*** 0.02 0.99*** 0.03
Flow(t) 0.12*** -0.08* 0.12*** -0.08 0.12*** -0.08
Management fee 1.16** -0.02 1.14** -0.03 1.17*** -0.03
Incentive fee 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.02 1.00 0.01
Leverage 0.22** -0.03 0.23** -0.03 0.22** -0.03
HWM 1.15 0.02 1.19 0.02 1.08 0.01
Min. investment 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.01
D1 (Fundamental) 0.65 0.11** 0.62* 0.11* 0.62* 0.07
D2 (Technical) 0.94 0.03 0.94 0.04 0.84 0.01
D3 (Disc Spread/RV) 0.80 0.08 0.84 0.08 0.86 0.04
D4 (Options) 0.84 0.02 0.95 0.02 0.85 0.02
D5 (Pattern Rec.) 0.66 0.06 0.66 0.06 0.59 0.06
D6 (Counter Trend) 2.50* 0.04 2.50* 0.05 2.40 0.04
D7 (Systematic Spread/RV) 1.03 0.09 0.99 0.10* 1.00 0.08
D8 (Short-term) 0.41*** -0.06 0.42*** -0.05 0.41*** -0.07
D9 (Medium-term) 0.48*** 0.07 0.48*** 0.08 0.48*** 0.05
D10 (Long-term) 0.67* 0.07 0.65 0.07 0.68 0.07
Likelihood ratio test (21) 308.74*** 311.86*** 323.37
Global Ph Wald test 26.39 26.49 37.78
1.6. Appendix 101
Figure 1.1: Assets Under Management for CTA Industry, 1994-2009.
Figure 1.1 shows the growth of the assets under management for the entire CTA industry
starting from January 1994 and ending in December 2009. Included are the onshore and










Figure 1.2: Failed Fund with Small AUM
Figure 1.2 shows VAMI and AUM for a fund that failed in terms of downside risk measures
and had negative return in the last six months yet its assets remained stable. Such a fund
would not be caught by Liang and Park's (2010) lter. Source: PerTrac Analytical Platform.
!
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Figure 1.3: Fund With Lost Assets More Than 12 Months Before End of
Data
Figure 1.3 shows VAMI and AUM for a fund whose assets dropped prior to 12 months before




Figure 1.4: Fund With Positive Average Return in the Last Six Months
Figure 1.4 shows VAMI and AUM for a fund which experienced a large drawdown of 78.24%
and a loss of assets yet in the last six months prior to termination its average return was




Figure 1.5: Non-Parametric Survival and Hazard Curves































NOT REPORTING SELF SELECTED
Smoothed Hazard Curve by Graveyard Status for Attrition All 2446 Funds
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Figure 1.6: Non-Parametric Survival and Hazard Curves
Figure 1.6 shows survival and hazard curves for 892 funds ltered by dynamic AUM. The
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Figure 1.7: Non-Parametric Survival and Hazard Curves
Figure 1.7 shows survival and hazard curves for 892 funds ltered by dynamic AUM. The
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Chapter 2
Performance and Persistence of
Commodity Trading Advisors
2.1 Introduction
In the last few years we have witnessed a major downturn in the world economy and
nancial markets. Many institutional investors have been hit by signicant losses from
their investments across multiple asset classes including hedge funds. Whilst the hedge
fund industry had been growing at an impressive rate over the last decade, the nancial
crisis led to a signicant outow of assets following disappointing returns. The nancial
crisis is clearly not over with economies plunging into deep recessions across many parts
of the world. In such an uncertain economic environment institutional and private in-
vestors are faced with dicult asset allocation decisions since even hedge funds which
until recently were considered to be market neutral have been hit with signicant losses.
With rising total debt levels across major economies such as the US, UK and EU, the
risks of deation or hyperination are high. There is however an asset class that is bet-
ter suited to such an environment. Faced with such uncertainty investors may benet
from investing in the most liquid of instruments such as futures.
Managed futures are also commonly referred to as CTAs and are a particular subset
of the hedge fund universe with many regulatory features and characteristics similar to
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that of hedge funds. Hedge funds and CTAs have been attracting increased interest from
academics and investors. Baquero et al. (2005) document that long/short equity and
managed futures were the most popular investment styles among hedge funds during
1990-2000 period. Although the number and assets under management of CTAs have
seen a dramatic growth in the past 20 years, there is little consensus in the empirical lit-
erature on the performance and persistence of managed futures. The earliest studies of
Elton, Gruber and Rentzler (1987, 1989 and 1990) on Commodity Pool Operators have
concluded that publicly traded commodity pools are unable to generate any superior
performance and most of the performance is retained by the managers through fees.1 A
recent study by Bhardwaj et al. (2008) mirrors the ndings of Elton et al. (1990) and
concludes that net of fees returns of CTAs fail to signicantly exceed those of T-bills.
Other authors, however, have argued that CTAs do outperform the market and that
numerous CTAs show persistence over a horizon of at least three months, Gregoriou
et al. (2010) and Capocci (2005). Edwards and Caglayan (2001), Liang (2003) and
Schneeweis and Georgiev (2002) have further demonstrated that unlike hedge funds,
CTAs oer signicant protection in down markets and have higher returns with an
inverse correlation to equity markets during downturns. Consequently, they conclude
that institutional investors should use CTAs as a hedging instrument in their portfolio
construction.
These recent ndings raise some interesting questions. In light of the negative pub-
licity of CTAs oered by Elton et al. (1990), what is the average performance of CTAs
and does an average CTA have any ability to deliver alpha? If not, are there any CTAs
in the cross section that are capable of delivering alpha and if so does that performance
persist? What are the factors that are driving this performance and persistence?
To answer these questions, this study employs data on a large-cross section of CTAs
with a novel strategy classication to shed light on the performance and persistence of
1Commodity Pool Operators are entities that accept funds for the purpose of trading commodity
futures contracts. A CPO can make its own trading decisions but will frequently contract CTAs. Both
CPOs and CTAs are regulated by the US federal government through the CFTC and an oversight from
NFA. (From http://richard-wilson.blogspot.com/2009/07/what-is-commodity-pool-operator.html).
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CTA managers between 1990 and 2010. This twenty year period is the longest studied in
the CTA literature and spans both bull (pre 2000 and 2007) and bear markets, including
several nancial crises: the Russian default crises of 1998, the burst of the tech bubble
in Spring 2000 as well as the credit crisis of 2008-2009. In this study CTAs are classied
according to two major style groups: systematic or discretionary. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that this is indeed the industry practice within most CTAs. A recent article in
the Financial Times discusses the benets of the two strategies2. Previous studies, Bil-
ligsley and Chance (1996), Brown et al. (2001), Diz (1999), etc., have all studied CTAs
as a single group. In contrast, more recent studies such as those of Capocci (2005)
and Gregoriou et al. (2010) have studied CTAs according to sub-categories reported in
BarclayHedge database. Apart from Kazemi and Li (2009), none of these studies have
separated CTAs into two main trading styles: systematic and discretionary. In fact, the
confusion arises as most CTAs are reportedly trend followers with many CTAs utilizing
proprietary trading models to capture trends in the markets using futures. Yet the fun-
damental dierence in the types of funds lies in the way they trade. Systematic CTAs
base their trading on technical models and all the execution is automated via trading
algorithms. This has been facilitated by an incredible growth in computing power which
has had a profound impact on the world of trading; exchanges are becoming electronic,
the power of computers continues to improve and the data they generate is becoming
more accessible and easily stored. The traders at the frontier of this technological revo-
lution are the systematic or algorithmic CTAs that trade highly liquid, exchange traded
instruments. In contrast discretionary CTAs involve a certain amount of human judge-
ment and manager discretion.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the performance and persistence of sys-
tematic and discretionary CTAs in light of recent market conditions by employing new
robust methodologies that are current in the hedge fund literature. Before using CTA
data, one must address and minimize biases such as survivorship and instant history
biases. These biases are well documented in the literature and arise from the lack of
2See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f37adf8e-aeeb-11e1-a4e0-00144feabdc0.htmlaxzz1xPRQ74tf
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uniform reporting standards3. I update earlier results on the eect of these biases on
performance and nd that results are consistent with the earlier literature. The perfor-
mance of the average CTA is investigated on an equal and value-weighted basis after
adjusting for these biases.4 CTAs are found to add value, even after fees, with large
systematic CTAs having superior performance to their discretionary counterparts. The
value-weighted portfolio, which represents the performance of the overall industry of
systematic CTAs delivers higher cumulative returns than many of the market indices.
Next, this study examines the ability of CTAs to deliver alpha over the period 1990-
2010. By further looking at the performance of funds in the cross-section this study
aims to determine if systematic CTAs have more skill than discretionary CTAs. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that the lack of emotion and the ability to diversify easily across
many markets may allow systematic CTAs to deliver better returns than discretionary
funds. Finally, this study aims to answer the question of performance persistence, an
issue that has received a lot of attention in the hedge fund and mutual fund literature
but has only been addressed with mixed results in the CTA literature5.
Evaluating the performance and persistence of CTAs is not only complicated by the
many biases present in the CTA data, but also by the non-normality of the many CTA
return series6 and the relatively short return histories. These issues have been success-
fully addressed in the hedge fund literature by employing robust bootstrap and Bayesian
methodologies, as proposed by Kosowski et al. (2007) and further used by Fung et al.
(2008), together with the GMM approach used by Jagannathan et al. (2010). None of
these methods have thus far been applied exclusively to CTAs. Furthermore, Fung et
al. (2008) and more recently Bollen and Whaley (2009) have argued that any perfor-
3See Fung and Hsieh (1997b), Fung and Hsieh (2000b), Fung and Hsieh (2009), Liang (2000), Malkiel
and Saha (2005), Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999).
4Interestingly a comparative study for CTAs by Bhardwaj et al. (2008) uses equally-weighted index
only as the TASS database used in the same study has incomplete AUM information.
5For hedge funds see Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999), Agarwal and Naik (2000a, 2000b),
Edwards and Caglayan (2001), Bares, Gibson and Gyger (2003), Baquero et al. (2005), Kosowski et
al. (2007) and Jagannathan et al (2010); for mutual funds see Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993),
Carhart (1997), Cohen, Coval and Pastor (2005) and Busse and Irvine (2006).
6Recent studies by Agarwal and Naik (2004), Gupta and Liang (2005) and Lo (2001) showed that
hedge funds have frequently non gaussian return distributions with high skewness and kurtosis.
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mance appraisal needs to account for the signicant changes in the risk factor exposures
of hedge funds since these funds employ dynamic trading strategies and therefore are
unlikely to have constant factor loadings. Fung et al.(2008) used a CUSUM test to iden-
tify structural breaks in the fund factor loadings at the aggregate level while Bollen and
Whaley (2009) argued that a more appropriate approach is to investigate risk dynamics
across individual hedge funds since the latter will be representative of managers shifts
in allocations across strategies.
The literature on risk dynamics in alternative investments has recently experienced
a resurgence of interest. For example, Patton and Ramadorai (2011) propose the use of
high frequency conditioning variables to model the dynamics of hedge fund risk expo-
sures. Clearly, estimates of alpha will be inaccurate if the risk exposures of funds change
over time and one does not account for it. This study, therefore, investigates the perfor-
mance of CTAs by rst modeling the dynamics of CTA risk exposures. A further issue,
highlighted by Titman and Tiu (2010) and by Billio, Getmansky and Pelizzon (2011) is
the importance of considering the eect of the nancial crisis when studying hedge fund
performance. The long data period employed in this study includes several crises, in
particular the recent credit crisis of 2008. Using scaled cumulative residuals structural
breaks are identied in the CTA factor loadings associated with various market events
such as the 1998 LTCM crisis. It is demonstrated that not all structural breaks are the
same for CTAs and hedge funds and also that factor loadings are dierent for systematic
and discretionary CTAs. Using these results, it is found that over the sample period of
1994-2010 some of the strategies of systematic CTAs delivered alpha almost consistently
in every subperiod whilst many discretionary CTAs had signicant alpha only at the
end of the sample period.
Using a robust bootstrap methodology the ability of funds to deliver signicant alpha
in the cross-section is investigated. In particular I nd that although the proportion of
funds that deliver statistically signicant alpha is similar across systematic and discre-
tionary CTAs, the actual alpha is higher for systematic CTAs and the number of funds
that subsequently fail are lower. Finally, the performance persistence of systematic and
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discretionary CTAs is investigated. Evidence of performance persistence for CTAs is
found, however this performance persistence diers across CTA strategies. If perfor-
mance persistence of discretionary CTAs is driven by small funds, the reverse is true for
systematic CTAs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses relevant lit-
erature. Section 2.3 describes proposed methodology. Section 2.4 describes the data.
Section 2.5 provides empirical results. Finally Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
According to an earlier study by Brown and Goetzmann (2003) hedge funds are dened
by their freedom from regulatory controls. Commodity Trading Advisors, CTAs, are a
subset of hedge funds normally listed with the style name \managed futures". CTAs
have several features that distinguish them from hedge funds. Firstly they are required
to register with the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC, and National
Futures Association, NFA. In addition, these managers trade in extremely liquid mar-
kets, namely in the global futures, forwards and options markets and are able to pass
some of the liquidity to their investors. As such, CTAs rarely have long lock ups or
redemption periods associated with hedge funds, see Bhardwaj et al. (2008). Assuming
that these markets should continue to function in both deationary and inationary en-
vironments, CTAs should allow investors to speculate in the futures markets in the most
dynamic way possible. Furthermore, futures markets are diversied across many asset
classes: interest rates, currencies, stock indices and commodities, a feature which pro-
vides investors with additional diversication in dicult trading environments. Hedge
funds, on the other hand, are free from regulatory controls of the Investment Company
Act of 1940, Brown and Goetzmann (2003) and therefore may engage in trading illiquid
securities whilst searching for arbitrage opportunities see Getmansky, Lo and Makarov
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(2004) thus making them less liquid to CTAs.
CTAs dier from hedge funds in many other important ways and have also been
studied for longer in the academic literature, see Elton et al. (1987, 1989 and 1990).
Firstly the legal framework of CTAs is slightly dierent as they are more regulated than
hedge funds yet less regulated than mutual funds. Even though they have to register
with the CFTC and NFA they are still able to pursue various trading strategies that are
unavailable to mutual funds. Since CTAs trade mainly in liquid futures markets they
do not have long lock-up and redemption periods frequently associated with hedge fund
investing, Getmansky et al. (2004). Fung and Hsieh (1997b) found that CTAs have
higher attrition rates than mutual funds. This is also documented by Liang (2003) and
Brown et al. (2001) who nd the attrition of CTAs to be higher than that of mutual
and hedge funds. In the earlier part of this thesis, however, it was found that the attri-
tion rate of CTAs is not as high as previously estimated and, once real failure is taken
into account, it is in fact similar to that of hedge funds at only 3%. Getmansky et al.
(2004) and Bollen and Whaley (2009) nd that the returns of managed futures are not
as serially autocorrelated as that of hedge funds, a result of their trading in liquid in-
struments. CTAs also dier from hedge funds in terms of their trading strategies. Fung
and Hsieh (1997) nd that CTAs have option like payos and that they perform well
during market spikes. They propose to model the returns of trend-following funds with
a primitive trend-following strategy in various markets (PTFS) and show that these
factors are particularly relevant to CTAs7.
Several papers in the literature examine CTA performance and persistence. Using
risk adjusted returns, Bhardwaj et al. (2008) nd that CTAs are inecient, with poor
performance over the period 1994-2007, and thus lend support to the earlier study of
Elton et al. (1990) who also found that CTAs failed to deliver superior returns. Capocci
(2005) nds that some CTA strategies do in fact outperform the EDHEC CTA Global
Index. Liang (2004) on the other hand investigates the comparative performance of
hedge funds, fund of funds and CTAs and nds that over the 1994-2002 period CTAs
7See Fung and Hsieh (2001).
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under-performed hedge funds. He also nds that, depending on market conditions, CTAs
are negatively correlated to hedge funds and fund of funds because they follow very dif-
ferent trading strategies from those of hedge funds and argues that thus CTAs represent
good diversication tool to a portfolio of hedge funds. Using a number of alternative
factor models, Gregoriou et al. (2010) nd that only a few of the CTA sub-strategies
outperform the market during the 1995-2008 period. With regard to the performance
persistence of CTAs, an early study by McCarthy, Schneeweis and Spurgin (1996) found
some performance persistence during the 1985-1991 time frame. In another study, how-
ever, Irwin (1994) found little or no evidence of predictability in average returns. A
further study by Brorsen (1998) employed regression analysis and statistical methods
and found no evidence of performance persistence. More recent studies by Brown et
al. (2001) and Edwards and Caglayan (2001) analysed the performance and persis-
tence of CTAs over the 1989-1998 time frame, reaching similar conclusions. The most
recent studies by Capocci (2005) and Gregoriou et al. (2010) used the BarclayHedge
database instead of the previously employed TASS database covering the 1994-2008 pe-
riod and found some performance persistence but noted that it was driven by some of
the sub-categories only. The authors pointed to the heterogenous styles across CTAs
and suggested that more needs to be done to identify CTA performance drivers and
their eect on the analysis of performance persistence. The conicting results of these
previous studies underline the role that a database can play in performance studies.
This was recently discussed in Joenvaara et al. (2012).
Performance and persistence have been studied more extensively in the mutual fund
and hedge fund literature. Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) used raw and risk
adjusted annual returns for oshore funds to nd that hedge funds can outperform the
market. Other studies include Fung and Hsieh (1997a) and Liang (2000, 2001) who used
raw returns to nd that hedge fund returns compared favourably to market returns dur-
ing the bull market of the 1990s. Other authors such as Malkiel and Saha (2005) were
rather sceptical of the ability of hedge funds to deliver superior returns. Several authors
have also documented that a large part of the variation in hedge fund returns can be ex-
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plained by market related factors. The relationship is usually non-linear, however, and
is best modeled with option based strategies, see Fung and Hsieh (1997a, 2001, 2002 and
2004b) and Agarwal and Naik (2004). Building on this pioneering work, Kosowski, Naik
and Teo (2007) and, later, Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008) used a bootstrap
methodology applied to a cross section of fund returns to identify funds with genuine
skill-based alpha from the cross section of fund returns.
The analysis in this chapter builds on this previous work and, in particular, on a
number of recent studies that suggest that certain types of funds realize systematically
better performance than others. While Titman and Tiu (2010) suggest that these better
performing funds are in fact those that load less on factor risk, Heuson and Hutchinson
(2011) nd that the better performing funds are in fact those with positive skewness,
and suggest that investors should account for that in their fund selection. Cai and
Liang (2011), meanwhile, through conducting optimal changepoint regression, segregate
a cross section of hedge funds into those with dynamic risk exposures and those without,
and nd that the dynamic funds are associated with better risk-adjusted performance
and lower volatilities. This study employs the most recent methodological advances
in the hedge fund literature to analyse CTA performance with a particular focus on
systematic and discretionary CTAs, employing dynamic factor exposures as suggested
in Patton and Ramadorai (2011) whilst allowing for skewness in returns, Heuson and
Hutchinson (2011), and controlling explicitly for luck, Kosowski et al. (2007).
The issue of performance persistence is particularly important for hedge funds and
CTAs due to the very high rate of attrition of these funds, see Brown et al. (1999),
Liang (2000) and Baquero et al. (2005). CTAs in particular have a high attrition rate,
as noted, for example, by Baquero et al. (2005): \A large proportion of about 37.4%
of the funds with the investment style managed futures have been liquidated by 2000."
Much of the theoretical debate on performance persistence in the mutual fund and
hedge fund literature has been addressed in reference to the Ecient Market Hypothe-
sis. Economic models, such as that proposed by Berk and Green (2004), predict little
or no persistence because much of it is competed away by rational investors that shift
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capital in search of superior returns. On the other hand, whilst the Ecient Market
Hypothesis rules out consistently superior performance, it does not exclude the possi-
bility of persistent under-performance as performance information is not always readily
available and requires full liquidity in the investment funds. For hedge funds there are
frequently many hurdles to investing, such as longer lock-up periods and redemption
notice periods which, in eect, prevent any assets from being withdrawn. Baquero et
al. (2005) argue that these share restrictions may cause more performance persistence
in a series of hedge fund returns compared to that of mutual funds, and Agarwal and
Naik (2000) nd that persistence is mostly driven by losers. Since CTAs fall somewhere
in between hedge funds and mutual funds in both regulatory framework and structural
organization, it is of interest to identify their eect on performance persistence across
CTAs. In particular, it is important to identify if systematic CTAs are better able to
generate persistently good returns than discretionary CTAs and, in so doing, whether
investors are able to identify such funds and rationally allocate capital to them.
In the hedge fund literature, evidence of performance persistence is rather mixed.
Brown et al. (1999) nd virtually no persistence using annual returns. Agarwal and
Naik (2000a) and (2000b) show that the persistence of hedge funds is only short-term
in nature (1-3 months). Edwards and Caglayan (2001) nd evidence of persistence
over a longer horizon 1-2 years. Capocci and Hubner (2004) follow Carhart (1997)
and nd some persistence across average performing funds. More recent literature on
hedge fund performance persistence has addressed well-known biases and data issues
that hitherto caused estimation problems. Baquero et al. (2005) examine the persis-
tence of raw and style-adjusted returns of hedge funds in the TASS database for the
period 1994-2000 whilst correcting for the look-ahead bias at quarterly, annual and bi-
annual horizons. They nd that positive persistence is strongest at the quarterly level
for both raw and style-adjusted returns whilst being statistically insignicant at the
annual level. Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007) employed the Bayesian approach of Pastor
and Stambaugh (2002a), who had applied it to mutual funds. The seemingly unre-
lated assets (SURA) Bayesian approach is a robust way of modeling misspecication
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and overcomes the short sample problem of fund return series by using the information
from non-benchmark passive returns. Kosowski et al. (2007) show that this method-
ology is particularly relevant to the study of hedge fund performance and demonstrate
that, relative to sorting on OLS alphas, sorting on Bayesian alphas provides evidence of
long-term persistence. Boyson (2008) follows the methodology of Kosowski et al. (2007)
by sorting on alpha t-statistics and shows that, in addition to sorting on past perfor-
mance, selecting funds based on age and size improves the likelihood of superior future
performance. These results resonate with the Berk and Green (2004) equilibrium: that
younger and smaller funds outperform portfolios of older and larger funds, a nding
similar to that of Teo (2010), who nds that smaller funds outperform larger funds. Ev-
idence of long-term persistence is also conrmed by Jagannathan, Novikov and Malakov
(2010). Their study accounted for look-ahead bias and employed generalized methods
of moments, GMM. Using this new approach, they found persistence over a three-year
horizon. Most recently, Heuson and Hutchinson (2011) argue that the skewness of hedge
fund returns is an important factor for investors and should therefore be integrated into
any performance assessment. They demonstrate, using the residual augmented least
squares approach, RALS, of Im and Schmidt (2008), that portfolios sorted on RALS
alpha persist more than those sorted on OLS alpha. In particular, their study nds
that managed futures have a larger number of funds with positive skewness than any
other hedge fund strategy. Sorting on RALS alphas is thus particulary relevant to these
funds.
Although there is a signicant quantity of literature on the performance persistence
of CTAs, all of these studies are based on the standard Frequentist performance mea-
sures. Gregoriou, Hubner and Kooli (2010) analyze the performance and persistence
of CTAs in the BarclayHedge database for the January 1995 to October 2008 period.
Using a nonparametric method, they nd that certain categories of CTAs have a larger
percentage of funds performing above the median. They document evidence of quar-
terly persistence and nd that funds with quarterly persistence are also more likely to
be persistent over a longer horizon. In contrast to Kosowski et al. (2007), Gregoriou
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et al. (2010) nd that extreme performance is not an indication of skill and the perfor-
mance of the top funds tends to revert towards that of the median CTAs. Brorsen and
Townsend (2002) use regression analysis and nd a small amount of persistence. None
of the above studies, however, have employed the more robust methodologies discussed
above. Bhardwaj et al. (2008) addressed the well-documented biases in the hedge fund
data, survivorship, instant history and self-selection bias and found that CTAs are in-
ecient performers relative to the market. However, they employed a standard OLS
methodology which was shown to be inappropriate to the study of hedge fund returns.
To address the dynamic risk exposures of hedge funds, Kosowski et al. (2007) and
Fung et al. (2008) identify aggregate structural breaks in hedge fund risk exposures.
Closely related to this study is dynamic performance measurement, which is particularly
relevant to the study of CTAs. Bollen and Whaley (2009) use optimal change-point re-
gression (a la Andrews, Lee and Plomberger (1996)) which allows risk exposures to shift
through time for each hedge fund leading to more accurate performance measurement.
Cai and Liang (2011) employ this methodology to identify funds with dynamic and non-
dynamic risk exposures and to study the qualities and performance dierences across
these two categories. More recently Patton and Ramadorai (2011) follow Fernson and
Schadt (1996) and propose an alternative method to model hedge fund risk exposures
using high frequency conditioning variables and thereby document an increase in alpha
for funds with dynamic risk exposures.
This study aims to contribute to the above literature in several ways. First it em-
ploys a novel dataset by identifying separate styles across CTAs. This has the advantage
of identifying the various characteristics of these funds and helps to isolate performance
dierences. Secondly, it allows for dynamic risk factors to measure performance, as
proposed by Patton and Ramadorai (2011), and explicitly controls for luck by using
a robust bootstrap method to identify alpha funds. Finally the study focuses on the
performance persistence of CTAs by employing the more robust methodologies used in
the most recent hedge fund literature.
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2.3 Methodology
A. Risk Adjusted Performance Evaluation
Some performance and persistence studies have used raw as well as risk-adjusted
returns, Baquero et al. (2005). Since most investors are risk averse it is unlikely that
investors will make investment decisions without considering the risk. Most academic
literature on both mutual and hedge funds, therefore, has tended to evaluate the perfor-
mance of these funds adjusted for risk.8 The original method used in empirical nance
to estimate the abnormal performance of a portfolio is due to Jensen (1968), who ap-
plied it to the study of mutual funds. Motivated by the CAPM, Jensen's alpha in this
model is the alpha from a regression of a portfolio's excess return on the excess returns
of the market:
Ri;t  Rf = i + i(RM;t  Rf ) + i;t (2.1)
where Ri;t is the return of the fund, RM;t is the return on the market index, Rf is the
risk free rate and i;t is the error term. This is usually used as a measure of out- or
under-performance. Further extensions of this basic model were developed by Fama and
French (1993) in the three-factor model:
Ri;t  Rf = i + 1;i(RM;t  Rf ) + 2;iSMBt + 3;iHMLt + i;t (2.2)
where SMBt is the factor mimicking portfolio for size (small minus big) and HMLt is
the factor mimicking portfolio for book-to-market equity (high minus low). The model
was further extended by Carhart (1997) by adding the momentum factor:
Ri;t  Rf = i + 1;i(RM;t  Rf ) + 2;iSMBt + 3;iHMLt + 4;iUMDt + i;t (2.3)
where UMDt is the factor mimicking portfolio for the momentum eect, which is dened
by Grinblatt et al. (1995) as the return from buying past winners and selling past
8See recommendation of report of Blake and Timmermann (2003) prepared for the FSA.
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losers. Whilst these models have been largely used in the mutual fund literature, none
of them seem to explain well the returns of the CTAs, see Gregoriou et al. (2010). Fung
and Hsieh (1997b, 2001), for example, have documented that the explanatory power
of these traditional asset index factors is particularly low for CTAs and have shown
that the returns of the CTAs feature option-like payos relative to the return of the
underlying assets. This nding motivated them to propose to model the returns of
CTAs relative to a dynamically traded portfolio of look-back straddles. Together with
equity and bond market factors, these trend-following factors can signicantly increase
the model's explanatory power for CTAs. As a result of this, a now widely used model
for performance evaluation in the hedge fund and CTA literature is the seven factor-
model developed by Fung and Hsieh (2004). The Fung and Hsieh (2004) model is as
follows:9
rit = ^














where rit is the net-of-fees excess return (in excess of the risk-free rate) of fund i on
month t, ^i is the abnormal excess return of fund i over the regression time period,
that is value added after fees that is not explained by common systematic risk factors.
^ik is the factor loading of the hedge fund i on factor k, and ^
i
t is the pricing error.
The set of factors comprises: the excess return on the S&P 500 total return index
(SNPMRF), a Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), the yield spread
of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond over the 3-month T-bill, adjusted for the duration
of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), and the change in the spread of Moody's Baa bond
minus the 10-year Treasury bond (BAAMTSY). PTFSBD, PTFSFX and PTFSCOM
are the excess returns on the portfolios of lookback straddle options on bonds, currencies
and commodities, respectively, which are constructed to replicate the maximum possible
9The time series of the seven factors can be downloaded from the authors' website:
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/dah7/HFData.html
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return to trend-following strategies on their respective underlying assets.10 Fung and
Hsieh (2004) show that these factors are able to explain a substantial part of the variation
of the hedge fund and CTA return series. Their benchmark model is now the standard
workhorse of hedge fund performance evaluation studies.11 Nevertheless, Gregoriou
et al. (2010) build their own option-based factors on eight nancial indices to model
CTA returns. They further supplement these option-based factors by integrating factor
mimicking portfolios for variance, skewness and kurtosis with the addition of Carhart's
(1997) momentum factor. Relative to the traditional asset pricing models, their model
is able to explain a signicantly higher proportion of return variation. An interesting
nding however, is that the model is not well adapted to explaining the returns of the
discretionary funds. This nding resonates with the conclusion of Kazemi and Li (2009)
who augment Fung and Hsieh (2001) PTFS factors with futures return-based factors
in order to study the market timing of discretionary and systematic CTAs. Whilst
adding futures return based factors signicantly increases the explanatory power for
systematic CTAs, the adjusted-R2 remains very low for discretionary CTAs. Bollen and
Whaley (2009) argue that although the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model has been widely
adopted in the hedge fund literature it is still open to the debate whether these factors
indeed represent trading strategies that can be mimicked in the spirit of Carhart (1997)
or Sharpe (1992). They, therefore, conduct their study using two models: the Fung
and Hsieh (2004) model and the returns of the long positions in the ten liquid futures
contracts. Their model also contains a squared term as with the size and value premia:
Ri;t  Rf = i + 1;iFt + 2;iF 2t + i;t (2.5)
where vector F contains observations of the returns of a buy-and-hold investment in
futures contracts on dierent assets and rolling the positions as maturities near. They
nd that, in contrast to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, the adjusted-R2 falls across
10Refer to Fung and Hsieh (2001) for the detailed description of the construction of these factors
11See Kosowski et al. (2007), Jagannathan et al. (2010), Boyson (2008), Eling (2010), Joenvaara et
al. (2012).
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all fund categories when the futures contract factors are used. For CTAs, however, the
dierence in the explanatory power is the smallest but the authors note that the average
alpha of CTAs becomes negative when futures contracts are employed. This suggests
that performance ranking can be quite sensitive to the choice of factors.
In line with these arguments this study uses the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
benchmark model, which is the standard workhorse of hedge fund performance studies.
Two additional trend-following factors are added, PTFS on interest rates, PTFSIR, and
on stock indices, PTFSSTK as well as GSCI index and Carhart (1997) momentum fac-
tor. I nd that only the GSCI factor is signicant and I therefore drop the momentum
factor from the model. The nal model, therefore, consists of the Fung-Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model augmented with two trend following factors on stocks and interest
rates together with the GSCI index.
B. Structural Breaks and Parameter Stability
Static analysis of CTA performance is not appropriate if the funds change their risk
exposures over time. Fung and Hsieh (2004, 2008) test the stability of the hedge fund
factors with cumulative recursive residuals. Accordingly, they nd two structural breaks
that they identied with the market events: September 1998 (the LTCM debacle) and
March 2000 (the end of the internet bubble). Using these breaks, Fung et al. (2008)
apply their model to the fund of hedge funds data in order to estimate the average al-
pha of the fund-of-funds. In particular, to estimate their model, the authors use dummy
variables for the various subperiods. Following their method, I test for the presence of
structural breaks in the CTA data. When testing for structural breaks, Fung and Hsieh
(2004) argued that, due to the tremendous growth in the hedge fund industry, the older
data is less reliable and they therefore ran the regression backwards. CTA data has
been available for much longer than hedge fund data. I thus employ a standard method
of rolling forwards when testing for regime changes in the CTA data. Regressing an
equally-weighted index (with an AUM lter) of CTA returns and a value-weighted in-
dex of CTA returns against the F-H 9 factor model, I obtain a time series of scaled
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recursive residuals. Plotting scaled recursive residuals against time with an error band
of 2 allows the identication of breakpoints by looking at where residuals stray out-
side these bands. Figure 2.1 plots scaled recursive residuals for the equally-weighted
index (with the AUM lter) of CTAs starting from January 1995 and working forwards
to December 2010.12 The two red broken lines represent the condence bands. The
crossing of these bands is evidence of model instability. For the equally-weighted index
there are several crossings: June 1996, January 1998, July 1999, end of 2000, March and
December 2003 and June 2008. For the value-weighted index the crossing of the bands
by the residuals happens on September 1998, end of 2000, Mar 2003 and June 2008.
The dates are similar to the results from the equally-weighted index. As discussed in
Fung and Hsieh (2004) the actual sample breaks are unlikely to have happened at these
exact times since the eect of the sample break shows up gradually in the regression.
Instead the authors searched for market events around the time of the sample breaks
to pinpoint the actual dates for the breaks.13 The plots show possible breakpoints to
be September 1998 and March 2000, as in Fung and Hsieh's (2008) fund of hedge fund
study. The data in this study covers a longer period than that of the Fung and Hsieh
(2008) study. I therefore identify another two possible break points: March 2003 and
June 2008. I test for the validity of these four breakpoints using Chow's (1960) test,
replacing standard errors with Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent standard errors. I nd that all but one of the breaks (March 2000) are signicant.




where Xt = [SNPMRFt SCMLCt BD10RETt BAAMTSYt PTFSBDt PTFSFXt
PTFSCOMt PTFSIRt PTFSSTKt]
12We lose the rst 12 months of data for estimation.
13In their 2008 study the authors rigorously tested the breaks with the Chow test.
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Here, Rt denotes either an equally-weighted index with an AUM lter or a value-weighted
index of excess CTA returns across all funds with at least 24 months of data in month t.
D1 is a dummy variable set to one during the rst period, January 1994 to September
1998, and zero elsewhere, D2 is set to one during the second period, September 1998
to March 2003, and zero elsewhere, D3 is a dummy set to one during the third period,
March 2003 to June 2008, and zero elsewhere and D4 is set to one during the nal data
period, June 2008 to end of data December 2010, and zero elsewhere. The X matrix
comprises the augmented Fung and Hsieh (2004a) model, described above. This frame-
work allows to estimate the average CTA alpha in various subperiods.
2.3.1 Identifying the Factors
Since this study analyzes the cross-sectional dierences in the performance of the CTAs,
there is another caveat that needs to be dealt with. With the extended model there is
a substantial set of possible factors and only a limited number of degrees of freedom.
Since the cross-sectional regressions are estimated using only 24 monthly observations,
which is the minimum return history required by this study, it is therefore not feasible
to include too many factors.14 My approach is rst to select a subset of factors, K,
for each CTA so as to maximize the explanatory power of a regression while rewarding
parsimony. To achieve this, a few studies have employed a stepwise regression procedure,
Gregoriou et al. (2010), Kazemi and Li (2009) as well as Titman and Tiu (2010). This
study, however, follows the methodology of Bollen and Whaley (2009) and Patton and
Ramadorai (2010) in choosing a subset of factors that minimize the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) which is equivalent to maximizing adjusted-R2.15 Formally the Bayesian
14A minimum 24 month return history is standard practice in the hedge fund literature, see Boyson
(2008), Joenvaara et al. (2012) and Kosowski et al. (2007).
15Other authors, such as Jagannathan et al. (2010), use SBC Schwarz's (1978) criterion to decide
how many factors to include. Bekaert et al. (2008), meanwhile, employs the PCGets algorithm.
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where n is the number of observations and K is the number of parameters to be es-
timated, including the intercept. Once the subset of factors is chosen, I estimate the
parameters of the model for each individual fund.
2.3.2 Cross-sectional Bootstrap
Instead of using an index of CTA returns this section seeks to identify cross-sectional
dierences in CTA performance. To that end this study follows closely the methodology
of Fung et al. (2008). In particular I segregate CTAs into those that deliver signi-
cantly positive alpha, called \Have-alpha" funds and those that do not and which only
take systematic risk, called \Beta-only" funds. To account for the time-varying risk
exposures, I implement the sorts on a yearly basis. In particular, each January I select
all funds which had a full return history in the preceding two years. For each fund I
identify the number of factors, K, from the extended Fung and Hsieh (2004) model by
maximizing the Bayesian Information Criterion, as described above. Using relevant fac-
tors for each CTA and a bootstrap procedure due to Kosowski et al. (2007), I segregate
the funds into those that have statistically signicant alpha and those that do not. The
bootstrap procedure is particularly useful for CTAs due to the non-normality of their re-
turns. When using standard t-tests to determine the signicance of alpha we rely on the
assumptions of homoscedastic, serially-uncorrelated and cross-sectionally independent
residuals, assumptions that are likely to be violated by the non-normality of the CTA
returns and to thus produce an unknown distribution of alpha. The bootstrap allows
to relax these assumptions of non-normality while at the same time controls explicitly
for luck.
16See Greene for further details.
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To begin the bootstrap procedure for each fund i, I measure performance relative to
the multifactor model. The risk factors are as described before from the extended Fung
and Hsieh (2004) model augmented with the GSCI factor. For each fund I estimate
the Bayesian Information Criterion that maximizes R2 to select the relevant number of
factors that maximized it. This procedure allowed the selection of dierent factors for
dierent funds, since many CTAs follow very concentrated strategies in various markets.
For example, some CTAs follow a trend-following strategy in currencies only and will
therefore have only one trend-following factor that is signicant, the PTFSFX. With
relevant factors for each fund, I therefore performed the following regression where x0t
represents the relevant risk factors for each fund:
ri;t = ^i + ^ix
0
t + ^i;t; t = 1; :::; T (2.8)
For each regression of each fund, I saved the coecient estimates ^i, ^i;t, t-statistics of
alpha, t^(^i)
17 as well as the time series of estimated residuals, ^i;t. I then draw T periods
with replacement from the original time series of t = 1; :::; T and create a new time series
of residuals. The order of the time scale will thus change for each bootstrap iteration b.




T where b stands for the
bootstrap iteration number. Using newly formed residuals, for each fund I create the
resampled monthly net return observations:
rbi;t = ^ix
0










T is the time reordering imposed by the resampled residuals in the boot-
strap iteration b. This new sequence of returns has an articial alpha that is equal to
17The t^^ was estimated using the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consis-
tent estimate of the standard error.
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With the above regression of the bootstrapped returns on the multifactor model, a
positive estimated alpha may result since the bootstrap may have drawn an abnormally
high number of positive residuals or, equally likely a negative alpha, if the resampling
drew an abnormally large number of negative residuals. I save the t-statistics of ^bi , t^
b(^bi)
for each fund. I repeat the above procedure for each fund for b = 1; :::; B iterations,
each time saving the t-statistics of alpha. In all the resample tests I set B = 1; 000. For
each fund I therefore obtain the cross-sectional distribution of estimates of the alpha
t-statistics t^b(^bi), which result purely from sampling variation since I impose the null
of no abnormal performance. For each fund i, if t^b(^bi) is in the upper decile of the
distribution of the simulated t-statistics, then the fund is designated a have-alpha fund.
Otherwise, the fund is put into the beta-only group.
I repeat the same exercise each year, every time using the most recent two year
window of observations for each fund. The two year window for estimation is standard
in the literature, see Kosowski et al. (2007) and Jagannathan et al. (2010). Whilst
allowing sucient return data to estimate factor loadings, the 24 months' window also
allows to capture the propensity of the funds to change their risk loadings over time, an
issue discussed earlier. This methodology will undoubtedly result in the funds classied
as have-alpha to change from one period to another depending on their previous risk-
adjusted performance, fund liquidations and new entries.
2.4 Data
A few databases track CTA returns, TASS, CISDM and BarclayHedge. In this study,
the performance of CTAs is evaluated using monthly net-of-fee returns of live and dead
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CTAs reported in the BarclayHedge18 database between January 1993 and December
2010. This time period spans the bull periods, pre 2000 and 2003-2007, as well as the
bear market periods starting with the bursting of the technology bubble in the spring
of 2000 and the recent nancial crisis of 2008. The BarclayHedge database has perhaps
the most comprehensive coverage of the total CTAs in existence. For each individual
fund, BarclayHedge provides information on monthly returns (net of management and
performance fees), assets under management (AUM), management and incentive fees,
lock-up period, strategy classication as well as a brief strategy description and various
other information specic to fund characteristics.
BarclayHedge reports two separate databases, consisting of both active \live" and
defunct funds, the \graveyard". The graveyard keeps track of the funds that ceased to
report to the database because of liquidation or some other reason. To minimize the
survivorship bias (discussed further below) I include both the live and the dead funds.
As of December 2010 there were a total of 4,048 defunct and live CTAs. To avoid double
counting, I removed funds of funds, which left a total of 3916 CTAs with a total AUM of
just over US$480 billion under management. The industry coverage is shown in Figure
2.2. The assets under management have grown from just over US$20 billion in 1993 to
over US$480 billion at the end of 2010. One important item worth noting is the reversal
in the growth of the number of CTAs after 2008, the year of the nancial crisis. The
recent fall in the number of funds, however, was accompanied by a rise in assets under
management. Some funds have clearly liquidated but the remaining funds have received
more capital, perhaps as investors began to reallocate to the CTAs in the knowledge of
their attractive performance during down markets.
In this dataset I control for a number of potential biases. First, I eliminate duplicate
share classes from the same fund family. For example, two funds can appear in the
database under the same name and be run by the same fund manager but one will be
denoted as \onshore" and the other as \oshore". These are created for regulatory rea-
18As shown in Joenvaara et al. (2012) BarclayHedge has the highest number of defunct funds as well
as the most extensive AUM coverage.
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sons but are virtually identical to each other. Similarly, there can be one fund that is an
\LP" and another \Ltd", or \Client" and \Proprietary". There are also many instances
of funds that provide multiple share classes denominated in various currencies, such as
EUR or GBP, designed for clients who choose to invest in currencies other than US$.
These structures are common in the hedge fund and CTA industry where managers
set up a master-feeder fund structure, with multiple feeders feeding to the same fund.
Another example of duplicate funds is when the same fund appears with the same name
twice but one is an older version designed by \Old". Such a fund will have an identical
but shorter return history and should therefore be removed. In order to deal with the
duplicates I used the following methodology: rstly I identied all the management
companies with multiple funds and searched for funds with the same name by string
comparison. Thereafter, if their return series had a correlation of 0.95 or more then
they were conrmed as duplicates. To decide which duplicates to remove I used either
the longest return series or, if the duplicates had an identical length of return series,
then I selected the fund with the larger assets under management base. This method is
similar to the one employed by Agarwal and Jorion (2010) and Avramov et al. (2011).
It is important to emphasize that this procedure would understate the aggregate assets
for the manager of the fund with the duplicates that exist side by side with their own
respective AUM. Although this is not crucial for the remainder of the analysis, for the
purposes of completeness, Figure 2.2 shows total assets in the industry including all the
duplicate funds.
Apart from removing duplicates, I also removed funds that report quarterly rather
than monthly returns, as well as funds that had missing information. After these ex-




It is well know that hedge fund and CTA data are not as clean as the mutual fund
data and are subject to various biases. These biases are mainly driven by the lack of
regulation and the voluntary nature of hedge fund and CTA reporting to the databases.
These biases have been extensively studied in the hedge fund literature and to a lesser
extent in relation to CTAs. Below is a brief discussion of the potential biases.
Self-Selection Bias - Self-selection bias arises from the fact that reporting in the
hedge fund and CTA industry is voluntary and so a fund may choose not to report if
its performance is poor. Equally, some very successful funds may never report to the
database if they raised capital quickly enough and no longer needed to advertise. Fung
and Hsieh (1997b) suggest that these two eects oset each other and thus should limit
this bias. Nevertheless, whilst this bias may be an issue for the hedge fund industry, it
is less likely to apply to CTAs where capacity constraints are not reached as quickly as
for hedge funds.19 Hence it is possible that self-selection bias is less prominent in the
CTA data.
Survivorship Bias - Many databases have started collecting hedge fund and CTA
data only fairly recently, around 1994. As a result, many databases do not have any
information on funds that liquidated prior to 1994. If the database contains returns of
only the surviving funds it can lead to an upward bias in the performance estimates if
funds drop out of the database for reasons of poor performance. This bias is known as
survivorship bias. Many databases now contain information on defunct funds as part
of their database. Most funds that stop reporting are moved to the graveyard. Since
reporting in the hedge fund and CTA industry is voluntary, however, some funds may
choose not to report for reasons other than liquidation, for example if a fund is closed
to new investment. Thus the graveyard may not contain only liquidated/failed funds.
19The issue of capacity constraints in the CTA industry is formally addressed in chapter three.
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Fung and Hsieh (1997b) estimate the survivorship bias for CTAs at 3.48% per year for
the period 1989 to 1995 and 3.6% for the period 1989 to 1997 (Fung and Hsieh (2000)).
They measure this bias as the dierence in performance between a portfolio of all the
surviving funds and a portfolio of all the funds taken together. Similar studies have
placed the survivorship bias in the hedge fund industry at 3% per year for 1994-1999,
Fung and Hsieh (2000). Similar results were also found by Liang (2000) of 2.24%, Barry
(2003) of 3.8% and Ibbotson and Chen (2005) of 2.71%. Malkiel and Saha (2005) how-
ever, have found a survivorship bias as high as 4.42%. Rouah (2005) nds a bias of
1.51% for the period 1994 to 2003 when using all exits to the graveyard. However, his
estimate of the bias increases to 3.35% when he adds funds no longer reporting to the
live funds. Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) on the other hand, dened
the survivorship bias as the dierence between a portfolio of surviving and liquidated
funds and found a low value of 0.16% per year. Their study, however, covered the 1988-
1995 period and therefore does not encompass the period when many funds disappeared
from the database. Their suspiciously low survivorship bias has been discussed by Liang
(2000). More recently, Bali et al. (2011) found a bias of 1.74% for the period 1994 to
2008 in the TASS database which is the longest period analyzed for the survivorship bias
in the hedge fund studies. The most recent update for CTAs has been done by Bhardwaj
et al. (2008) who found a survivorship bias for the CTAs in the TASS database of 3.2%
for the period 1994 to 2007. This is similar to the previous results of Fung and Hsieh
(1997b) and Capocci (2005). I update the results for the survivorship bias using the
BarclayHedge database for CTAs. Table 2.1 reports the monthly survivorship bias for
the period 1993 to 2009. This is the longest period yet analysed for CTA data. The
estimated bias for the entire period is 0.33% per month (3.92% per year). This is in line
with previous ndings of Fung and Hsieh (1997b) and Bhardwaj et al. (2008) for CTAs
and is in line with industry consensus of 3%. A look at the subperiods however reveals
that the survivorship bias is much larger before 2000, 5.6%.
In a recent report, Fung and Hsieh (2009) stress the importance of dierentiating be-
tween truly liquidated funds and missing funds when estimating the survivorship bias.
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Further, the authors note that, in light of the recent nancial crisis, the liquidation
statistics from this period will be particularly important in estimating the survivorship
bias. Using the results from the previous chapter that allowed funds in the graveyard
to be separated into truly liquidated funds and those that are still alive or have simply
stopped reporting, Table 2.2 reports mean monthly returns for equally weighted port-
folios formed using funds broken down by exit type. Table 2.2 shows the returns of the
graveyard funds that were identied as either still alive or not reporting. The results
show that these funds do indeed have very good returns, with mean monthly returns
that are higher than for the surviving funds, 1.35% for the \Alive" group and 1.40% for
the \Not Reporting" group vs. 1.29% for the Surviving funds. Liquidated funds have a
mean monthly return of 0.63% which is lower than the return of all the graveyard funds.
This conrms that the lters employed to sort the graveyard are indeed able to separate
the truly failed funds from funds that are still alive or not reporting. Furthermore,
these results highlight the importance of separating the graveyard into true failures in
the survival studies.
Panel B shows that treating funds that are no longer reporting as live funds increases
the survivorship bias to 4.2%. This nding is higher than that found in existing studies.
To mitigate the eects of this bias, therefore, for the rest of the analysis this study
includes all the funds in the graveyard as well as the live database.
Backll Bias - The second potential bias in the CTA data is the backlling bias,
also known as \instant history" bias. Funds tend to start reporting to a database only
after a period of successful trading, possibly with private capital. Once they start to
report to a database, however, they are free to backll their returns. Since funds are
more likely to report to a database following periods of good performance and less likely
to report if they had poor performance, this creates an upward bias in the reported
performance of both hedge funds and CTA databases. Several studies in the literature
have documented the size of this bias. In particular for CTAs, Fung and Hsieh (2000)
nd a backll bias of 3.6% for CTAs and Bhardwaj et al. (2008) nd a bias of 1.6% if
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24 months are removed. Bhardwaj et al. (2008), however, argue that to remove backll
bias entirely one needs to the use rst day of reporting to the database as a screen
and remove all the data between the start of reporting and fund inception. Unlike the
BarclayHedge database, TASS provides both an inception date and the date of rst re-
porting to the database. Using this information, the authors show that for some funds
even the most conservative screen, in which 36 months of data is removed, is not enough
to remove this bias entirely. Most of the hedge fund literature, however, uses a screen
of between 12 and 27 months. In particular, Kosowski et al. (2007) use a screen of
12 months, Gregoriou et al. (2010) use 24 months and Titman and Tiu (2010) use 27
months. Park (1995) estimated an incubation period of 27 months for the MAR CTA
database. Brown, Goetzman and Park (1997) also found an incubation period of 27
months in the TASS CTA database but 15 months for hedge funds. This could explain
the ndings of Bhardwaj et al. (2008) who argue for a larger screen. Consequently,
I estimate the eect of backll bias in the BarclayHedge CTA database using various
screens and report the results in Table 2.3. Following the methodology of Park (1995)
I estimate this bias as the dierence between an average monthly return of a portfolio
that invests in all funds in the database and the average monthly return of a portfolio
that invests in all funds after deleting the rst 12, 24, 36 and 48 months of data for each
fund. For the period 1993-2009 the observable portfolio averaged 10.98% per year while
the adjusted observable portfolio averaged 8.84% (after deleting the rst 12 months of
data), 8.57% (after deleting 24 months of data), 7.83% (after deleting 36 months) and
7.91% after deleting 48 months. These results give an estimated bias of 2.14%, 2.41%,
3.15% and 3.07% respectively, which is slightly lower than the bias found by Fung and
Hsieh (2000) for TASS CTAs. The results also indicate that the longer the estimation
period the higher the bias, although this reverses after 36 months, indicating that it is
unnecessary to remove more than 36 months of data. Since a 12 months correction is
standard in the hedge fund and CTA literature, to avoid backll bias, I delete the rst
12 months of data in the remaining analysis. In the robustness checks, however, I repeat
the analysis deleting 24 months of data.
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Return Smoothing - Several studies have showed that the returns of hedge funds
exhibit positive serial correlation, see Getmansky et al. (2004). This arises due to hedge
funds investing in illiquid securities. Managers are therefore forced to use past prices to
estimate returns for their portfolios with illiquid securities. Alternatively, some authors
have argued that some funds may purposely smooth the return prole. Lo (2002) shows
that smoothed returns result in overstated Sharpe ratios and information ratios. Get-
mansky et al. (2004) and Loudon et al. (2006) propose models to correct for smoothing
in returns. As shown in the literature, however, this issue is not prevalent among CTAs,
see Bollen and Whaley (2009). Since CTAs trade in liquid securities only they are un-
likely to have smoothed returns. Both Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) and Bollen
and Whaley (2009) nd that, in comparison to hedge funds and fund of funds, CTAs
show very little evidence of serial correlation in returns.
2.4.2 Summary statistics
Table 2.4 Panel A reports for the period January 1994 to December 2010 the cross-
sectional mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum statistics for CTA
characteristics. This table includes all the funds that were present in the sample without
any lters. In this database 27.2% of funds are alive while the rest are in the graveyard.
As expected, performance measures are higher for the live funds than for defunct funds:
annualized mean return is 12.1% for live funds vs. 8.9% for defunct ones (1.01% and
0.74% monthly). Live funds are also substantially larger than defunct funds with mean
assets under management of 155.94 million for live funds and 23.28 million for defunct
funds. The average age of the funds are 4.75 years (57 months) which is similar to the
results reported in Bali et al. (2011) and in Joenvaara, Kosowski and Tolonen (2012).
Since for the main analysis we will need to include the returns of funds with at least
24 months of data, Table 2.4 also shows the number of funds and the proportion with
less than 24 months of data. From the entire database, therefore, 567 or 21.2% of funds
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will have to be excluded. This is quite a substantial loss of information and points to a
large number of very young funds.
The payout structure appears to be similar across the funds, with a median man-
agement fee of 2% and an incentive fee of 20%. Nevertheless, across both live and
defunct funds there are funds that charge as much as a 50% incentive fee. Again this
is similar to the results reported in Bali et al. (2011). Another interesting result is the
indication for the large size disparity across funds. The mean of the average monthly
assets under management is US$59.31 million. Figure 2.3 shows that there are a lot of
CTAs in the database that never reached more than US$1 million under management,
approximately 19%. In addition 50% of the funds never reached more than US$10 mil-
lion under management and 62% of the funds never reached more than US$20 million
under management. Together with the age statistics this points to a large number of
entrants into the CTA industry: there are many funds with very short histories and a
very small asset base. Indeed, the barriers to entry into the CTA industry are much
lower than for hedge funds due to the large amount of leverage embedded in futures
trading. As a result many traders are able to set up on their own and run small trading
shops, frequently investing their own assets rather than managing clients' money. It is
questionable if these small trading funds should be included in any research as it is un-
likely that many institutional investors are likely to invest in these one man operations.
To the extent that they represent a large proportion of the CTA database, this raises
serious questions for researchers who look at the performance of the CTA industry.
Table 2.4 Panel B displays summary statistics for the sample of CTAs including me-
dians, rst and third quartiles of the annualized mean excess return, standard deviation,
skewness, kurtosis and maximum drawdown across CTA strategies. The average excess
return adjusted for instant history bias across all funds is 3.95% per year, 4.35% for
systematic CTAs and 2.58% for discretionary CTAs. Apart from options, all other CTA
strategies exhibit positive skewness and kurtosis, indicating a departure from normality
of CTA returns. The median maximum drawdown is fairly constant across most strate-
gies, at 20.27% and is much lower than that of the risk factors, indicating the ability of
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CTA managers to manage the downside. The last section contains summary statistics
for the benchmarks included in the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factor model extended
with an additional three factors.20 Table 2.5 shows the correlation across factors. The
correlations between factors are low on average, suggesting that multicollinearity is un-
likely to be an issue.
Regulation requires all CTAs to register with the NFA as well as the CFTC, after
which many funds choose to report to a database. Various studies have applied AUM
lters due to concerns that funds with less than a certain level of assets may be too
small for many institutional investors, for example Kosowski et al. (2007) remove all
funds with less than US$20 million and Boyson (2008) removes funds with less than
US$35 million under management. Titman and Tiu (2011) remove funds with less than
US$30 million. In the case of the CTA funds such lters will remove more than 50%
of the database, which is a large amount of data. Avramov et al. (2011) suggest a
dynamic AUM lter which reects the growth of assets in the entire industry. In line
with this reasoning and to avoid removing too many funds, whilst at the same time
removing funds that are unlikely to be of serious interest to investors, I apply an AUM
lter of US$20 million for funds that existed before 2000 and thereafter an AUM lter
of US$35 million. This should preserve as much data as possible whilst removing many
small funds. The remainder of the analysis, therefore, will concentrate on those funds
that had at least 24 months of data. This yields a total of 2100 funds with a further
application of an AUM lter where appropriate.21
2.5 CTA Performance
In this section I investigate CTA performance with a particular focus on the dierences
between systematic and discretionary CTAs. I investigate the average performance of
20I thank David Hsieh for making these factors available on his website.
21Following Kosowski et al. (2007) the AUM cuto is implemented every month.
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systematic and discretionary CTAs by constructing equally-weighted (EW) as well as
value-weighted (VW) portfolios. An important question in portfolio management is
whether active fund managers add value on average after fees22, and this is measured
by estimating alpha in regression (2.4). For investors this is of particular interest when
deciding whether to allocate to a manager or not. The major interest is whether sys-
tematic CTAs deliver better returns than discretionary funds. Contrary to the ndings
of Bhardwaj et al. (2008) on CTAs, but consistent with the literature on hedge funds
(e.g. Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007)), I nd that CTAs add value even after fees. In
addition, I nd that systematic CTAs deliver superior performance on a risk adjusted
basis but this out-performance is driven by large funds. These results hold true even
after adjusting for well documented biases in the data.
In order to allow for a sucient number of observations to calculate the average
return I only use funds that contain at least 24 non-missing monthly returns. Another
problem is that quite a few funds have a series of zeros at the end of their return stream.
These are possibly funds that are not performing well delaying reporting in expectation
of imminent liquidation whilst the database vendor lls the gap with temporary zeros.
Eventually these funds shut down but never provided the performance for that period.
After carefully removing all the zero values at the end of the fund returns and respec-
tive AUM numbers and applying the 24 months requirement, the total number of funds
reduced to 1942. A few funds also had missing AUM observations but these were very
few and, as discussed in Joenvaara et al. (2012), the BarclayHedge database is one of
the most complete databases for AUM series. In total there were only four funds that
had no AUM, which is a tiny proportion relative to the whole dataset. After removing
these funds, the nal dataset consisted of 1938 funds. I used excess returns from these
1938 funds to construct an equally weighted as well as value-weighted portfolio with
monthly re-balancing. The return series for each portfolio was used to construct Figure
2.4 which shows cumulative excess returns of value-weighted and equally-weighted port-
22Previous studies on hedge funds shown that hedge funds add positive values for investors even after
fees, see Fung and Hsieh (2004), Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007)
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folios of all CTAs against various benchmarks: S&P 500, MSCI World Index, GSCI,
HFRX Aggregate Absolute Return, Dow Jones Credit Suisse Managed Futures Index,
Dow Jones Credit Suisse Blue Chip Investable Index, Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge
Fund Index and Barclays Aggregate Bond Index. Firstly, Figure 2.4 shows that the
equally-weighted portfolio has a higher cumulative return than the value-weighted port-
folio. Joenvaara et al. (2012) document a similar result for hedge funds and explain
that this outperformance may be driven by the better performance of smaller funds, as
suggested in Teo (2010). The equally-weighted portfolio, however, marginally under-
performs the S&P 500. Both CTA portfolios outperform the other indices, apart from
the Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index (although they outperform the HFRX
Absolute Return Index). The large dierence in performance between the two hedge
fund indices is indicative of the database dierences discussed in Joenvaara et al. (2012).
Table 2.6 shows summary statistics for the excess returns of the EW and VW portfolios
for the aggregate portfolio of CTAs as well as by strategies. Panel A shows the excess
returns of the equally-weighted portfolios whilst panel B shows the excess returns of
the value-weighted portfolios. The aggregate data indicates that CTAs add value on
average. The annualized average EW and VW excess returns are 7.82% and 7.31% per
year. These values are quite dierent to the ndings of Bhardwaj et al. (2008) who
argue that relative to T-bills, the average value added by CTAs per annum was only
85 basis points. Of interest are the dierences between CTA strategies. Whereas the
best performing strategy using the equally-weighted index is options23, which shows an
annualized return of 11.16%, systematic CTAs outperform on a value-weighted basis.
The excess returns of the value-weighted portfolio of systematic CTAs is 7.08% annual-
ized, versus 4.68% for discretionary CTAs. The highest Sharpe ratio is also achieved by
the short-term systematic traders when using the value-weighted portfolio. Figure 2.5
shows cumulative excess returns for equally-weighted as well as value-weighted portfo-
lios for systematic and discretionary CTAs. The value-weighted portfolio for systematic
23A result similar to Gregoriou et al. (2010) who also nd Options strategy to be the best performing
among all CTAs using an equally-weighted index.
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CTAs outperforms signicantly the value-weighted portfolio of discretionary CTAs but
the reverse is true for the equally-weighted portfolio. This underscores the importance
of the AUM lter when analyzing CTA performance, given the large number of tiny
funds in the CTA database. Contrary to the ndings of Teo (2010) and Joenvaara et al.
(2012) for hedge funds, this study will demonstrate that for systematic CTAs large funds
outperform small funds, as size will serve as a proxy for the research and development
necessary to build successful models.
Although the performance of the CTAs found here is substantially higher than the
performance documented in Bhardwaj et al. (2008), my ndings could be inuenced by
the instant history bias. In fact Bhardwaj et al. (2008) argue that this is indeed one of
the reasons for their nding of negligible CTA out-performance relative to T-Bills. Using
information on the funds' inception dates as well as the date of rst reporting, they show
that even the most conservative screen of 36 months used in academic literature is not
enough completely to remove this bias. Park (1995) nds that for CTAs a 27 months'
screen is appropriate. However, the dierences in the ndings of Bhardwaj et al. (2008)
could in fact be driven by dierences across databases as argued by Joenvaara et al.
(2012). Since BarclayHedge does not provide information on the date of rst porting
to the database, I am unable to perform the same analysis, however I will apply the
12 months screen used in most academic studies.24 Table 2.7 shows the average excess
performance of equally and value-weighted portfolios of CTAs adjusted for instant his-
tory bias by using dierent screens for inclusion of funds in the portfolio. Even after
removing 43 months of data the average annualized excess return on an equally weighted
portfolio is 5.77%. There is not much dierence, however, between a 24 months' screen
and a 43 months' screen. The BarclayHedge database on CTAs is substantially larger
than the Lipper TASS database used in the Bhardwaj et al. (2008) study. It is possible
that the average number of backlled months is lower in the BarclayHedge database
24I also apply a 24 months screen and nd that results are not substantially aected: an equally-
weighted portfolio of all CTAs delivers an annualized mean return of 6.35% whilst a value-weighted
portfolio delivers an annualized mean return of 7.98% which is an increase rather than a decrease in
performance.
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than in the TASS database. Joenvaara et al. (2012) show that substantially dier-
ent results can be found in hedge fund studies depending on the database used as the
database universes are rarely overlapping. For the remainder of the analysis, therefore,
to eliminate backll bias I will use a 12 months screen. Of interest is that the perfor-
mance of the value weighted portfolio remains unchanged with a 12 months screen and
actually increases with an increase in the length of the screen. Table 2.6 Panel D also
shows the average excess performance of equally-weighted and value-weighted portfo-
lios by strategies. A systematic value-weighted portfolio still outperforms discretionary
funds, 7.88% vs. 4.26%: a dierence that is economically and statistically signicant.25
Although an equally weighted portfolio of discretionary CTAs outperforms systematic
CTAs, this dierence has diminished and is not statistically signicant. It seems that
instant history bias has less eect on larger CTAs. The AUM lter may also help to
alleviate the instant history bias.
Table 2.6 Panel E presents average performance for the equally weighted portfolio
across various size categories and strategies of CTAs. Similar to the ndings of Teo
(2010) and Joenvaara et al. (2012), the table shows that for the aggregate CTA group
performance is related to the fund size. In particular, smaller funds deliver the highest
mean annualized return of 7.4% whilst the largest funds, those above US$250 million,
had an average performance of 5.47%, a dierence of almost 2%. Panels B and C,
however, show that the dierence in performance between small and large funds in the
aggregate sample of CTA funds is driven predominantly by the discretionary CTAs.
The dierence in average performance between small funds and funds with AUM above
US$250 million for discretionary CTAs is 3.29% whereas there is a negligible dierence
of 0.56% across systematic CTAs. This explains why the cumulative excess return of
the value-weighted portfolio of systematic CTAs had a signicantly better performance
than the equivalent portfolio of discretionary CTAs. The results indicate that, whilst the
relationship between CTA size and performance is monotonic for discretionary CTAs,
the same does not apply to systematic CTAs. Since institutional investors, and even
25Signicant at 10% with a p-value of 0.0851 and t-statistics of -1.70.
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many high-net-worth individuals, are unlikely to invest into small funds, these funds
should be excluded from the analysis and, indeed, such AUM lters have been used
in previous academic studies.26 Recently, Kosowski et al. (2011) propose the use of a
dynamic AUM lter instead of a static one to account for the growth of assets in the
industry over the years documented in the literature. In line with their argument, I use
a lter of US$20 million for those funds with returns prior to January 2000 and a US$35
million lter for those funds with returns from that point until the end of the data.27
Figure 2.6 shows an equally weighted portfolios of systematic and discretionary CTAs
adjusted for survivorship and instant history biases and after applying a dynamic AUM
lter. By the end of December 2010 systematic CTAs have gained almost 327% whilst
discretionary funds have gained 255%.
In conclusion, the results demonstrate that CTAs do deliver, on average, econom-
ically and statistically signicant performance. After adjusting for survivorship and
instant history biases, between January 1994 and December 2010 the average CTA out-
performed T-Bills by 6.51%. This is signicantly dierent to the results reported by
Bhardwaj et al. (2008) and may underline dierence across databases as reported in
Joenvaara et al. (2012).
2.5.1 Risk-Adjusted Performance and Changing Exposures of
CTA Indices
Table 2.8 reports results from estimating equation (2.6). The rows list the explanatory
variables of the matrix Xt and the columns report the results over the entire period
and sub-periods. The bottom panel of the table contains estimates of the Chow struc-
tural break test, Chi-square statistics, for the signicance of the three structural breaks:
September 1998, March 2003 and July 2007. Bali et al. (2011) follow the methodol-
ogy of Fung and Hsieh (2008) and also nd a break in July 2007. Table 2.8 Panel A
reports the results using an equally-weighted (EW) index of excess CTA returns with
26See Kosowski et al. (2007), Boyson (2008) etc.
27I implement the AUM cuto every month.
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a dynamic AUM lter of US$20 million and US$35 million. Table 2.8 Panel B reports
the parallel results for the value-weighted index (VW). I use the Chow test to test for
the structural breaks identied earlier. The 2 statistics in both tables show that the
March 2000 break is not signicant whereas those in September 1998, March 2003 and
in particular November 2007 are signicant. For the value-weighted index March 2003
break is more signicant than September 1998 or November 2007. In unreported tests,
the model without GSCIRF shows an even stronger rejection of the null of no breaks.
This result is in contrast to the hedge fund literature that identied two major breaks
in the hedge fund data: September 1998 and March 2000. CTAs are known to perform
particularly well when the rest of the asset classes are not, Liang (2004), therefore it is
likely that CTAs may have dierent breaks to hedge funds. March 2003, in particular,
marks the beginning of the Iraq war and of the policy of rate cuts by the US Federal
Reserve, as well as the end of the stock market decline following the bursting of the
technology bubble. This was perhaps a period of major trend reversals aided in part by
Federal Reserve's quantitative easing. A similar break occurred later following the July
2007 housing bubble crush. The stock market began to decline sharply since its October
2007 highs, followed by a period of rate cuts by the Federal Reserve. CTAs appear to
be particularly inuenced by the Federal Reserve's monetary policies and unexpected
government interventions, since trends tend to reverse abruptly in such circumstances.
The results of both tables indicate that the average CTA has delivered a positive
and statistically signicant alpha over the entire period from January 1994 to December
2010. For the equally-weighted and value-weighted indices monthly alphas are signicant
at 1% with values of 0.61% and 0.88%, respectively, with adjusted-R2 of the regression
at 0.382 and 0.321. These low values of adjusted-R2 indicate that a lot of the variance
still remains unexplained by the current model. However, R2 increases to 0.518 and
0.489 for the regressions with structural breaks, underscoring the importance of iden-
tifying time variation in factor loadings when evaluating risk adjusted performance of
CTAs. Similar conclusions on the importance of dynamic modeling of the CTA risk fac-
tors were documented in Patton and Ramadorai (2011) and Bollen and Whaley (2009).
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Table 2.8 Panel A and Panel B show the variation in risk exposures during subperiods.
For example, the coecient on SNPMRF is not signicant for the entire period but is
highly signicant for the period beginning April 2003 to November 2007. For the VW
index all the trend-following factor coecients are signicant in the full period but show
variation in signicance in the subperiods.
Whilst the results for the entire period show that the average CTA delivered a sta-
tistically and economically signicant alpha, the results with structural breaks for the
equally-weighted index show the exact period when this alpha was. The results show
that the average alpha was economically and statistically signicant only in the rst
and last periods: January 1994 to September 1998 and August 2007 to December 2010.
The results for the value-weighted index are similar. Both of these results, however,
are exactly opposite to the results reported in Fung et al. (2008) for the fund-of-funds
who nd a statistically signicant alpha only in the bull period of October 1998 to
March 2000. Nevertheless, the results reported here are still consistent with the current
literature on CTAs, that nds that CTAs tend to perform well when hedge funds and
other asset classes do not. Fung et al. (2008) argue that the hedge fund industry may
be heading towards zero alpha, as supported by the absence of any signicant alpha in
their ndings after March 2000. My results for CTAs, however, show that signicant
alpha is found before September 1998 and after the recent nancial crisis, despite the
recent growth in assets. This underscores the need to separate CTAs from hedge funds
in performance studies.
Before discussing the dierences between systematic and discretionary CTAs, it is in-
teresting to note the dierences in the above results between value-weighted and equally-
weighted indices. Alpha is statistically and economically signicant in two subperiods
for the VW index whereas it is lower in magnitude and signicant in only one sub-
period for the EW index. Since large funds will have a larger weighting in the value
weighed index this points to the cross-sectional variation in alpha generation between
funds of dierent size. It may also suggest that there are CTAs in the sample that are
consistently able to generate alpha. The next section on bootstrap and performance
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persistence will further explore this issue.
Finally, it is important to address dierences between systematic and discretionary
CTAs. In unreported tests, using the Chow test for structural breaks, I nd that sys-
tematic CTAs have the same breaks as for the full CTA sample. Discretionary CTAs,
on the other hand, appear to have fewer breaks. Using an EW index of discretionary
CTAs I nd that the March 2000 and July 2007 breaks are signicant, but with a
VW index of discretionary CTAs only the November 2007 break is signicant - this is
also supported by Figure 2.1C. Table 2.9 reports the results of regression (2.6) of an
equally-weighted index with an AUM lter by investment objective. Panel A reports the
results for the entire period. On average, systematic CTAs deliver an economically and
statistically signicant monthly alpha of 0.73%, whilst discretionary CTAs deliver an
alpha of 0.38%. Looking at sub-strategies further shows that the best performers among
systematic CTAs are medium-term trend followers with a monthly alpha of 0.83%, sig-
nicant at 1%. Fundamental discretionary funds appear to be the worst performers
among discretionary funds, monthly alpha of 0.23%. Of interest are the dierences
in structural breaks between systematic funds. Panel B shows the results of regres-
sion (2.6) by investment objective with three structural breaks (September 1998, March
2003 and July 2007). Firstly, adjusted-R2 increases for systematic CTAs using this
model. The adjusted-R2 does not increase much for the discretionary CTAs, indicating
no improvement for the model with these breaks. Regarding monthly average alphas,
almost all systematic sub-strategies have positive and statistically signicant alphas in
the three subperiods, with short-term trend-followers delivering signicant alpha con-
sistently throughout the whole period. Discretionary CTAs show signicant alpha only
in the last period and some in the third subperiod leading up to the nancial crisis of
2007. Panel C also reports the results of regressing discretionary CTAs on a model with
two structural breaks identied earlier with the Chow test (1987), i.e. March 2000 and
November 2007. Using this model there is an improvement in adjusted-R2 from 0.24 to
0.28 for the entire discretionary CTAs index. The results show that discretionary CTAs
behave dierently to systematic CTAs and have achieved economically and statistically
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signicant alphas from April 2000 to end of December 2010.
In conclusion, the results above underscore dierences between hedge funds and
CTAs and in particular dierences between systematic and discretionary CTAs. Sys-
tematic CTAs have dierent structural breaks to hedge funds, March 2003 but not March
2000, and they also deliver statistically and economically signicant alphas when hedge
funds do not. This result has been documented earlier for CTAs but not specically for
systematic CTAs. Furthermore, the results suggest that there exist dierences between
systematic and discretionary CTAs: not only do systematic CTAs deliver superior re-
turns but they also appear to deliver signicant alpha consistently throughout the entire
period. The current model does not explain much of the variance of the discretionary
CTAs, adjusted-R2 are much lower than for systematic CTAs. Finally, contrary to the
conclusion of Fung and Hsieh (2008), the alpha of systematic CTAs does not seem to
be heading towards zero.
2.5.2 Cross-Sectional Dierences in Funds
This section studies the cross-sectional dierence in funds among systematic and discre-
tionary CTAs. Table 2.10 Panels A and B show the results of the bootstrap experiment
for each two year classication and holding periods together with the percentage of the
total number of funds that were classied as have-alpha or beta-only funds.28 Table
2.10 Panel A shows the results for systematic CTAs while Panel B shows the results
for discretionary CTAs. Similar to the ndings of Fung et al. (2008), the number of
funds in both groups increases steadily over time. Fung et al. (2008) argue that this
is a reection of the increased availability of data and the growth in the CTA industry.
Despite the negative publicity associated with CTAs, the number of funds has continued
to grow. My results are similar to the ndings of Fung et al. (2008), in that a larger
share of funds is classied as beta-only funds than have-alpha funds. Whilst the average
proportion of have alpha funds for the period 1994-2003 is 0.22 in the Fung et al. (2008)
28Only funds with full two year return histories were included in the analysis.
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study, my results document a higher proportion for the systematic funds, 0.33%. This
proportion uctuates from year to year, but the average appears to be driven by the
increase in the proportion of have alpha funds in the last three years, 2007-2010. The
results also show a decrease in the proportion of have alpha funds following the 1998
LTCM crisis and in 2003-2004 after possible trend reversal. These results are consistent
with the earlier ndings of the structural breaks. For discretionary CTAs, the proportion
of have-alpha funds uctuates less, indicating less sensitivity to the market conditions.
This is in line with the ndings of Table 2.9 which shows no rm evidence of signif-
icant alpha until after 2007. Interestingly, the proportion of discretionary have-alpha
funds increases to 0.48% in the 2009-2010 period. I also document the average alpha
of have-alpha and beta-only funds. Whilst the proportion of have-alpha funds is not
that dierent between systematic and discretionary CTAs, my results highlight that the
values of alpha obtained by those have-alpha funds are signicantly and economically
higher for systematic funds than discretionary.
The two year transition period results show that systematic have-alpha funds have
less probability than discretionary funds of subsequently being reclassied as liquidated
or failures. More of them are likely to be classied as funds that stopped reporting. The
results also show that more of the have-alpha funds from both groups are subsequently
reclassied as have-alpha funds: that is there is greater persistence among this group
of funds. What is of particular interest is that for those have-alpha funds that are sub-
sequently reclassied as have-alpha funds the average fund size is over US$1 billion for
systematic CTAs but only US$275 million for discretionary CTAs. That is, performance
persistence for these funds is driven by large funds. In summary, the results of this sec-
tion further conrm that in the cross-section of CTAs there exist funds among both
systematic and discretionary CTAs that are able to deliver signicant alpha. Moreover
this proportion is larger than that documented for fund of hedge funds indicating more
skill among CTAs. In addition, whilst systematic and discretionary CTAs have similar
proportions of have-alpha funds, the systematic have-alpha funds deliver statistically
signicant higher average alpha. These have-alpha funds have a propensity to deliver
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alpha in the future and for systematic CTAs it appears to be driven by larger funds.
2.6 Performance Persistence
In this section I study performance persistence among CTAs, both as an entire asset
class and by the CTA strategies identied earlier, while correcting for backll, serial
correlation and survivorship biases in the data. When investors are seeking to invest
in a CTA, is the prior performance record useful in making investment decisions? If so
then past performance is indicative of future results and such information is valuable.
Predictability and persistence are slightly dierent concepts however. Persistence im-
plies that there is a positive correlation between past and future performance. When
the abnormal performance is due to skill then funds maintain their relative positions
in the rankings in the two periods. For investors, performance persistence is impor-
tant for several reasons. Investors investing into hedge funds face restrictions on capital
withdrawals in the form of long lock-up periods, redemption notice periods and advance
notication periods.29 All these restrictions make it impossible for investors to with-
draw their capital easily and in such circumstances long-term performance persistence
becomes important. Few CTAs, however, impose restrictions on capital withdrawals
since most engage in trading the most liquid instruments, futures. For investors invest-
ing into CTAs, taking advantage of the liquidity becomes especially interesting since
an investor can potentially increase the returns to his portfolio by buying past winners
with frequent re-balancing. Thus short-term persistence for CTAs potentially has some
value.
Research on performance persistence is quite extensive in the mutual fund and hedge
29Some hedge fund strategies such as Merger Arbitrage for example, impose long lock provisions
(sometimes up to a year). In such instances investors are not allowed to redeem or sell shares. The
lock-up period helps the manager avoid liquidity problems when his capital is allocated to illiquid
investments. At the end of the lock-up period investors are able to redeem their shares by giving advance
notice and then waiting for the redemption period to end before receiving their capital. According to
Joenvaara et al. (2012) up to 25% of hedge funds impose a one year lock-up period, although periods
of two years or more have become more common in recent years as well.
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fund literature. For mutual funds the literature documents very limited evidence of per-
formance persistence. Hendriscks et al. (1993) and Grinblatt and Titman (1992) show
only short-term persistence for mutual funds whilst Carhart (1997) attributes any short-
term persistence to momentum. Literature on hedge funds and CTAs, meanwhile, has
provided somewhat mixed evidence on performance persistence. For hedge funds, nearly
all authors have found short-term performance persistence but mixed results for long-
run performance persistence. Using the return on a hedge fund in excess of the average
return earned by all the hedge funds following the same strategy as a measure of perfor-
mance, and employing parametric and non-parametric tests for performance persistence,
Agarwal and Naik (2000a, 2000b) nd evidence of signicant quarterly persistence but
no semi-annual or annual persistence.30 Edwards and Caglayan (2001) test for annual
persistence and nd that it holds for losers as well as winners. Brown, Goetzmann and
Ibbotson (1999), on the other hand, use annual data to study the performance of o-
shore hedge funds and nd little persistence. Similarly Bares, Gibson and Gyger (2003)
use an eight-factor APT model and nd persistence at monthly and quarterly horizons
only. Recently, however, using sophisticated econometric approaches, some authors have
found evidence of long-term persistence in hedge funds. Jagannathan et al. (2010) em-
ploy a parametric approach whilst correcting for look ahead and backll biases and serial
correlation by utilizing GMM estimation, and nd evidence of performance persistence
for a three year interval. Contrary to the ndings of Edwards and Caglayan (2001),
Jagannathan et al. (2010) show that there is performance persistence among winners
but not among losers. Joenvaara et al. (2012) explain that the dierence in the results
of dierent studies are a consequence of using commercial databases rather than the
aggregate of all databases. Following standard Carhart (1997) methodology and sorting
on t-statistics, the authors show that there is indeed annual performance persistence but
only for the aggregate of all databases rather than individual ones. Similarly to Boyson
(2008) they nd that persistence is driven by small funds. Kosowski et al. (2007) follow
30The authors use a cross-product ratio (CPR) test as well as the Chi square test due to Carpenter
and Lynch (1999) as the non-parametric method and regression based method.
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the methodology of Carhart (1997) together with Bayesian techniques and nd that the
performance of hedge funds persists at annual horizons.
Literature on CTA performance persistence is not as extensive as that on hedge
funds particularly with regard to methodologies applied. The earliest studies Irwin,
Krukemeyer and Zulauf (1992b) and Irwin (1994) nd no evidence of performance per-
sistence. Schneeweis, Spurgin and McCarthy (1997) nd small amount of persistence
but their sample was very small, 56 funds. Most of these studies used Elton, Gruber
and Rentzler (1990) method that ranked funds by their mean return or Sharpe ratio and
then determined whether funds that ranked high in the rst period also ranked high in
the next. Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) used non-parametric approach and also
found no evidence of performance persistence for CTAs. Using regression analysis and
Spearman's rank correlation test, Brorsen and Townsend (2002) were the rst to docu-
ment performance persistence for CTAs. The most recent study by Gregoriou, Hubner
and Kooli (2010) used the largest period studied to date to analyze performance persis-
tence of CTAs. Although the study nds short-term persistence and limited long-term
persistence these results are shown to vary greatly from one CTA category to another.
When testing for performance persistence one can test for statistical predictability
or economically signicant predictability or both, Cuthbertson et al. (2006). Statistical
measures of persistence will rank funds based on some risk adjusted performance mea-
sure over some past horizon and then measure the association between past performance
and future performance. Examples are regressions of pre and post-alphas as employed
in Jagannathan et al. (2010). Similarly, tests based on contingency tables, e.g. Cross-
product ratio (CPR) or Chi-square statistics as in Agarwal and Naik (2000a), involve
frequency counts of repeat winners and losers in two consecutive periods. Whilst these
methods measure the degree of persistence from a statistical point of view, one can-
not directly assess the economic signicance of predictability. Another popular method
to test for persistence, which is employed in this study, is the frequentist approach of
recursive portfolios due to Carhart (1997). This method allows to test both for statis-
tical predicability whilst at the same time providing a way to measure the economic
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signicance of the results. This methodology was used in the studies by Kosowski et
al. (2007), Boyson (2008), Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) and Joenvaara et al.
(2012). First, a sorting rule is established. Whilst in theory sorting may involve any
rule that separates the funds into future \winners" and \losers", the most commonly
used metric is the risk adjusted performance. Kosowski et al.(2007) advocate the use
of alpha t-statistics, which is equivalent to sorting on information ratio. Sorting on the
t-statistics of alpha reduces the sensitivity of estimates to outliers as well as serving to
correct for errors in alpha measurement that are due to the short time series of CTA
data. Specically, each January I sorted the portfolios into decile portfolios based on
their t-statistics of alpha obtained from the extended Fung and Hsieh (2004) model.31
To obtain estimates of alpha, however, for each fund I rst identied K number of factors
from the extended Fung and Hsieh (2004) model that maximized the adjusted-R2 using
the Bayesian Information Criterion. Using K number of factors for each fund I then
estimated alpha t-statistics. This process was repeated each January for the January
1994-December 2010 period. I used funds that had at least 24 months of returns in the
last two years prior to the formation period. Once formed, portfolios were held for a
period of either 3 months, 6 months or one year. The post-ranking portfolio returns
were re-balanced monthly so that the weights were adjusted whenever a fund disap-
peared. CTAs with the highest t-statistics of alpha comprised Decile 1 and those with
the lowest t-statistics of alpha comprised the bottom decile. I also calculated the spread
return of the top and bottom portfolios dened as Decile 1 - Decile 10. A signicant
dierence in the spread return is evidence of performance persistence during the selected
evaluation period. To understand the drivers of performance persistence better, which
is particularly important for systematic CTAs, I constructed value-weighted as well as
equally-weighted post-ranking portfolios.
The overall results of this study show that CTA performance persists for both sys-
tematic and discretionary CTAs, but there are important dierences between the two.
31For some strategies, due to the small amount of data, I used quintiles or terciles. Where appropriate
I marked in the results which strategies used which method.
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Table 2.11 shows the results of sorting funds into decile portfolios on the basis of OLS
alpha and t-statistics for the aggregate CTA database. Table 2.12 shows the results
for the quintile portfolios for systematic and discretionary CTAs. Both tables show
that ranking on t-statistics of alpha produces a higher spread than when ranking on
OLS alpha - perhaps a result of the improvement in precision obtained from sorting
on the t-statistics. Results are broadly consistent with Kosowski et al. (2007) and
Joenvaara et al. (2012). For the annual evaluation period, the results show evidence of
statistically signicant persistence for all CTAs.32. Overall, the results show evidence of
performance persistence for the aggregate database of all CTA funds. Using t-statistics
of alpha to sort portfolios into deciles produces a spread of 5.26% with a t-statistic of
2.26. According to this result an investor can increase alpha by buying the top decile
funds and avoiding the bottom decile funds by using alpha t-statistics. Results for
the discretionary and systematic CTAs show a dierent picture. Whereas discretionary
CTAs show evidence of performance persistence with a spread of 8.12%, when sorting
on alpha t-statistics the spread of systematic CTAs is only 2.38% and is not statistically
signicant. These results do not hold for the value-weighted portfolios, however.
Table 2.13 shows the results of the equally-weighted and value-weighted CTA perfor-
mance persistence test. The table reports annualized Fung and Hsieh (2004) ten factor
alpha and the t-statistics of alpha below for the top portfolio, bottom portfolio and the
spread. The results are shown for portfolios that were held quarterly, semi-annually
and annually. There are striking dierences in the estimates between systematic and
discretionary CTAs. Discretionary funds show evidence of performance persistence for
both the equally-weighted and the value-weighted portfolios, however their performance
persistence is driven by small funds as the spread is higher for the equally-weighted
portfolio than for the value-weighted one. This is similar to the ndings of Joenvaara et
al. (2012) and Boyson (2008) for hedge funds. For example, for a three month evalua-
tion period the spread for the equally-weighted portfolio is 9.74% signicant at 1%. For
32Due to the lower number of funds for the sub-strategies I sort the funds into quintile portfolios
instead of decile portfolios.
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the same evaluation period, however, using the value-weighted portfolio the spread de-
creases to 6.28% and for the 12 months' evaluation period it decreases further to 5.07%
and is not signicant. Thus performance persistence of discretionary CTAs is driven by
small funds. This is similar to the results in the literature on hedge funds. Teo (2010)
shows that small hedge funds outperform large funds and Joenvaara et al. (2012) show
that hedge funds persist but this persistence is driven by small funds only. For system-
atic CTAs results are strikingly dierent. As a group systematic CTAs show signicant
performance persistence only for the value-weighted index with a spread of 10.52% with
a t-statistic of alpha of 2.87. Most interestingly this spread is driven mainly by short-
term and medium-term trend followers. Short-term trend-followers have a spread of
12.74% signicant at 1% for the annual formation period. These funds also have signi-
cant persistence for the equally-weighted index but the results are lower. Medium-term
trend-followers also show signicant spread for the annual horizon but not for quarterly
or semi-annual. None of the other systematic strategies show evidence of performance
persistence. In the mutual fund literature Hendricks et al. (1993) also document more
evidence of long-term rather than short-term persistence with persistence being highest
at two year horizon. Finally, Options funds show negative spread indicating no per-
sistence for any period. Discretionary funds that use relative value strategies have a
signicant spread of 11.88% with quarterly rebalancing, but this spread diminishes and
becomes insignicant at semi-annual and annual horizons.
To conrm that performance persistence is driven by the assets under management
of CTAs I perform separate sorts on fund size, with results reported in Table 2.14.
Funds were sorted into terciles based on their prior period mean assets under manage-
ment and held for one year or six months. An important aspect of this method is that
it is cross-sectional. Therefore if a fund has attracted more capital and grew larger in
one period it would be moved into another tercile in the next period and replaced by
another smaller fund. This test follows closely the methodology of Boyson (2008) which
was designed intentionally to test the predictions of the Berk and Green (2004) model.
In their model Berk and Green (2004) argue that investors rationally allocate capital
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to funds that perform well, which in turn increases their size and subsequently leads
to lower performance as managers face capacity constraints. If this model holds then
performance persistence should decrease as fund size increases, argues Boyson (2008),
because as funds grow they face fewer investment opportunities and higher transaction
costs. The Berk and Green (2004) model was written to describe the mutual funds
industry but literature on hedge funds shows that the implications of the model may
also hold for hedge funds. Fung et al. (2008) show evidence of capacity constraints for
funds of funds and Boyson (2008) documents that size matters for performance per-
sistence. My results for discretionary CTAs are in line with those found in the hedge
fund literature: large funds underperformed small funds in the 1994-2010 period by 2.91
per annum for the one-year evaluation period and by 3.45% for the six months holding
period. The results are similar to those found in Boyson (2008). For systematic CTAs
however, large funds signicantly outperformed smaller funds by 3.46% for the one-year
holding period and 2.75% for the six month holding period. This nding indicates that
systematic CTAs face lower capacity constraints than discretionary funds. This has
important implications. First of all, from a theoretical point of view, these results for
systematic CTAs challenge the general conclusions in the hedge fund literature that
suggest that the industry is experiencing diminishing alpha due to capacity constraints.
My results show that this is not the case for systematic CTAs. Secondly I show that
the performance of CTAs persists but this persistence varies signicantly across strate-
gies: the persistence of discretionary CTAs is driven by small funds, whereas that of
systematic CTAs is driven by large funds. CTAs pursuing options strategies show no
persistence at any horizon. These results have important implications for institutional
investors. Institutional investors face minimum capital constraints and therefore, for
many, investing into small funds may be unrealistic. My results demonstrate that, un-
like for hedge funds, institutional investors can increase the returns to their portfolios
by investing into large systematic CTAs from a top decile and that capacity constraints
among systematic CTAs are not as severe as for the rest of the hedge fund industry.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this study, I employ a novel dataset on CTAs to investigate performance, risk and
performance persistence of CTAs over the longest period studied in the CTA literature,
1993-2010. Firstly I update and extend the results on the eect on performance of data
biases. In contrast to previous ndings, however, I nd that even after correcting for
these biases, the average CTA is able to add value after fees. These results are strongest
in particular for large systematic CTAs.
Furthermore, I nd that the returns of CTAs are driven by the nine risk factors which
are found by extending the seven-factor Fung and Hsieh (2004a) model. This model ap-
pears to be better suited to systematic rather than to discretionary CTAs, however, as
a large proportion of the variance of the discretionary CTAs remains unexplained by
the model. Using these factors I nd several structural breaks in the data including
one break, March 2003, that is particular only to CTAs. Using these breaks I nd that
some of the systematic funds were able to deliver statistically signicant alpha in every
subperiod, whilst discretionary CTAs had statistically signicant alpha only at the end
of the sample. These averages conceal cross-sectional variations, however. Using robust
bootstrap methodology I nd that on average 30% of CTAs deliver positive and sta-
tistically signicant alpha. Although these proportions are similar between systematic
and discretionary CTAs, the level of alpha of these alpha funds is higher for systematic
CTAs. Furthermore, these alpha funds are less likely to fail in the future with lower
failure probabilities for systematic CTAs.
I also investigate performance persistence among systematic and discretionary CTAs.
I nd evidence of signicant performance persistence for the aggregate CTA database at
an annual horizon. For the sub-strategies there are important dierences however. I nd
greater performance persistence for discretionary CTAs when using an equally-weighted
rather than a value-weighted index, implying that smaller funds drive performance per-
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sistence. For systematic CTAs, I nd little performance persistence using an equally-
weighted index and the largest performance persistence when using a value-weighted
index. These results have important implications for institutional investors. Previous
ndings in the hedge fund literature have found that smaller hedge funds deliver higher
performance than larger funds and greater performance persistence. These results are
in line with Berk and Green's (2004) equilibrium but will be dicult for institutional
investors to exploit due to the capital allocation constraints that they face. My ndings,
however, show that for CTAs, institutional investors will be able to improve the return
to their portfolios by investing into the top decile of large systematic CTAs. These
ndings challenge the view that CTAs are not able to add value after fees. They also
suggest that contrary to the conclusions in the hedge fund literature, systematic CTAs




Table 2.1: Survivorship Bias in CTA Returns
Table 2.1 reports the survivorship bias calculated from the ltered database containing 2798
funds, including 728 live funds and 2070 dead funds for the period January 1993 to December
2010. In this table survivorship bias is calculated as the dierence between an equally
weighted portfolio of all the live funds and an equally weighted portfolio of all the funds. All
returns are net of all fees. Return is a mean return for the year and the numbers are monthly
percentages. Obs. indicates the number of monthly returns used to calculate the mean return
for the year.
Year End All funds Surviving funds Dissolved funds
Return Obs. Return Obs. Return Obs.
1993 1.37 8038 2.32 671 1.29 7367
1994 0.74 8113 0.91 807 0.72 7306
1995 1.41 8046 2.15 988 1.30 7058
1996 1.19 7697 1.90 1127 1.07 6570
1997 1.24 7283 1.43 1215 1.21 6068
1998 1.07 7149 1.63 1432 0.93 5717
1999 0.42 7268 0.59 1736 0.37 5532
2000 1.17 7022 1.42 1989 1.07 5033
2001 0.57 6903 0.75 2211 0.49 4692
2002 1.41 7331 1.61 2547 1.29 4784
2003 1.11 7994 1.46 2849 0.91 5145
2004 0.61 8818 0.81 3425 0.49 5393
2005 0.66 9768 0.82 4340 0.53 5428
2006 0.81 10347 0.96 5299 0.65 5048
2007 1.10 10619 1.25 6392 0.87 4227
2008 1.26 10505 1.60 7530 0.36 2975
2009 0.20 9369 0.27 8445 -0.85 924
Mean 1993-2000 1.08 1.55 0.99
Mean 2001-2009 0.86 1.06 0.53
Mean 1993-2009 0.96 1.29 0.75
Panel B: Surviving funds - All funds
Bias 1993-2000 0.47 per month
5.61 per year
Bias 2001-2009 0.20 per month
2.42 per year
Bias 1993-2009 0.33 per month
3.92 per year
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Table 2.2: Table II: Mean Monthly Returns of Live and Dead Funds with
Various Exit Types and Survivorship Bias
Table 2.2 reports mean monthly returns calculated for equally weighted portfolios of funds
with various exit types for the period January 1993 to December 2010. In particular, the
graveyard funds are separated into liquidated funds, funds that are alive but are closed to new
investors, called \Alive" and funds that simply stopped reporting to the database for various
reasons, \Not Reporting". The database is ltered to exclude duplicates and contains 728
live funds and 2070 dead funds. Dierence in means is the dierence between live funds and
funds in the graveyard with various exit types. Ann. is the annualized dierence in means.
Panel A: Surviving Funds = All Surviving Funds as of Dec 2010
Live Return Dead Return Dierence Ann.
Defunct funds in Means
Liquidated + Alive
+ Not Reporting 1.29 0.75 0.54 6.50
Liquidated + Alive 1.29 0.66 0.63 7.56
Liquidated + Not Reporting 1.29 0.62 0.67 8.04
Alive + Not Reporting 1.29 1.36 -0.07 -0.84
Liquidated 1.29 0.63 0.66 7.92
Alive 1.29 1.35 -0.06 -0.72
Not Reporting 1.29 1.40 -0.11 -1.32
Panel B: Live funds = All Surviving Funds + Alive Funds + Not Reporting Funds
Live Return Other Return Dierence Ann.
in Means
All funds 1.31 0.96 0.35 4.20
Liquidated funds 1.31 0.63 0.68 8.16
2.8. Appendix 160
Table 2.3: Instant History Bias for CTAs
Table 2.3 reports the instant history bias calculated for CTAs in the BarclayHedge database
for the period January 1993 to December 2010. The database contains 728 live and 2070
dead funds. Instant history bias is calculated as the performance dierence between average
monthly returns of the observable portfolio, which naively invests in all of the existing funds
each month, and of the adjusted portfolio which invests in all the CTAs after deleting the
rst 12, 24, 36 and 48 months of returns. All returns are net of all fees.
Mean Annual Return Dierence Average no.
of funds
All 10.98% 710
Without 12M 8.84% 2.14% 563
Without 24M 8.57% 2.41% 436
Without 36M 7.83% 3.15% 335
Without 48M 7.91% 3.07% 288
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.4 reports descriptive cross sectional statistics for the entire database of CTA returns
prior to application of instant history bias lter. This table shows the descriptive statistics for
the 728 live, 2070 dead funds as well as for the entire group as of December 2010. The table
reports the number of funds, the cross-sectional mean, standard deviation, median, minimum
and maximum for CTA characteristics including return, size, age, management and incentive
fees.
Panel A:
Live and Dead No. of funds Mean Stdv Median Min Max
Average monthly return 2677 0.81 1.65 0.63 -16.27 21.16
Average monthly AUM in millions 2672 59.31 458.48 4.2 0.004 13230.38
Age of the fund 2677 57 46 43 2 216
Management fee 2677 1.96 1.08 2 0 6
Incentive fee 2677 20.39 4.52 20 0 50
Funds with less than 24 months data 567 0.53 2.62 0.44 -20.89 19.57
Live No. of funds Mean Stdv Median Min Max
Average monthly return 728 1.01 1.23 0.84 -5.02 9.77
Average monthly AUM in millions 726 155.94 862.02 11.63 0.01 13230.38
Age of the fund 728 83 60 64 3 216
Management fee 725 1.72 0.74 2 0 5
Incentive fee 725 20.64 4.76 20 0 50
Dead No. of funds Mean Stdv Median Min Max
Average monthly return 1949 0.74 1.78 0.54 -16.27 21.16
Average monthly AUM in millions 1947 23.28 83 2.98 0.004 1423.28
Age of the fund 1949 48 35 37 2 199
Management fee 1950 2.06 1.28 2 0 6


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Instant History Bias Eect on Value and Equally-Weighted
Portfolios
Table 2.7 shows the eect of various screens for instant history bias on value and equally-
weighted portfolios.
Backll Bias and CTA Performance
Summary of the eect of bias on returns
Mean Stdv Mean Ann. Stdv Ann.
Aggregate EW no backll removed 0.65 1.97 7.82 6.81
Aggregate VW no bias removed 0.63 2.68 7.31 9.29
Aggregate EW 12 month bias removed 0.55 2.09 6.51 7.25
Aggregate VW 12 months bias removed 0.62 2.71 7.30 9.38
Aggregate EW 24 month bias removed 0.54 2.22 6.35 7.69
Aggregate VW 24 months bias removed 0.68 2.79 7.98 9.65
Aggregate EW with 43 months bias removed 0.50 2.33 5.77 8.08
Aggregate VW with 43 months bias removed 0.72 2.87 8.51 9.94
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Table 2.8: Return Decomposition of EW CTA Index (with AUM lter)
Table 2.8 Panel A reports the results of regressing an equally-weighted index of excess CTA
returns (with AUM lter) on the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model extended with
PTFSIR (the excess return of the portfolio of lookback straddle options on interest rate),
PTFSSTK (the excess return of the portfolio of lookback straddle options on stock) and
GSCIRF (the excess return on the GSCI index). Column two shows the results of the
regression for the entire period, January 1994 to December 2010. Columns three to six
report the results of the regression (4.6) for each subperiod. D1 is set to one during the rst
period (January 1994 to September 1998) and zero elsewhere, D2 is set to one during the
second period (October 1998 to March 2003) and zero elsewhere, D3 is set to one during
the third period (April 2003 to July 2007) and zero elsewhere and D4 is set to one during
the nal period (August 2007 to end of data, December 2010) and zero elsewhere. Values of
the t-statistics, calculated using Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent estimates of the standard errors, are reported in italics below each coecient.
Statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
The bottom panel reports the Chi-squared statistics for the Chow test for structural breaks.
Panel A:
Factors Jan 1994-Dec 2010 Period I Period II Period III Period IV
Constant 0.006*** 0.005** 0.002 0.001 0.015***
4.345 1.907 0.720 0.381 6.940
SNPMRF 0.001 0.047 -0.060 0.474*** 0.005
0.031 0.625 -1.131 7.169 0.112
SCMLC 0.013 -0.140** 0.051 0.069 -0.132
0.322 -1.857 0.777 1.044 -1.559
BD10RET 0.168** 0.102 0.383*** 0.256*** -0.187***
2.651 0.698 2.635 3.175 -2.623
BAAMTSY 0.045 0.026 0.182 -0.190 -0.084***
0.660 0.076 0.858 -0.993 -2.157
PTFSBD 0.027*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.031 0.056***
3.330 2.457 2.047 1.526 4.162
PTFSFX 0.042*** 0.034*** 0.085*** 0.030*** -0.017
5.546 3.871 6.282 3.534 -1.595
PTFSCOM 0.037** 0.092*** -0.026** 0.017** 0.089***
2.796 5.396 -1.719 1.739 5.270
PTFSIR -0.008* -0.012 0.025*** 0.010 -0.022***
-1.833 -1.028 3.345 0.908 -6.320
PTFSSTK 0.030*** 0.015 0.020 0.021 0.068***
2.952 0.743 1.124 1.729 5.047
GSCIRF 0.0742*** 0.081** 0.088*** 0.074*** 0.055**
3.600 1.698 2.116 2.918 1.754
Adjusted R2 0.3822 0.5224
No of months 204 204
Chow Test for Structural Breaks
Sep-98 2 (10) 49.78***
Mar-00 2 (10) 27.86
Mar-03 2 (10) 47.81***
Nov-07 2 (10) 77.26***
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Table 2.8 Continued: Return Decomposition of Value-Weighted CTA Index
(with AUM lter)
Table 2.8 Panel B reports the results of regressing a value-weighted index of excess CTA
returns on the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model extended with PTFSIR (the excess
return of the portfolio of lookback straddle options on interest rate), PTFSSTK (the excess
return of the portfolio of lookback straddle options on stock) and GSCIRF (the excess return
on the GSCI index). Column two shows the results of the regression for the entire period,
January 1994 to December 2010. Columns three to six report the results of the regression
(4.6) for each subperiod. D1 is set to one during the rst period (January 1994 to September
1998) and zero elsewhere, D2 is set to one during the second period (October 1998 to March
2003) and zero elsewhere, D3 is set to one during the third period (April 2003 to July 2007)
and zero elsewhere and D4 is set to one during the nal period (August 2007 to end of data,
December 2010) and zero elsewhere. Values of the t-statistics, calculated using Newey-West
(1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimates of the standard errors,
are reported in italics below each coecient. Statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively. The bottom panel reports the Chi-squared
statistics for the Chow test for structural breaks.
Panel B:
Jan 1994-Dec 2010 Period I Period II Period III Period IV
Constant 0.0088*** 0.0054** 0.0064* 0.0041 0.0179***
-5.2163 2.2991 1.9117 1.3047 5.5078
SNPMRF -0.0132 0.0197 -0.1139* 0.6163*** 0.0270
-0.2968 0.2502 1.9117 7.0329 0.4251
SCMLC -0.0005 -0.1735** 0.0417 0.0505 -0.2089
-0.0092 -2.2899 0.5770 0.5720 -1.5391
BD10RET 0.2389*** 0.1987 0.3787** 0.3088*** -0.0756
3.1257 1.3620 2.3670 3.3045 -0.6409
BAAMTSY 0.0263 -0.0561 0.1569 -0.0268 -0.1398**
0.3069 -0.1707 0.6554 -0.1201 -1.7416
PTFSBD 0.0294*** 0.0398** 0.0321 0.0422** 0.060***
3.091 2.4657 1.8155 1.7054 2.7590
PTFSFX 0.0397*** 0.0289*** 0.0793*** 0.0330*** -0.033**
4.4581 3.3939 5.5056 2.6583 -1.7781
PTFSCOM 0.0363** 0.0966*** -0.0305* 0.0056 0.1030***
2.5534 6.5198 -1.7886 0.4475 4.0371
PTFSIR -0.0129** -0.0182 0.0412*** 0.0353*** -0.0306***
-2.0199 -1.5235 4.2641 2.2095 -4.3351
PTFSSTK 0.0427*** 0.0212 0.0262 0.0412*** 0.0786***
3.2056 1.0028 1.2536 2.5563 4.0091
GSCIRF 0.0659** 0.0830 0.0969* 0.0487** 0.0414
2.4503 1.6640 1.7934 1.6818 0.8578
Adjusted R2 0.3209 0.4987
No. of months 204 204
Chow Test for Structural Breaks
Sep-98 2 (10) 49.15***
Mar-00 2 (10) 20.57*
Mar-03 2 (10) 60.17***
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.14: Performance of Portfolios of CTAs Formed on Size
Table 2.14 reports the results of equally-weighted portfolios of CTAs formed on fund size for
the period January 1994 to December 2010. Funds are sorted each year in terciles based on
their mean assets under management in the previous 24 month period. The ten factor model
was used to assess the out-of-sample performance of CTAs. t-statistics for the signicance of
alpha are reported in parentheses.
One Year Evaluation Period
Systematic
Tercile 1 Tercile 2 Tercile 3 Tercile 3 - Tercile 1
5.58 8.02 9.03 3.46
(2.74) (3.73) (3.89) (2.95)
Adj R2 37.33 43.14 33.37
Discretionary Tercile 1 Tercile 2 Tercile 3 Tercile 3 - Tercile 1
7.62 3.12 4.7 -2.91
(2.71) (2.17) (4.23) (-1.02)
Adj R2 15.21 11.62 22.03
Six Months Evaluation Period
Systematic
Tercile 1 Tercile 2 Tercile 3 Tercile 3 - Tercile 1
6.05 7.86 8.8 2.75
(3.12) (3.64) (3.96) (2.59)
Adj R2 39.06 42.43 33.03
Discretionary
Tercile 1 Tercile 2 Tercile 3 Tercile 3 - Tercile 1
8.41 3.62 4.97 -3.45
(2.95) (2.46) (4.48) (-1.19)
Adj R2 14.32 0.02 23.58
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Figure 2.1: Scaled Recursive Residuals for the CTAs
Figure 2.1A. shows a plot scaled recursive residuals for the equally-weighted index of CTA
returns. Figure 2.1B. shows a plot of scaled recursive residuals for the value-weighted index
of CTA returns. Figure 2.1C. shows a plot of scaled recursive residuals for the value-weighted
index of discretionary CTA returns.
Figure 2.1A











 Scaled Recursive Residuals for the CTAs (Equal−Weighted Index with AUM Filter, F−H Model), 1995 −2010
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Figure 2.1B











 Scaled Recursive Residuals for the CTAs (Value−Weighted Index, F−H Model ), 1995 −2010
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Figure 2.1C











 Scaled Recursive Residuals for Discretionary CTAs, (Value−Weighted Index, F−H Model with GSCI), 1995−2010
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Figure 2.2: Total AUM for the CTA Industry
Figure 2.2 shows a plot of total assets under management and growth in the number of funds













































Number of funds and Assets Under Management in the CTA 
industry 1993-2010 
Total AUM No. of funds 
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Figure 2.3: CTA Mean Assets Under Management
Figure 2.3 shows a plot of mean assets under management for the managed futures industry,
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Figure 2.6: Cumulative Excess Returns: Equally-Weighted Portfolios
adjusted for biases and with AUM lter for Systematic and Discretionary
Funds
Figure 2.6 shows a plot of Equally-Weighted Portfolios of Excess Returns of Systematic and
Discretionary CTAs adjusted for instant history and survivorship biases and with AUM lter.








Much of the literature on Commodity Trading Advisors has focused on performance
attribution and its persistence (see Irwin and Brorsen (1998), Brown et al. (2001) and
Gregoriou et al. (2010)). According to recent media reports, however, CTAs were one
of the few protable trading strategies during the nancial crisis of 2008.1 Figure 3.1
shows that as a result of this good performance, CTAs received a large inow of assets
thereafter despite a simultaneous decrease in the number of funds. Little attention has
been paid to CTA fund ows and the factors relating to them in the academic literature.
Brown et al. (2001) and Do et al. (2011) are the only studies that have considered the
fund ow-performance relationship. CTAs appear to have regained investors' interest
in the last few years. It is, therefore, of interest to study the behaviour of investor ows
to individual CTAs and the factors that investors consider before placing their money
into these funds.
In the mutual fund literature the fund ow-performance relationship has been exten-
sively analyzed. For example, Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and
Tufano (1998) have analyzed the driving factors of ows into the mutual fund industry
and found that these are positively related to past relative performance. However, this
relationship is found to be nonlinear and dierent across dierent performance regions.
For example the authors nd that for the top performers - funds in the top performance
quintile - performance is associated with economically and statistically signicant in-
ows i.e. a positive and statistically signicant coecient. That is top performing funds
that experience good performance will further increase in size. In the lowest quintile
however, the association is weak and insignicant. This is seen graphically in Figure
3.122. The relationship between ows and performance is only signicant for funds
in the top performance region and insignicant in the low performance region (note
absence of slope in the leftmost portion of ow/performance graph) producing a con-
1The Financial Times, March 2011. \CTAs: \True diversiers" with returns to boot".
2Reproduced from Sirri and Tufano (1998).
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vex ow-performance relationship. The authors attribute this to investors chasing past
performance by disproportionately selecting high performing funds while failing to ee
from lesser performing funds at the same rate (i.e. absence of signicant slope). Other
signicant factors are the volatility of returns and fees which negatively impact ows.
In the hedge fund literature the ow-performance relationship has also been extensively
analysed albeit with mixed results. For example using annual hedge fund data Agarwal,
Daniel and Naik (2003) also found a positive and convex ow performance relationship
for hedge funds: well performing funds in the top quintile attract signicantly greater
inows than their poorly performing counterparts. On the other hand, using a single
linear response equation, Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003) found the relationship
between ows and past performance to be negative: managers refuse new money af-
ter a good year and seek additional funding after a bad year. The authors propose
that in a stylized framework in a which hedge fund manager exploits limited arbitrage
opportunities, capital can be put to a protable use only up to the point after which
any additional capital inows will lead to an increase in systematic risk. Therefore the
authors argue that since hedge fund technology is non-linear, managers may refuse new
money when they do well. However, when the authors examine the dierential response
of new money to past performance by allowing coecients to dier for dierent per-
formance quintiles of lagged returns as in the mutual fund framework, they nd that
the coecient is negative only in the high performance region and positive in the low
performance region. That is, new money ows out of the good performers producing
a concave ow-performance relationship. This, the authors argue, provides support for
the hypothesis that good performers may not readily accept new money due to limited
arbitrage opportunities. This highlights the need to account for the nonlinearity of the
relationship between ows and past performance. Getmansky (2005) also nds a con-
cave fund ow-performance relationship for hedge funds, although the response of ows
to the top performers is insignicant rather than negative as in Goetzmann et al. (2003):
top performing funds do not grow proportionately as much as the average fund in the
market. On the other hand, Baquero and Verbeek (2009) nd that the response of ows
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to past performance is invariant to the performance region to which a fund belongs to,
that is they nd a strictly linear response. Finally, Ding, Getmansky, Liang and Werm-
ers (2009) attempt to reconcile these dierences in results in the response of ows to past
hedge fund performance. The authors argue that dierences in the liquidity restrictions
of hedge funds, such as fund lockups, aect the shape of the ow-performance relation-
ship: funds with tighter share restrictions have a concave ow-performance relationship
and funds without any restrictions have a convex ow-performance relationship.
Studies of CTA fund ows are rather limited as most of the literature has focused
on performance attribution. Lajbcygier (2008) and Do et al. (2011) are the only stud-
ies that have looked at the factors determining CTA ows and have found a positive
relationship between fund ows and past performance. However, the authors have not
examined if this response is dierential across dierent performance regions as was found
in the mutual fund, hedge fund and private equity (See Kaplan and Schoar (2003)) in-
dustries. CTAs however are dierent to both hedge funds and mutual funds. From
a regulatory point of view, CTAs are less transparent and less regulated than mutual
funds. That said, momentum, the main trading style of many CTAs has been well an-
alyzed by researchers, yet their trading activities are still somewhat of a black box for
many unsophisticated investors and are far less transparent than those of the mutual
funds. The convex ow-performance relationship found in the mutual fund industry has
been attributed to the transparency of the trading styles and the liquidity of the indus-
try. On the other hand, the concave ow-performance relationship found by academic
research for hedge funds has been attributed to extensive investor search costs, limits to
the investment strategies and tighter share restrictions. Commodity Trading Advisors,
however, trade in the most liquid instruments, futures and forwards, the markets for
which are very deep and liquid. As a result, the subscription and redemption notices
tend to be much shorter for many CTAs than for hedge funds. Academic studies have
also found managed futures to have less illiquidity than hedge funds, Getmansky, Lo and
Makarov (2004) and Bollen and Whaley (2009). From a structural and functional point
of view this places CTAs somewhere between hedge funds and mutual funds. These
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dierences may have implications for how investors will allocate their portfolios across
dierent funds. Hence this leads to a question: What are the determinants of money-
ows in CTAs and in particular how are they related to fund's past performance?
In this chapter I analyze the response of quarterly and yearly money ows to the
past relative performance of CTAs. In particular, following earlier literature on hedge
funds and mutual funds, I look at whether this relationship is dierential in dierent
performance regions. Whilst Ding, Getmansky, Liang and Wermers (2009) focus on
annual data for hedge funds, I use both quarterly and yearly data to study the ow-
performance relationship of CTAs. Baquero and Verbeek (2009) also use quarterly and
annual data for hedge funds and show that the shape of the ow-performance relation-
ship diers depending on the time horizon employed in the study. Accordingly, I use
piecewise linear regression to model the non-linearity of the ow-performance relation-
ship and apply it to quarterly as well as yearly data. I also look at the possible eect
of the share restrictions in the CTA industry on the ow-performance relationship. As
argued by Ding et al. (2009), in the presence of share restrictions, the ow-performance
relationship of hedge funds becomes concave, whilst in the absence of share restrictions
it remains convex, as previously documented in the literature. Since the BarclayHedge
database has incomplete information on CTA share restrictions, I model the restrictions
using Getmansky et al.'s (2004) asset illiquidity parameter, 0 and show that there
are a few CTA strategies, such as systematic spread/relative value and discretionary
spread/relative value strategies, that do indeed have tighter share restrictions than the
other CTA strategies. These share restrictions, however, have a limited eect on the
shape of the ow-performance relationship in the CTA industry. Instead I argue that,
in the CTA industry, the strategy of the CTA and the size of the fund have a more
signicant impact on the shape of the ow-performance relationship. For the quarterly
data, I nd that the relationship is concave and largely driven by large CTAs. However,
these fund ows are inuenced by the strategy that the CTAs belong to. By extending
the analysis of fund ow-performance relationship to individual CTA strategies, I nd
that systematic CTAs have a linear quarterly ow-performance relationship whilst dis-
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cretionary CTAs have a concave quarterly relationship and that this is mainly driven
by small discretionary CTAs.
In the last section I also address the eect of ows on performance persistence and,
to this end, I look at the smart money eect in the CTA industry. Smart money is
dened as the ability of investors to infer the skill of the fund managers and therefore to
allocate assets more smartly between those fund managers, thereby receiving a greater
return in the next period than other \naive" investors. The smart money eect has been
extensively documented in the mutual fund and hedge fund industry. Gruber (1996) and
Zheng (1999) studied the smart money eect on the mutual fund industry and found
that ows predicted future returns. Sapp and Tiwari (2004), however, attribute this
eect to the momentum of the strategies of mutual funds, whilst Frazzini and Lamont
(2008), who have more recently looked at the long-term performance of smart money,
nd that it quickly reverses. In the hedge fund industry, the ndings have been rather
mixed. Baquero and Verbeek (2009) nd no smart money eect in the TASS hedge fund
database, whilst Ding et al. (2009) nd some smart money eect but only in the absence
of share restrictions. Ozik and Sadka (2010) nd a smart money eect for hedge funds
in the TASS database for the period 1999-2008 but show that the smart money strategy
predominantly stems from funds that have a higher ow-impact coecient. Moreover,
the eect is more apparent for outows than inows. Ahoniemi and Jylha (2011) also
nd evidence of smart money in the TASS hedge fund data, although their focus is on
the contemporaneous direction of causality and thus no smart money eect is found past
the months of the ows. In the CTA literature only one study has thus far addressed
the eect of smart money. Do, Fa, Lajbcygier and Veeraraghavan (2010) analysed the
CTA ow data in the BarclayHedge database for the period 1975 to April 2006, nding
no evidence of smart money.
Turning to the issue of the eect of hedge fund ows on performance persistence,
according to Berk and Green's (2004) model for mutual funds, persistence in the mutual
fund industry is rather indicative of the lack of competition in the supply of capital.
Thus, Baquero and Verbeek (2009) nd that, at the quarterly horizon, where response
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of money ows to hedge funds is weaker, there is evidence of performance persistence for
better performing funds but this persistence disappears at the annual horizon as investor
ows catch up. Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2008) also nd that the alpha of
fund of hedge funds tends to zero with an increase in the supply of capital. In the second
part of this thesis, I found that there is performance persistence for CTAs at the annual
horizon and that performance persistence is driven by large systematic funds, whereas
for discretionary funds it is driven by small funds. In this chapter I analyze the eect
of ows on the performance persistence of large funds at quarterly and annual horizons
and nd opposite results to those of Baquero and Verbeek (2009). Systematic CTAs
with large inows show no performance persistence at a quarterly horizon but evidence
of performance persistence at an annual horizon. For discretionary CTAs the pattern
is somewhat similar to hedge funds. I nd no evidence, however, of any smart money
eect in the CTA industry, despite using two dierent methodologies and applying them
to various CTA strategies. My results indicate that investors do not always appear to
be able fully to exploit the liquidity that CTAs provide.
Although fund ow-performance relationship and the smart money eect have been
well addressed in the hedge fund industry, to the best of my knowledge the eect of
ows on performance and persistence has not been rigorously examined in the CTA
literature. So far, Do, Fa, Lajbcygier and Veeraraghavan (2010) is the only study that
exclusively addresses this issue. In this study, I therefore provide several contributions
to the CTA literature. Whilst Do et al. (2010) also use the BarclayHedge database
strategy classications to study CTAs, as I have shown previously in this thesis, most
of the funds in the BarclayHedge database require manual reclassication. To that end
I hand-collected a substantial amount of missing information by direct contact with the
industry professionals to ascertain the exact strategy classication of each fund. This
thesis, therefore, uses the most thoroughly constructed CTA strategy classications that
allows a more robust study of the dierences between two important strategies among
CTAs: systematic and discretionary. Furthermore, unlike previous studies in the CTA
literature I apply the ow-performance relationship using quarterly as well as annual
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data and nd that the relationship at the quarterly horizon is dierent for some strate-
gies than for others. To the best of my knowledge, I am also the rst to test for the eect
of ows on performance persistence in the CTA industry. My results show that CTAs
have long term performance persistence rather than short-term performance persistence
with large inows of capital and that this is mainly driven by large systematic CTAs.
Finally, this chapter is related to the literature on capacity constraints. To the best
of my knowledge this is the rst paper to look at capacity constraints within various
CTA strategies. In the hedge fund literature, capacity constraints have been studied
by Fung, Naik and Ramadorai (2008) who nd evidence of diminishing alpha with an
increase in asset ows for fund of hedge funds. Naik, Ramadorai and Stromquist (2007)
further examine capacity constraint at the level of hedge fund strategies and nd four
hedge fund strategies that are capacity constrained: Relative Value, Directional Traders,
Emerging Markets and Fixed Income. Managed futures, they document, do not appear
to suer from capacity constraints. This chapter explicitly addresses the question of
capacity constraints between systematic and discretionary CTAs. Could the dierences
between these two types of funds aect the response of their returns to capital inows? I
hypothesize that, if at all, and despite the fact that futures markets are relatively liquid
and deep, discretionary funds are more likely than systematic funds to experience capac-
ity constraints. This is due to the fact that systematic CTAs are more likely to benet
from diversication across multiple markets whilst discretionary CTAs are limited by
the number of markets a human is able to follow. Baltas and Kosowski (2012) recently
nd a lack of capacity constraints in momentum strategies. They do not, however, use
the same data classication as in this study and thus do not examine dierences be-
tween systematic and discretionary CTAs. Furthermore, if capacity constraints are not
the cause of the lack of short-term performance persistence for systematic CTAs this
poses an interesting avenue for future research.
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3.2 Data
In this study, CTA performance and ows are evaluated using monthly net-of-fee returns
and assets-under-management (AUM) of live and dead CTAs reported in the Barclay-
Hedge database between January 1994 and December 2010. This time period spans the
bull periods, pre 2000 and 2003-2007, as well as the bear market periods starting with
the burst of the technology bubble in the spring of 2000 and the recent nancial crisis of
2008. The BarclayHedge database has perhaps the most comprehensive coverage of the
total CTAs in existence including the largest percentage of defunct funds (Joenvaara et
al. (2012)), thus making it potentially less aected by survivorship bias. Joenvaara et
al. (2012) further observe that AUM coverage in the BarclayHedge database is superior
to other databases. Since AUM series is especially important for calculating the ow
rates, this makes this database particularly attractive.
BarclayHedge reports two separate databases, consisting of both active live and de-
funct funds, the \graveyard". The graveyard keeps track of the funds that ceased to
report to the database because of liquidation or some other reason. To minimize the sur-
vivorship bias this study includes both live and defunct CTA funds. For each individual
fund, BarclayHedge provides information on monthly returns (net of management and
performance fees), assets under management (AUM), management and incentive fees,
lockup period, strategy classication as well as brief strategy description and various
other information specic to fund characteristics. As of December 2010 there were a
total of 4,048 defunct and live CTAs. To avoid double counting, all fund of funds were
removed, leaving a total of 3916 unique CTAs with a total AUM at the end of 2010 of
about US$480 billion. The industry coverage is shown in Figure 3.1. The assets under
management have grown from just over US$20 billion in 1993 to over US$480 billion by
the end of 2010. One important item worth noting is the reversal in the growth of the
number of CTAs after 2008, the year of the nancial crisis. However, this fall in the
number of funds was accompanied by a rise in assets under management. Some funds
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have clearly liquidated but the remaining funds have received more capital, perhaps as
investors began to reallocate to the CTAs in the knowledge of their attractive perfor-
mance during down markets.
In this dataset I control for a number of potential biases. Firstly, I eliminate du-
plicate share classes from the same fund family. For example two funds can appear in
the database under the same name and be run by the same fund manager but one will
be denoted as \onshore" and the other as \oshore". These are created for regulatory
reasons but are virtually identical to one another. Similarly there can be one fund that
is an \LP" and another \Ltd", or \Client" and \Proprietary". There are also many in-
stances of funds that provide multiple share classes denominated in various currencies,
EUR or GBP, designed for clients who choose to invest in currencies other than US$.
These structures are common in the hedge fund and CTA industries, where managers
set up a master-feeder fund structure, with multiple feeders feeding to the same fund.
Another example of duplicate funds is when a fund appears with the same name twice
but one is an older version designated as \Old". Such a fund will have an identical
but shorter return history and should therefore be removed. In order to deal with the
duplicates I used the following methodology: rstly I identied all the management
companies with multiple funds and searched for funds with the same name by string
comparison. Thereafter, if their return series had a correlation of 0.95 or more then
they were conrmed as duplicates. To decide which duplicates to remove I used either
the longest return series or, if the duplicates had an identical length of return series, I
selected the fund with the larger assets under management base. This method is similar
to the one employed by Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) and Avramov et al. (2011). It
is important to emphasize that this procedure would understate the aggregate assets
for the manager of the fund with the duplicates that exist side by side with their own
respective AUM. However, this is not crucial for the remainder of the analysis but for
the purposes of accuracy, Figure 3.1 shows total assets in the industry by including all
the duplicate funds.
Apart from removing duplicates I also removed funds that reported gross-of-fee re-
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turns and funds that reported quarterly returns instead of monthly returns. As a result,
the remaining dataset of CTAs contained 2677 funds, of which 728 funds were in the
Live database and 1949 funds in the Defunct database. Furthermore, I removed funds
that had no AUM series but only a return series and applied the dynamic AUM lter
used throughout this study. This left a total of 908 funds. There were further concerns
on the accuracy of the information on total assets-under-management (AUM), since for
some funds reported values ended in substantial number of zeros. Because money ows
will be derived from the reported AUM values, these zeros had to be removed. If a fund
had one month of missing assets under management, I linearly interpolated the missing
observations using adjacent assets under management. If assets under management were
reported as 0 in the middle of an AUM series, those observations were eliminated and
the longest resulting AUM time-interval was reported. Because this study uses quarterly
data as well as yearly data, all the funds with less than four quarters of return history
were also removed. Although this may impose a survival condition, it also insures that
a sucient number of lagged returns would be available for model estimation. Further-
more, it removes the extreme cash inow rates that are commonly associated with the
incubation stage (Baquero and Verbeek, 2009). Finally, after these extensive lters,
there were 854 funds left in my sample.
3.2.1 Share Restrictions
In contrast to the study of Ding et al. (2009), who report various parameters for
share restrictions obtained from the TASS database, this study is unable to collect
this data due to incomplete information in the BarclayHedge database. Out of 2677
funds, this information is frequently missing or simply written as \Not Provided". For
example, for advance notice period, out of 2677 funds 1231 funds have this eld empty.
Ding et al. (2009) show that asset illiquidity and the smoothing parameter, 0, can
be used as a proxy for share restrictions. Although there is a distinction at the fund
level and asset illiquidity at the underlying security the authors demonstrate that all
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the restrictions such as subscription, redemption, advance notice and lock-up periods
increase monotomically with an increase in asset illiquidity. This study will therefore
use the asset illiquidity parameter, 0 to model share restrictions.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Capital Flow Analysis
An important characteristic of this study is the use of quarterly data as well as annual
data. Since CTAs are reported to be more liquid than hedge funds the use of quarterly
data is particularly important as it enables an exploration of the short-term dynamics
of the inows and outows. Previous studies have mainly used either annual data, e.g.
Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2009), Ding et al. (2009). Others have employed quarterly
time horizon, Getmansky (2005), Fung et al. (2008) and Baquero and Verbeek (2009).
Following Sirri and Tufano (1998) and others, ows are measured as the growth rate
of a fund's total assets-under-management (AUM) between the beginning and end of
the quarter t, net of investment returns, assuming all the dividends are reinvested. The
denition assumes that ows occur at the end of the period t.
Flowi;t =
AUM +i;t  AUMi;t 1(1 +Ri;t)
AUMi;t 1
(3.1)
Baquero and Verbeek (2009) also use an alternative measure, DollarFlow:
DollarF lowi;t = AUM +i;t  AUMi;t 1(1 +Ri;t) (3.2)
This denition has a drawback in the event that inows or outows are proportional
to the size of the fund, irrespective of its performance. On the other hand, the other
measure of ow can be magnied by the inow rates of small funds. Since this study has
removed small funds this is unlikely to be a problem and therefore the rst denition is
used throughout this study. The ows are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to
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prevent outliers from aecting the analysis.
3.3.2 Performance Measures and Flow-Performance Relation-
ship
The ow-performance relationship requires the use of the right performance measure.
From a theoretical perspective I use the information that would be available to prospec-
tive investors: i.e. simple performance measures that are available in most databases,
raw returns. Baquero and Verbeek (2009) show that relative performance is also a good
predictor of ows as well as absolute performance. Following previous literature, I use
relative performance.
In order to study the dierential response of ows to past performance I use the
methodology of Sirri and Tufano (1998), also used in the hedge fund literature, by using
a piecewise linear regression. To that end, each year, I separate fund returns in the
cross section into performance terciles. To do this as in Sirri and Tufano (1998) I rst
assign to each fund i a fractional rank, Franki;t 1, from 0 to 1 which is based on returns
during previous year/quarter. This fractional rank represents the fund's percentile per-
formance relative to other funds with the same investment objective in the same period.
For example if a fund has a Franki;t 1 of 0.20 this means that the fund was better than
20% of its peer group. In this study, fractional ranks are dened on the basis of funds'
raw returns. I then estimate the coecients on fractional ranks using piecewise linear
regression over three terciles that allows one to estimate a possible dierential response
of money ows to past performance. Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Agarwal et al. (2003)
use quintiles instead of terciles but then group the middle three quintiles together as
they nd that the coecients on the middle three quintiles are not signicantly dierent
from each other. Therefore, following Getmansky (2005) and Ding et al. (2009) I use
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; F ranki;t   Trank1i;t   Trank2i;t) Top tercile rank (3.3)
For example if a fund's fractional rank in the previous year/quarter was 0.4 then it would
have bottom tercile rank, Trank1i;t = Min(
1
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; 0:4) = 1
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0. The coecients on these piecewise decompositions of fractional ranks i.e. Tranks, rep-
resent the slope of the ow-performance relationship over dierent performance regions
and thus capture incremental slope coecient with respect to the previous performance
region. In such specication therefore, concavity in the ow-performance relationship is
represented by the slope coecient of the bottom Trank being signicantly higher than
the next Trank whilst the convexity is represented by the slope coecient of a higher
tercile being higher than the previous lower tercile.
In order to compare my ndings for CTAs with those of Ding et al. (2009), Agarwal
et al. (2004), Baquero and Verbeek (2009) for hedge funds and Sirri and Tufano (1998)
for mutual funds, I follow a similar methodology and use the following multivariate
regression to examine the determinants of money ows into CTAs.





i;t 1 + 2i;t 1 + 3ln(AUMi;t 1) + 4ln(AGEi;t 1) +
+5Flowi;t 1 + 6Livei + 7HWMi + 8ManagementFeei +
+9IncentiveFeei + 10StyleEffect+ i;t (3.4)
where Trankji;t 1 is as dened before, i;t 1 is the standard deviation of monthly returns
of fund i during quarter/year t-1. Included are also the natural logarithm of size and
age of fund i in the previous period. Unlike Ding et al. (2009), I include the logarithm
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of age and size to account for the possible nonlinearity. Flowi;t 1 is the money-ow in
fund i in the previous quarter/year, Livei equals 1 if the fund is in the Live database,
and 0 if it is in the Defunct database, HWMi equals 1 if a fund has a high water mark
provision and 0 otherwise, ManagementFeei is the management fee charged by the
fund and measured as a percentage of assets under management, IncentiveFeei is the
incentive fee charged by fund i, also measured as a percentage of a fund's upside. Style
Eect captures the inuence of average ow into the same style as the fund i, and i;t is
the error term.
Hypothesis 1: Positive fund ow-performance relationship: Funds with better past
performance will attract higher inows than funds with lower performance
As discussed before, it is likely that good past performance will serve as a signal to in-
vestors and will attract new inows. As CTAs are restricted from advertising, investors
will infer manager's ability from past performance. That is the relationship will be
positive. However, given the results of the mutual fund and hedge fund literature, this
relationship may not be linear - that is the response of investors to past performance
may be dierential depending on the fund's past relative performance.
Hypothesis 2: Funds with higher past inows are likely to attract higher current ows
In addition to past performance, investors may also use past ows as a signal of man-
ager's ability, that is higher past inows into a fund will signal a manager's quality.
Previous studies in the hedge fund literature have found a positive and signicant re-
lationship between past and current ows, Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2004) and Get-
mansky (2005).
Hypothesis 3: Size of the fund is likely to negatively inuence future inows
Previous literature on hedge funds has found that larger funds are less likely to receive
future inows, Getmansky (2005), Agarwal et al. (2004) and Ding et al. (2009). Ding et
al. (2009) show that percentage ows are less sensitive to performance for larger funds
indicating that these funds are too large to eciently exploit market ineciencies. A
priori it is unclear as to the direction of this relationship for CTAs as the main trading
style of many CTAs is trend-following.
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In analyzing the above relationship, I estimate each quarter or year a piecewise lin-
ear regression using Fama and Macbeth's (1973) technique. Cross-sectional regressions
are run each quarter/year. Thereafter, the time-series of the estimated coecients are
averaged and their t-statistics are computed. Following Petersen (2009), t-statistics are
scaled to adjust for the possible correlation in coecients across time. As argued by
Sirri and Tufano (1998) this multivariate regression can be estimated using a pooled re-
gression method as well as Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. However, the authors
highlight the potential problems in using a pooled regression technique, which implic-
itly assumes each fund-quarter/year observation to be an independent observation. If
this assumption is violated, it will lead to an underestimation of the standard errors
and hence the statistical tests will be inaccurate. Therefore, Sirri and Tufano (1998)
recommend the use of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) technique which produces more
conservative estimates of the standard errors. For this reason, this technique has also
been adopted in the previously mentioned studies of the ow-performance relationship
e.g. Ding et al. (2009), Getmansky (2005) and Agarwal et al. (2004).
3.3.3 Asset Illiquidity Parameter, 0
Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) propose a general model of the illiquidity and
smoothing of hedge fund returns. Denoting the true economic return of a hedge fund
in period t by Rt, Rt is then assumed to satisfy the following linear single-factor model:
Rt = + t + t; E[t] = E[t] = 0; t;t  IID (3.5)
and
V ar[Rt]  2 (3.6)
This true return represents the return that would determine the equilibrium value of the
fund's securities in a frictionless market. This true return is rarely observed, however,
and instead we observe R0t which represents the reported return in period t. The authors
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model this return as:
R0t = 0Rt + 1Rt 1 + 2Rt 2
j 2 [0; 1]; j = 0; 1; 2
0 + 1 + K = 1 (3.7)
R0t is a weighted average of the fund's true monthly returns, Rt, over the most recent
k+1 months including the current months. Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) set k to
2 and estimate 0, 1, 2 using a maximum likelihood procedure. As such, 0 measures
asset illiquidity or return smoothing. If 0 is close to 1 for a specic fund then most of
the real contemporaneous return is currently reected in the observed return, therefore
such a fund exhibits lack of smoothing and more liquidity. If 0 is small, however, then
a fund is rather illiquid and is more likely to exhibit smoothing of returns. Getmansky,
Lo and Makarov (2004) also impose a ve-year lter on the funds' return history in
order to obtain more accurate estimates of 0, 1 and 2.
3.3.4 Performance Persistence and Flows
To explore the link between performance persistence and ows, I follow the methodology
proposed in Baquero and Verbeek (2009) and sort CTAs each quarter/year into quintile
portfolios based on past quarter/year t-statistics of alphas and independently on past
quarter/year ows. When estimating alphas I extend the Fung and Hsieh factors with
the addition of GSCI in excess of the risk free rate and apply the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) to identify the optimal number of factors for each fund. This procedure
amounts to picking the right combination/number of factors by essentially maximising











I then construct portfolios at the intersection of ows and t-statistic of alphas. Three
middle quintiles are grouped into one portfolio and therefore nine portfolios are formed.
These portfolios are formed equally-weighted as well as ow-weighted and their returns
in the subsequent quarter/year are analyzed.
3.3.5 Smart Money Eect
To measure the performance of ows I use a portfolio sorts approach rather than a
regressional approach. In particular, two methodologies proposed in the literature are
employed. Firstly, I follow Zheng (1999) and apply a measure of portfolio performance




(wi;t   wi;t 1)Ri;t+1 (3.9)
where wi;t and wi;t 1 are the weights of CTA i at the end of quarters t and t-1 as mea-
sured by assets relative to the total assets of the CTA industry. Ri;t+1 is the raw return
of fund i between time t and t+1. N denotes the total number of CTAs used in the sam-
ple. This expression represents the return to the dollar invested in a zero-cost portfolio.
As shown in Zheng (1999), under the null hypothesis that investors have no selection
ability the expression above would converge to zero in large samples3. Alternatively, if
the investors are smart in allocating their capital to future well-performing funds then
the average GT measure over the sample period used should be signicantly positive
and converge to the covariance, under the assumption that the weights are uncorrelated
to the raw return, Ri;t+1.
4 The advantage of this measure is that it exclusively measures
the selection ability of investors and does not require a knowledge of the benchmark,
which is particularly useful to the study of CTAs and hedge funds. The authors who
have applied this measure are Zheng (1999) and Ding et al. (2009).
As well as applying the GT measure, Ding et al. (2009) create two zero cost portfo-
3See Grinblatt and Titman (1993) for a full discussion of the measure.
4See Zheng (1999).
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lios, equally and ow weighted, to measure the existence of smart money. Specically,
at the beginning of each quarter, each fund is put into either a positive-ow or negative-
ow portfolio depending upon whether the ows in the previous quarter were positive
or negative. The portfolios are formed by going long on the positive ow funds and
going short on the negative-ow funds and are created either equally-weighted or ow-
weighted. Portfolios are re-balanced quarterly and held for a quarter. Although this
is not an implementable trading strategy as currently there is no secondary market for
tradable CTAs and hence one can not short a CTA, nevertheless, the strategy serves to
show the relationship between ows and performance. The above measures only show
the eect of ows on the next period return. If the smart money eect holds, how-
ever, one should be able to see the dierence in performance between the high and low
ow portfolios persist for the months following the formation. In this spirit, I follow
the methodology of Baquero and Verbeek (2009) and form positive-ows portfolios and
negative-ows portfolios by creating two investment and divestment portfolios. Follow-
ing Zheng (1999), the performance of these portfolios is examined over several holding
periods, from one to eight quarters, by compounding their returns. In addition both
equally-weighted and ow-weighed portfolios are formed. The procedure is repeated
each quarter with portfolios re-balanced assuming investors adopt the follow-the-money
approach. Time average of the time series are reported for the holding periods as well
as the ranking period.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for equally-weighted CTA quarterly ows across
each category for the period January 1994 to December 2010. Panel A shows quarterly
ows for the entire dataset of all funds, Panel B shows the same statistics for Live funds
only and Panel C for Defunct funds. Flows are dened as the percentage change in
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assets between the end of the previous quarter and the end of the next quarter, net of
quarterly returns. Initially, ows are calculated for each CTA for each quarter. Then
they are aggregated for each category using equal weights. For each category ows are
also winsorized at the top 1% to prevent the inuence of outliers. Table 3.3 also shows
the quarterly ow rate, return and aggregate AUM for the CTA industry for each quar-
ter over the period January 1994 to December 2010.
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows that the average growth rate of the entire sample was
10.75%. This is slightly lower than the 15.93% rate reported for hedge funds in Ding
et al. (2009) but slightly higher than the rate reported there for managed futures. The
ow rate is highest for systematic short-term trend-following funds (23.57%) and dis-
cretionary technical funds (19.05%). Categories with the lowest ow rates are system-
atic long-term trend-following funds (4.32%) and medium-term trend-following funds
(7.82%). Nevertheless, all these rates are still higher than comparative equally-weighted
returns from Table 3.2, which are less than 3%, demonstrating that CTAs grow mainly
externally from an increase in client capital inows. Of interest is the standard devi-
ation of 6.54% which is signicantly lower than the standard deviation of hedge funds
reported in Ding et al. (2009). For some strategies, however, the volatility of ows is
much higher: systematic short-term trend-following funds and discretionary technical
and spread/RV funds exhibit volatility of ows of 23.53%, 23.43% and 30.25% respec-
tively. Flows of discretionary funds are overall more volatile than ows of systematic
funds. For all CTAs, average ows uctuate from a minimum of -3.38% to a maximum
of 25.68% although these rates are much higher for other strategies e.g. systematic
short-term funds with a maximum of 120.94%. All CTAs exhibit positive skewness of
ows, with the discretionary spread/RV funds having the most positive skewness of 2.59.
Similar to the ndings of Ding et al. (2009), ows also appear to be sticky with a serial
correlation of 11.43. The Jarque-Bera test of normality is rejected for all funds apart
for two substrategies, options and systematic pattern recognition.
Panels B and C show the same statistics for Live and Defunct funds separately.
Flows are higher for Live funds, with an average ow rate for all CTAs of 11.06% and
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8.71% for Defunct funds. The standard deviation of ows of defunct funds is also higher
at 10.22% compared to live funds at 6.25%. Minimum ows are also lower (more neg-
ative) for Defunct funds than Live funds (-20.03% compared to -1.07%). Nevertheless,
maximum ows are similar between Live and Defunct funds. Flows of Live funds are
also more sticky with higher serial correlation, 14.66%, compared to 9.41% for Defunct
funds.
Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for quarterly returns of CTAs. The most rep-
resented style is systematic with 589 funds out of 894 funds. Panel A shows descriptive
statistics for all funds together, Live and Defunct, whilst Panels B and C show the
same statistics for each group separately. In each panel, statistics are calculated for
an equally-weighted portfolio of funds within each category. On average all CTAs ex-
hibit a quarterly return of 2.87% with systematic long-term trend-following funds and
discretionary fundamental & technical funds achieving the highest quarterly returns of
3.35% and 3.51% respectively. Options funds and systematic funds have higher stan-
dard deviations than other funds, whilst the highest maximum return is achieved by
the systematic long-term trend-following funds. The Jarque-Bera normality is rejected
for funds engaging in options strategies, which is consistent with these funds engaging
in highly leveraged strategies with option like features, Agarwal and Naik (2004). In
terms of higher moments, only options funds have negative skewness (-0.39%) whilst the
remaining funds have positively skewed returns. Kurtosis appears to be normal for most
funds apart from discretionary fundamental and technical funds that have a kurtosis of
7.07.
The average serial autocorrelation is negative at -3.41% but some funds, such as
discretionary spread/RV and systematic short-term funds, exhibit high and positive au-
tocorrelation of 10.7% and 10.92% respectively. Consistent with Getmansky, Lo and
Makarov (2004), funds that hold and trade illiquid securities tend to have highest rst
order serial correlation. Discretionary spread/RV funds are similar to Fixed Income
Arbitrage funds that have been shown to have high autocorrelation coecients5. The
5See Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004).
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reason for the high autocorrelation coecient of systematic short-term funds is unclear.
Panels B and C show that an equally-weighted portfolio of Live funds has a higher mean
quarterly return (3.54%) than Defunct funds (2.43%) consistent with poor performance
being the reason for the funds' liquidation. The maximum return is higher for Live
funds than for defunct ones (17.16% compared to 12.55%). The autocorrelation coef-
cient is also less negative for Live funds and more of the Live funds' categories reject
the Jarque-Bera normality of returns, indicating that some of the Defunct funds engage
in more levered and speculative strategies.
Table 3.3 shows the evolution of returns and ows for each quarter over the entire
period. Aggregate Assets-under-Management grew from around US$20000 million to
almost US$280000 million. The periods of the highest quarterly returns occurred in
the third quarter of 1998, fourth quarter of 2000, second and third quarters of 2002
and around 2008. These coincide with the periods of structural breaks identied in the
second chapter and coincide with the major crises in the nancial markets: the LTCM
debacle of 1998, the 2000 technology bubble crush and the 2008 nancial crisis. It is also
clear that investors are responsive to returns, as the largest inows are observed straight
after the above mentioned crises and periods of high return. In particular, following two
quarters of 10.23% and 7.56% returns in 2002 quarters two and three, the average ows
to CTAs increased to 17.35%, 22.61% and continued at a higher than average rate until
well into 2004. Similarly, inows were larger after the 1998 crisis. The rst quarter
of 2008 saw an increase in quarterly inows indicating investors reallocating to CTAs
during the crisis.
3.4.2 Smoothing Parameter, 0
Table 3.4 shows results for asset illiquidity and the smoothing parameter, 0, calculated
by strategy as well as pulling all CTAs together. Panel B of Table 3.4 shows results by
strategy while separating funds into Live and Defunct groups. 0 is an asset illiquidity
measure as well as the degree of smoothing, as dened in Getmansky et al. (2004). Ding
3.4. Results 209
et al. (2009), however, show that it could also be useful in capturing share restrictions
employed by hedge funds. Whilst Ding et al. (2009) employ both share restrictions as
well as 0 to measure how restrictive the funds are, I am unable to use share restrictions
due to incomplete information on these parameters in the BarclayHedge database.
To measure the degree of restrictions imposed, 0, I follow the methodology of Get-
mansky et al. (2004) and include only funds with a 5-year return history in the cal-
culation of 0. This reduces the sample size to 536 funds compared to 894 previously.
Table 3.4 shows that when taking all 536 funds together, the median asset illiquidity
proxy, 0, is 1.01, which is higher than the 0.86 reported for hedge funds in Ding et al.
(2009). If 0 for a particular fund is close to 1 then that fund exhibits more liquidity
and less return smoothing as most of the contemporaneous return is reected in the
observed data. Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) estimate 0 for managed futures for
the period 1994 to 2002 at 1.13, which is similar to my results. Of particular interest
are the dierences in results for systematic and discretionary funds. The median 0 for
most systematic funds, apart from spread/relative value, is above one at 1.05, which is
in line with the high liquidity of the CTA strategies. Discretionary funds on the other
hand, have a lower median 0 of 0.92 and closer to the 0.86 median 0 reported for the
entire universe of hedge funds in Ding et al. (2009). This highlights the dierences in
the trading style between systematic and discretionary funds where discretionary funds
are able to engage in any trade that the manager may deem protable at the time, per-
haps at times at the expense of liquidity. Discretionary spread/RV funds in particular,
have a median 0 of 0.68 which is consistent with these funds being more restrictive and
is similar to the gure of 0.76 in Getmansky et al. (2004) for Nondirectional/Relative
Value funds, which the authors show to be the ones with the largest serial correlations.
Again, systematic spread/RV funds, although more liquid than their discretionary coun-
terparts, still have the lowest median 0 out of all systematic funds, 0.93. Nevertheless,
it is still makes them more liquid than the average hedge fund.
Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the same statistics across all CTA categories separated
by funds having a status of being live or defunct. The last column reports dierence in
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the means of 0 between live and defunct funds. Apart from the discretionary technical
funds, systematic and discretionary funds have higher 0 for defunct funds, indicating
that Live funds are perhaps more restrictive, a nding similar to Ding et al. (2009).
Apart from systematic pattern recognition, however, none of these dierences are sta-
tistically signicant. In addition, defunct options funds have lower 0 than live funds.
Table 3.5 shows whether share restrictions may have an impact on fund return volatil-
ity. For each CTA category, funds are separated into those with below median 0, called
Low 0 Funds, and those with above median 0, denoted as High 0 Funds. For each
category, each CTA's observed returns are unsmoothed using Getmansky et al. (2004)
econometric model and the volatility of the real returns is calculated. Table 3.5 then
reports the average and the median standard deviation of returns and the dierence
between these averages. High 0 funds, or funds with low restrictions, appear always to
have higher volatility of returns than funds with greater restrictions. These dierences,
interestingly, are statistically signicant for the entire group of CTAs together. However,
once one looks at the sub-strategies it is apparent that the dierence is mainly driven
by systematic funds and, in particular, by the systematic trend-following funds. The
results indicate that investors understand the impact of share restrictions, in particular
when funds are more volatile, as the option to redeem becomes more valuable.
3.4.3 The Flow-Performance Relationship of CTAs
This section discusses the dynamics of the relationship between ow rate and past per-
formance in the CTA industry. Table 3.6 shows the results for Fama-MacBeth OLS
estimates of the piecewise linear regression as dened in equation (3.4). Current quar-
terly fund ows are dened as a percentage change between this period and past period
assets, adjusted for investment returns. Table 3.6 shows results for quarterly ows in
Panel A and yearly data in panel B. Baquero and Verbeek (2009) point out that it
is important to model fund ow-performance relationship using quarterly data rather
than annual data as in Ding, Germansky, Liang and Wermers (2009) and Goetzmann
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et al. (2003) which allows to investigate short-term dynamics of ows. In the case of
CTAs, most subscription and redemption frequencies are either monthly or at the most
quarterly. None are on an annual basis. Therefore, using annual data is less likely to be
relevant for CTAs.
Table 3.6 Panel A shows estimates for all CTAs together for low performance (0.201***),
middle performance (0.093***) and high performance (0.120**) terciles. Therefore, if a
fund was in the top tercile in the last quarter an increase in return by 10% would lead
to an increase of 1.2% in ows, while if the fund was in a bottom tercile an increase in
return in the last quarter of 10% would lean to an increase of 2.01% in ows in the next
quarter. Although the top performing funds appear to be growing not proportionately
as much as the average fund in the market, the relationship still appears to be linear.
All three estimates are signicant and, although they are not identical, the Chow (1960)
test does not reject the equality of these coecients and therefore linearity is not re-
jected. The relationship for quarterly ows and performance appears to be linear when
all funds are taken together. This relationship remains linear for the yearly fund ow re-
lationship, as shown in column two of Panel B, although the high performance estimate
is not signicantly dierent from zero. Other signicant variables are size, dened as
the natural logarithm of the last quarter's assets under management, last quarter's ow,
live/defunct variable and the style eect. Past ows have a positive eect on current
ows with a signicant coecient of 0.143 for quarterly data but are not signicant for
the yearly data. Hence, ows persistent only in the short-term and not in the long-run.
Ding et al. (2009) also document that standard deviation is a signicant variable, but
for my CTA data it is only signicant for Live funds, as shown in column four of Panel
A. Standard deviation is signicant for yearly ow-performance relationship, which is
similar to the Ding et al. (2009) model. Getmansky (2005), however, uses quarterly
data and also nds that standard deviation is not signicant at this frequency. The
relationship between past size and ow, holding other variables constant, is negative,
with a coecient of -0.023. Investors are less likely, or are less able, to invest if the
fund is already very large. In addition Live funds receive on average higher inows
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that Defunct funds. Unlike, Ding et al. (2009) I do not nd HWM, nor management
nor incentive fees to be signicant. The coecient estimate for Style Eect variable is
positive and signicant at 1%. Same style ows positively impact ows to an individual
fund, perhaps mimicking the current investors' preferred style.
Quarterly vs. Yearly CTA Flow-Performance Relationship
Panels A and B of Table 3.6 also show the quarterly and yearly performance ow re-
lationship for Live and Defunct funds after controlling for other fund characteristics.
For quarterly data, the relationship between ow and performance for funds in the Live
database is concave. The low performance estimate is signicant, with a coecient of
0.201, the middle performance coecient is 0.036 and not signicant and the high per-
formance coecient is 0.138 and signicant. The Chow (1960) test rejects the equality
of these coecients. The low-performance estimate is higher than the high-performance
estimate, indicating a concave relationship: that is, low performing funds command
a disproportionately higher amount of ows than high performing funds. For Defunct
funds, the coecients for the three performance ranks are 0.149, 0.451 and -0.345 respec-
tively. The coecients for the middle and high performance are signicant at 5%. The
low-performance estimate is signicantly higher than the high performance estimate,
again indicating a concave ow performance relationship, although the Chow (1960) test
only weakly rejects linearity. Getmansky (2005) also nds a concave ow-performance
relationship using quarterly data, even for most hedge fund strategies including man-
aged futures. Ding et al. (2009) use yearly data and nd the relationship to be convex
for Defunct funds, concave for funds in the Live database and linear for the entire hedge
fund database. Baquero and Verbeek (2009) use quarterly data and test rigorously for
non linearities in the data to nd that the relationship is strictly linear. For the yearly
data, Panel B, the Chow (1960) test does not reject the equality of any of the coef-
cients indicating that the yearly ow-performance relationship is linear for all CTAs
irrespective of whether they are in the Live or Defunct database.
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Separating Large and Small Funds
I further look at the potential inuence of large funds on the ow-performance rela-
tionship. To this end, Table 3.7 shows results of Fama-MacBeth OLS estimates for a
group of large funds only, i.e. funds that have reached at least US$250 million under
management during their reported return series. Again for all CTAs together the rela-
tionship is linear. All the variables that were previously signicant remain signicant
for large funds as well. Table 3.7 also shows the ow-performance relationship for large
funds from the Live and Defunct databases. For Live funds, the relationship is concave,
funds in the low performance tercile receive larger inows than funds in the highest
performance terciles. The coecient on low performance is 0.222 and signicant at 1%
whereas it is insignicant for the high performance tercile. The coecients for defunct
funds are very close to each other, 0.196 for the low performance tercile and 0.136 for
the high performance tercile, indicating the linearity of the relationship. Interestingly,
management fee is signicant and negative for large funds in the live group whereas it is
insignicant for all the other groups. This indicates that large funds that charge higher
management fees receive less inows than funds that do not. Management fee appears
to be an issue for larger funds in attracting funds, less than the rest of the CTA universe.
In unreported tests, I estimate the ow-performance relationship for small funds only
and nd that the relationship is linear across all three databases, all funds together,
Live funds and Defunct databases. Thus the concave quarterly relationship of the Live
funds reported in Panel A of table 3.6 is driven primarily by the large CTAs rather than
share restrictions as shown in Ding et al. (2009) for hedge funds. It is unlikely that
share restrictions will have an eect on the ow-performance relationship of CTAs given
the highly liquid nature of these funds.
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CTA Flow-Performance Relationship by Strategy
In order to ascertain if there are any strategy eects that could aect the ow-performance
relationship Table 3.8 reports the ow-performance relationship for each CTA strategy.
Panel A shows Fama-MacBeth OLS estimates for the ow-performance relationship for
each CTA strategy by taking Live and Defunct funds together. Unlike the results of
Getmansky (2005), who shows that the ow-performance relationship is consistent and
concave for all hedge fund strategies, CTA strategies exhibit variations in the ow-
performance relationship. Firstly, all three terciles are signicant for systematic CTAs
and most of its sub-strategies, whilst the explanatory power of the regression is weaker
for discretionary CTAs and most of its performance terciles are not signicant. I apply
the Chow (1960) test to test for equality of coecients of performance terciles to each
strategy. Systematic funds and their subcategory, trend following funds, have a linear
relationship, whilst systematic spread/relative value funds have a convex relationship
with estimates for low performance, middle performance and high performance terciles
at (-0.329***), (0.845**) and (0.119) respectively; that is, well performing funds receive
disproportionately larger inows than poorly performing funds. The situation reverses
for the discretionary funds that appear to have a concave ow-performance relationship
with coecients of (0.549***), (0.093) and (-0.113) for low, middle and high perfor-
mance terciles respectively. Furthermore, whilst the ow-performance relationship is
concave for most discretionary funds, it is convex for discretionary spread/relative value
funds, similar to systematic spread/relative value funds; that is, funds that exploit ar-
bitrage opportunities receive more inows from investors if past performance was good:
there is more return chasing by investors among these funds. Regarding other control
variables the situation is dierent for each strategy. Whilst last quarter's assets under
management are signicant for all strategies, past ow and live dummy variables are only
signicant for systematic CTAs. The economically and statistically signicant last quar-
ter's ow estimates indicate persistence in money ows for systematic trend-following
CTAs. In particular for systematic trend-following funds, an increase in last quarter's
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ow by 10% increases next quarter's ow by 1.64%, while for systematic short-term
trend-following funds a 10% increase in ows induces an increase of 3.51% in ows next
quarter. Interestingly, management fee, which was insignicant in a regression with all
CTAs becomes signicant for systematic spread/relative value funds and discretionary
technical funds. This underscores the heterogeneity of CTA strategies.
Panels B and C show by strategy results by separating the funds into large and
small funds. Comparing Panels B and C it becomes apparent that the previously found
relationship between performance and ows is driven mainly by large funds. The coef-
cients on low, middle and high performance terciles remain signicant for large funds
for systematic CTAs, but become insignicant for small systematic CTAs. Nevertheless,
the ow-performance relationship for systematic CTAs remains linear for small funds.
For discretionary funds, however, the relationship becomes concave, with performance
tercile estimates at (0.723*), (0.100) and (-0.641*) for low, middle and high performance
terciles respectively. Thus, the concavity in the ow-performance relationship of discre-
tionary CTAs is largely driven by small funds. Regarding other control variables, it
appears that the results of Panel A are mainly driven by the large funds: coecients on
the log of assets under management, last quarter ow and live dummy remain signicant
for large funds but become insignicant for small funds, even though the sample size
of the funds in the small group is signicantly larger. The results, therefore, conrm
that CTA ows respond to historical relative performance and that this relationship
depends on the strategy that the fund pursues: systematic CTAs appear to have a lin-
ear quarterly relationship, irrespective of whether the funds are large or small, whereas
discretionary CTAs have a concave quarterly ow-performance relationship and this is
mainly driven by small funds.
Eect of Restrictions on the Flow-Performance Relationship
Table 3.9 shows the eect of possible share restrictions on the ow-performance rela-
tionship as discussed in Ding et al. (2009). I hypothesize that given the deep liquidity
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of the futures markets in which CTAs trade, not many CTAs are likely to have share
restrictions. In fact Table 3.4 showed that CTAs have a much higher median restriction
parameter, 0, compared to the reported median for hedge funds in Ding et al. (2009)
and Getmansky et al. (2004). Therefore it is unlikely that share restrictions will have
an impact on the ow-performance relationship of CTAs. Table 3.9 shows the eect of
the share restriction parameter by running the model in equation (3.4) with additional
interaction terms as in Ding et al.(2009): Low Performance*Low 0, Middle Perfor-
mance*Low 0 and High Performance*Low 0 where Low 0 is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if 0 is below the median level and 0 otherwise. Panel A shows the results for
quarterly data and Panel B for yearly data. In Table 3.9 Panels A and B the coecients
on interaction terms are rarely signicant. In particular for yearly data, the coecient
on interaction terms is only weakly signicant for systematic funds for the High Per-
formance*Low 0, making the relationship possibly concave. This is only signicant at
10%, however. For quarterly data, the relationship for systematic funds is convex with
the addition of interaction terms, even though the coecients on interaction terms are
not signicant. The coecient on the high performance tercile is positive and signicant
at (0.205***) while for the low performance tercile it is (0.168***). Thus, in the ab-
sence of any share restrictions well-performing funds command larger inows than worse
performing funds. This relationship appears to be driven by systematic trend-following
funds. Discretionary funds appear to have a linear relationship with none of the inter-
action terms being signicant. Of interest is the signicance of interaction terms for all
funds in Panel A. Thus, in the presence of share restrictions for all CTAs, the relation-
ship becomes more linear, with coecients for low performance, middle performance
and high performance becoming (0.164), (0.149) and (0.129). In the absence of share
restrictions, the relationship still remains linear. Hence, in conclusion, share restrictions
have a limited eect on the ow-performance relationship of CTAs.
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3.4.4 Performance Persistence and Flows
Berk and Green's (2004) model predicts that as money ows into well-performing funds
from investors chasing good performance, the inow of new assets will compete away
any future performance persistence. While this theoretical model ts well with the
empirical ndings in the mutual fund industry it has not been well sustained by the
empirical ndings in the hedge fund industry. Baquero and Verbeek (2009) test for
performance persistence and nd that in the short-term, at quarterly horizons, money
inows do not hurt performance persistence, due to the slow responsiveness of investors
to past performance. This could be due to share restrictions and search costs impeding
investors from fast allocation of funds, as is indeed possible in the mutual fund industry.
On the other hand, with time, at yearly horizons, money inows compete away any
performance persistence. For poorly performing funds, investors' withdrawals act as a
disciplining mechanism on the poorly performing funds and thus there is no persistence
of poor performance in the short term but only at yearly horizons.
In the previous section of this thesis, I found that systematic CTAs have more per-
sistence at the annual horizon and less at the quarterly one. I also found that whilst
performance persistence of discretionary funds is driven by small funds, result similar to
the hedge fund industry, performance persistence of systematic CTAs is mainly driven
by large funds. Given this nding, this section studies performance persistence of CTAs
together with money ows. Figure 3.2 shows cumulative quarterly ows for systematic
and discretionary CTAs. The broken red line shows cumulative ows of systematic CTAs
and the solid blue line the cumulative ows of the discretionary funds. Over the Jan-
uary 1994 to December 2010 period the cumulative ows of systematic CTAs have slowly
surpassed those of the discretionary funds. There is evidence that investors are aware
of the dierence in the two types of funds and have directed increasingly more capital
towards systematic CTAs. This may also point to a lack of capacity constraints among
systematic CTAs as they are more able to accept more capital than the discretionary
funds. To study the eect of capital ows on the performance persistence of systematic
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and discretionary CTAs I sort funds each quarter/year into quintiles based on their
past quarter t-statistic of Fung-Hsieh alphas and at the same time independently on
past quarterly/yearly ows. I then construct portfolios at the intersection of both sorts.
Three middle quintiles are then grouped into one portfolio and hence nine nal portfo-
lios are formed. Portfolio returns in the next quarter are created by equally-weighting
fund returns. This process is repeated each quarter/year with portfolios re-balanced at
each time. The results of this method are summarized in Tables 3.10 for quarterly data
and 3.11 for yearly data. Looking at the quarterly results for top performers across
strategies shows that they are similar across all strategies apart from options. Top per-
forming funds that receive large inows subsequently underperform funds that receive
the lowest ows or which experience outows. This is consistent with Berk and Green
(2004) model whereby large inows compete away the performance persistence of the
best performing funds. Taking all CTAs together, this dierence in under-performance
amounts to -3.98% per quarter, which is economically but not statistically signicant.
Results for all systematic funds and systematic trend-following funds are remarkably
similar with an economically signicant dierence between top performing funds with
large inows and outows of -3.58%. However, this dierence in only signicant for sys-
tematic trend-following funds. Top performing funds in the systematic trend-following
group that receive more inows, on average, perform worse in the subsequent quarter
than funds with outows (average return is 5.04% and is statistically signicant). The
options strategy is the only strategy where there is performance persistence among top
performing funds at the quarterly horizon although the dierence between top perform-
ing funds with inows and outows is not statistically signicant. These results are in
stark contrast to those reported in Baquero and Verbeek (2009) for hedge funds, who
report the continued performance persistence of top performing funds with large inows
at quarterly horizons. Baquero and Verbeek (2005) attribute this to slow responsiveness
of money ows, possibly due to share restrictions or search costs. CTAs, however are
much more liquid and it appears that investors quickly deploy capital to well-performing
funds: the average ow growth rate for top performing CTAs is 66.54% in Table 3.10
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whereas it is 39.51% for hedge funds reported in Baquero and Verbeek (2009). Interest-
ingly, the growth rate of options funds is much lower at 26.57%, perhaps explaining the
continued persistence of top performing options funds.
Panel C in Table 3.10 shows the performance of the worst performing funds. Here,
results are similar to those of Baquero and Verbeek (2009): funds that receive large
positive inows underperform funds that experience outows. For all CTAs together
this dierence amounts to -0.91%, similar in magnitude to the -0.98% reported in Ba-
quero and Verbeek (2009) for hedge funds. As investors rush to withdraw capital, they
argue, this action acts as a disciplining mechanism on fund managers who sell the worst
performing securities fast. Hence, there is no performance persistence either for the top
or the worst performing CTAs at the quarterly horizons. The situation reverses dra-
matically when one looks at Table 3.11, which depicts yearly performance persistence.
Looking at all top performing CTAs together we see that these top performing funds
that receive large inows continue to outperform funds that experience outows, aver-
age return of 31.49% per year, statistically signicant). This is contrary to the results
of Baquero and Verbeek (2009) that is there is evidence of performance persistence at
the yearly level. Looking at the results at the strategy level, we see that this remark-
able result is driven by systematic trend-following CTAs that show an economically and
statistically signicant dierence in return of top performing funds with inows and
outows of 3.19% per year. This is also suggestive of smart money in this category. For
discretionary CTAs however, the dierence in performance between funds with inows
and outows is negative and statistically signicant at -2.47% per year: that is, yearly
performance is also competed away by large inows into discretionary CTAs, a similar
result to the one found in hedge funds. These striking results are possibly indicative of
a smart money eect or the lack of capacity constraints for systematic CTAs as well as
possible capacity constraints or lack of smart money for discretionary CTAs. Looking at
Panel C for the worst performing funds at a yearly horizon, systematic CTAs show per-
formance persistence for these worst performing funds with large inows, although this
dierence is not economically or statistically signicant and systematic trend-followers
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further show the under-performance of large inow funds. Overall, at a yearly horizon,
funds in the worst performing quintile that experience outows outperform those that
receive inows. These results are further summarised in Figures 3.3, which shows quar-
terly and yearly results for systematic CTAs, and Figure 3.4, which shows the same
results for discretionary CTAs. The bars represent the time series of portfolio returns
that are reported in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. At yearly horizons top performing CTAs with
large inows signicantly outperform those with large outows for discretionary CTAs,
with the largest outperformance reported for top performing funds with the lowest in-
ows (outows) at the quarterly horizon.
In the second part of this thesis, I documented that size has an eect on performance
persistence. In this section I look at the eect of fund ows in large funds on perfor-
mance persistence. Table 3.12 shows a summary of the results of quarterly and yearly
persistence for each CTA strategy for funds in the largest AUM quintile. For compar-
ison purposes the same results are shown for the smallest AUM quintile in Table 3.13.
The results found above remain largely unaected for the funds in the top quintile. We
continue to see the performance persistence at annual horizons for top performing funds
with the largest inows outperforming funds with outows and, this time, the result
holds even for discretionary CTAs. The annual results for top performing funds are
also economically larger than those documented for the entire sample, with the largest
increase documented for systematic CTAs, 7.95% for systematic funds versus 3.84% per
year for systematic funds when we look at large and small funds together. We also
see a lack of performance persistence for top performing funds with the largest inows
at quarterly horizons and outperformance of the worst performing funds with inows
by funds with outows. Looking at results for the smallest funds, we see that there
is no performance persistence of top performing funds with large inows at quarterly
horizons but there is performance persistence at annual horizon, but this time this is
only evident for systematic CTAs and not discretionary CTAs. These results are also
depicted in Figures 3.5 to 3.8. Looking at Figure 3.6, which shows results for yearly
data for the largest funds, it can be seen that systematic funds in the top performance
3.4. Results 221
quintile with large inows have signicantly and economically outperformed funds with
the lowest ows. For discretionary CTAs this dierence is not very signicant. Thus,
large top performing systematic funds continue to benet from inows. Size and in-
ows possibly help in research and development of further systematic models. Figure
3.8 shows results for yearly data for the smallest funds. Again inows do not appear
to hinder performance persistence of the top performing funds but at a yearly horizon
there is no performance persistence for well-performing discretionary CTAs with large
inows.
3.4.5 Smart Money
This section addresses the smart money eect in the CTA industry. If some funds have
superior performance, as measured by both their raw as well as risk-adjusted returns,
and investors are able to infer this superiority, then rational investors are likely to al-
locate more capital towards funds with higher expected alpha. The high ow funds
would then have higher returns even though the actual return may not necessarily be
aected by ows. Existing literature on smart money is rather mixed. In the mutual
fund industry, Zheng (1999) and Gruber (1996) show the existence of smart money:
investors are able to select funds by moving away from badly performing funds towards
well-performing funds. In fact, the authors nd that both raw returns and risk-adjusted
returns are signicantly higher for funds that experience high inows. In the hedge
fund industry, however, the evidence on smart money is rather mixed and for CTAs it
is almost non-existent. Baquero and Verbeek (2009) examine the relationship between
ows and returns for hedge funds and nd no dierences in performance between funds
with positive and negative money ows. Ding, Getmansky, Liang and Wermers (2009),
on the other hand, nd evidence of smart money but only for funds that are not aected
by share restrictions. Do, Fa, Lajbcygier and Veeraraghavan (2010) nd no evidence
of smart money in the CTA industry; they show that chasing past performance does
not work, especially in the short-run. This section reports results for the smart money
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eect for CTA funds and various sub-strategies thereof.
Table 3.14 reports time-series averages across all quarters for the Grinblatt and
Titman measure, GT, as well as for the equally-weighted and ow-weighted zero-cost
portfolios. The zero-cost portfolios are formed by going long on funds with positive
last quarter inows and shorting funds with previous quarter outows. These portfolios
are then either equally-weighted or ow-weighted across the funds and re-balanced each
quarter. If investors have fund picking ability, then the returns of the GT measure and
zero-cost portfolios should be positive and signicant. Table 3.14 shows that, in fact,
none of the measures are positive and signicant. For all CTAs together, the GT measure
is negative and insignicantly dierent from 0 at -0.01% per quarter. The only signicant
GT measure is for systematic spread/relative value funds but it is negative rather than
positive: -0.13% for GT measure and -0.89% per quarter for the equally-weighted zero-
cost portfolio. Although a few of the returns for the ow-weighted zero-cost portfolio
are positive, e.g. long-term trend-following systematic funds have an average quarterly
return of 1.01% and discretionary funds 0.08%, none of them are statistically signicant.
Moreover, the returns to the ow-weighted zero-cost portfolio are not statistically signif-
icant for any of the strategies and, for many systematic funds, they are in fact negative.
Equally, none of the returns for an equally-weighted zero-cost portfolio are signicant,
in particular, for all the trend-following systematic funds (i.e. short-term, medium-term
and long-term trend-followers) they are negative and insignicant, indicating that funds
with inows subsequently perform less well than funds with outows and that investors
are not able to allocate to future high performers or withdraw money from future losers.
The results of this table for CTAs are in stark contrast to the results of Ding, Getman-
sky, Liang and Wermers (2009) for hedge funds, who nd a positive GT measure for all
hedge fund strategies other than managed futures. In regard to managed futures, Ding
et al. (2009) nd that all three measures are negative for managed futures funds, albeit
none are signicantly negative. Their results thus support the results found here. Do,
Fa, Lajbcygier and Veeraraghavan (2010) also nd no evidence for smart money in the
CTA industry using a regression approach, and show that investors are not successful
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when chasing past performance among CTAs. By breaking CTAs into sub-strategies
my results show that the lack of smart money is driven by the systematic CTAs as the
GT measure for discretionary funds tends to be positive rather than negative.
Whilst the results of Ding et al. (2009) show the existence of smart money in the
hedge fund industry, they demonstrate that this is only prevalent among more liquid
funds as proxied by above median 0. By separating funds into those with above median
0 and those with below median 0, they are able to show that the smart money eect
exists only for the most liquid funds. This result, however, contradicts the lack of smart
money found both in this study in respect to CTAs and in their study, in that CTAs
are among the most liquid funds among hedge funds. In order to see if perhaps smart
money eect exists among funds with the highest ows rather than positive ows only,
I follow the methodology of Ozik and Sadka (2010). Each quarter, all the CTAs are
sorted into three equal-size portfolios based on their prior ow. The portfolios are then
re-balanced quarterly and held for one quarter. Thus portfolio one would contain funds
with the lowest ows in the last quarter whilst portfolio three would contain funds with
the highest ows in the last quarter. If smart money eect is present then portfolio
returns should increase with prior ow. For hedge funds, Ozik and Sadka (2010) are
able to show that the portfolio return spread of the high-minus-low ow earns 21 basis
point per month (2.53% annually) and is statistically signicant, thus demonstrating
the existence of smart money in the hedge fund industry. Even the Fung-Hsieh alpha of
the spread is statistically signicant. Table 3.15 Panel A shows excess return, in excess
of three-month treasury bills, for CTA portfolios sorted on ows and Panel B shows
Fung-Hsieh alphas. For all CTAs together the spread between the highest ow funds
and the lowest ow funds is negative and signicant, -0.34%. Interestingly, this negative
spread is more driven by discretionary funds than systematic funds. Medium-term and
long-term trend-followers, in fact, have small positive spreads, albeit non-signicant.
The spread of the systematic spread/relative value funds is negative and signicant sug-
gesting that funds with the highest ows are subsequently less able to earn high returns
and in fact under-perform funds with the lowest ow. This eect is most pronounced
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for spread/relative value funds, since the strategy of these funds requires availability of
arbitrage opportunities which may be quickly exhausted with large inows. The spread
for discretionary spread/relative values funds is also negative although weakly signi-
cant.
Panel B reports the risk adjusted-returns for (alphas) using the Fung and Hsieh
factors augmented with the additional GSCI factor and using the BIC criterion to es-
timate the alphas.6 The results from Panel B are similar to Panel A, indicating that
the results are robust to risk-adjustment. Again the only strategy to have a signicant
spread return, albeit negative, is systematic spread/RV.
Long-Run Performance of Flows
Although there is no smart money eect for CTAs in the short-run, it is also interesting
to study the long-run performance of the ow strategies. Frazzini and Lamont (2008)
look at the long-run performance of the ow strategies of mutual funds and show that
the smart money eect disappears in the long-run. Ozik and Sadka (2010) also look
at the long-run eect of smart money on hedge funds and nd the eect to be per-
manent, with reversals in performance only occurring for inows. Ahoniemi and Jylha
(2011) nd that the out-performance of the high ow is mainly contemporaneous and
exists predominantly during the month that the ow occurs and for one month after.
Subsequently it completely reverses, indicating a lack of persistence, and thus there is
no evidence of a long-term smart money eect. Baquero and Verbeek (2009), on the
other hand, nd no evidence of ow related out-performance, even in the short-run, thus
indicating a complete absence of smart money for hedge funds at the aggregate level.
Table 3.16 shows results that test for the long-run eect of smart money in the
CTA universe. It shows the returns of the investment and divestment portfolios in the
ranking and post formation periods. Following Zheng (1996), the returns of positive
ow portfolios and negative ow portfolios are examined by compounding the returns
6The BIC is the Bayesian Information Criterion measure that allows us to choose a subset of factors
that achieve the highest adjusted-R2. It was also employed in the second part of this thesis and was
shown to produce superior results.
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over dierent holding periods, from one to eight quarters after ranking. These time
series are then averaged. Both equally and cash-ow weighted returns are reported for
the investment, divestment and the dierence between the investment and divestment
portfolios. Table 3.16 reports the results by grouping all the CTAs together, whilst
Table 3.17 reports the results of the dierence in return between investment and divest-
ment portfolios for each sub-strategy of CTAs. Panel A shows results for investment
portfolio for all funds. In the ranking period, the cash-ow weighted portfolio return is
signicantly higher than the return of the equally-weighted portfolio, with a dierence
of 1.29% per quarter. This portfolio, however, then underperforms the equally-weighted
portfolio in the evaluation periods by -0.06% in the next quarter and -0.1% thereafter,
indicating that investors fail to allocate appropriately to the funds that perform best
in the following period. The returns for the equally-weighted portfolio increase each
quarter but for cash-ow weighted portfolio they decrease with time. These results are
similar to those reported by Baquero and Verbeek (2009) for hedge funds. The returns
of the divestment portfolio, shown in Panel B, show that investors are able to exploit the
liquidity of CTAs by removing money from the funds that subsequently become worse
performers, with the returns of the cash ow-weighted portfolio being lower than the
returns of the equally-weighted portfolio. Figure 3.9 shows the time-series returns of
the investment and divestment strategies for all CTAs. The cash ow-weighted portfolio
consistently underperforms the equally-weighted portfolio subsequent to the formation
period, a result similar to that of Baquero and Verbeek (2009), although the dierences
between the two portfolios are substantially larger.
Finally, Panel C compares the investment and divestment portfolio for all CTAs.
In the ranking period only the cash ow-weighted portfolio has a sorting capacity.
The return to the cash-ow weighted return for the investment portfolio signicantly
outperforms that of the divestment portfolio. Ozik and Sadka (2011) also nd some
signicant out-performance of the investment portfolio in the ranking period. This
out-performance, however, temporarily reverses in the next two quarters and becomes
negative, -0.23% for the rst quarter and -0.03% for the second, but improves there-
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after to return to positive out-performance, although this positive out-performance is
not signicant. These results conrm the earlier ndings on performance persistence
in that there is no short-term persistence when sorting on past ows and performance.
The results do oer some suggestion of long-term persistence, however, in that there is
some evidence in Panel C of the out-performance of the investment portfolio over the
divestment portfolio after two quarters. A possible explanation is that the huge inows
attracted by previous high-returns end up being temporarily allocated among less prof-
itable trading strategies resulting in only a temporary reduction in fund returns. Thus,
ows appear to have good sorting capacity in the long-term only.
For the equally-weighted portfolio, however, there is no evidence of the investment
portfolio outperforming the divestment portfolio. In fact, for equally-weighted return
the divestment portfolio marginally outperforms the investment portfolio in both rank-
ing and evaluation periods. Overall, therefore, the results conrm the earlier conclusion
that there is no smart money eect at the aggregate level in the CTA industry. Looking
at returns of the investment-divestment portfolios for the sub-strategies in Table 3.17
and Figures 3.10 and 3.11 shows that systematic CTAs continue to exhibit temporary
underperformance of the investment portfolio relative to the divestment portfolio in the
two quarters subsequent to the ranking, with a reversal to a weak smart money eect
from the third quarter onwards. This carries across all sub-strategies of systematic
funds: short-term trend-followers, medium-term trend-followers, etc. For discretionary
CTAs, however, the pattern is reversed: cash ow-weighted returns of the investment
portfolio outperform, albeit insignicantly, the returns of the divestment portfolio in the
rst few quarters subsequent to ranking with a reverse of this outperformance occurring
by the 5th quarter. Zheng (1996) also nds the reversal in outperformance for mutual
funds and Baquero and Verbeerk (2009) nd the same eect for hedge funds. Even
though CTAs have reportedly less share restrictions than most hedge funds, however,
investors do not always appear to be able to fully exploit that liquidity.
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3.4.6 Capacity Constraints
Recent studies in the mutual fund literature have shed light on capacity constraints,
Chen et al. (2004) and Yan (2008). Their results provide support for the Berk and Green
(2004) equilibrium model that states that in a competitive provision of capital alpha
will tend to zero and there should be no performance persistence. In the second part
of this thesis I found that, contrary to the earlier ndings in the hedge fund literature,
alpha has not decreased for systematic CTAs and in particular I found positive and
statistically signicant alpha in the last period, August 2007 to December 2010. Fung
et al. (2008) and Naik, Ramadorai and Stromquist (2007) nd that, in the hedge
fund industry, fund alpha has declined substantially in the recent period of their study,
March 2000 to December 2004. They attribute this decline to the increased capital ows
also recorded during this period. Whilst Fung et al. (2008) nd capacity constraints
for fund of hedge funds, Naik, Ramadorai and Stromquist (2007) look at the capacity
constraints at hedge fund strategy level and detect only four out of eight strategies as
capacity constrained: Relative Value, Directional Traders, Emerging Markets and Fixed
Income. These results indicate that the Berk and Green (2004) model may also hold
for hedge funds. Naik, Ramadorai and Stromquist (2007) do not, however, nd any
capacity constraints for managed futures. In this section, and given the results of this
thesis, I directly address the question of capacity constraints at the various levels of CTA
sub-strategies with a particular focus on systematic CTAs given the scalability issues of
these funds discussed previously. As shown in Figure 3.1, the CTA industry has grown
substantially, especially from 2004. This raises the question of whether CTAs may start
facing hitherto undetected capacity constraints and, if this is the case, whether this is
likely to occur for some CTA strategies more than others.
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the rst to examine capacity constraints
for various CTA sub-strategies. Would one expect dierences in results for various CTA
strategies? The fundamental dierence between systematic and discretionary CTAs is
not the actual strategy, as both are trend-followers, but the way they implement their
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trading. There is inherently greater potential for scalability for systematic CTAs: once
programmed, computers can trade many more markets than a single manager. They
may need to be reprogrammed, however, to adjust for inow of capital. Previously I
found yearly but not quarterly performance persistence for systematic CTAs and the
reverse for discretionary CTAs. Based on these observations, it is possible to nd some
capacity constraints for discretionary CTAs as opposed to systematic CTAs.
I analyze the eect of fund ows on CTA performance for each strategy by rst
computing the returns for each sub-strategy using an AUM-weighted index (henceforth
AUMW-index). I further aggregate the ows at the end of each month for each strategy






where Flowi;t denotes individual monthly fund ows, AUMi;t denotes individual monthly
fund assets under management and N stands for number of funds in each month in each
CTA strategy. Following Naik et al. (2007), I then regress the AUM-weighted return






where Rs denotes AUM-weighted strategy return. Also following Naik et al. (2007),
I control for size in the CTA industry by including the log of total assets under man-
agement in each strategy. To control for potential non-linearity in the relationship, the
square of the log of AUM is also included. Naik et al. (2004) also include the number
of funds within a strategy in a prior year to control for competition, see Getmansky
(2004). A negative and signicant value of  is evidence of capacity constraints within
a strategy.
Table 3.18 presents the results from estimating the regression given in equation
(3.11). The coecient on lagged ows,  is on average negative but in most cases
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insignicant. The coecient is weakly signicant for all CTAs taken together and sig-
nicant at 1% for discretionary and discretionary CTAs that employ technical analysis.
This negative and statistically signicant coecient suggests the presence of capacity
constraints. That is an increase in 10% in annual ows into these strategies would result
in a decrease in subsequent monthly return of 11 basis points for discretionary funds
and 15 basis points for discretionary technical funds. Naik et al. (2007) nd evidence of
capacity constraints for four out of eight hedge fund styles, one of which is Directional
Traders. Directional traders are somewhat similar to managed futures in that both can
focus on directional trends. Naik et al. (2007) explain the presence of capacity con-
straints in this strategy if too many directional funds focus on the same sector. Although
systematic trend-followers pursue the same type of strategy they do not appear to suer
from capacity constraints. The ability of machines to trade multiple markets simultane-
ously allows systematic trend-followers to avoid overcrowded trades. A recent Financial
Times article observes \Systematic allows the CTA to trade multiple markets simultane-
ously."7 Thus it appears that discretionary CTAs may suer from overcrowded trades
more than systematic ones. Interestingly, I nd that for discretionary and systematic
spread/relative value and options strategies the coecient is positive, although it is not
statistically signicant. Nevertheless, despite the fact that some of the CTA strategies
exhibit a statistically signicant  coecient, it is not economically important just yet.
If assets continue to increase at the same rate as in the past few years, however, the
eect of ows on returns could become important for discretionary CTAs.8
In Table 3.18 the coecient on size and size squared is only signicant for system-
atic and discretionary spread/relative value funds with reverse signs for the two types
of funds. For discretionary spread/relative value funds the sign is consistent with the
presence of diminishing returns to scale whereas, for systematic funds spread/RV funds
size seems to enhance performance. Competition seems to have no eect on perfor-
mance in the CTA industry, the coecient on the number of funds in the strategy is
7The Financial Times, June 9, 2012, \A true CTA will stick to chosen path."
8An article in the Financial Times on June 11, 2011, states that assets have continued to increase
into CTAs despite market downturn.
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mostly insignicant. Whilst Do et al. (2010) show that performance has an eect on
the timing of funds entering the industry and the overall number of funds, the increase
in the number of funds in a strategy does not hinder future performance. This result is
contrary to the results of Getmansky (2004) and Naik et al. (2007) who nd the eect
of competition in the hedge fund industry to be signicant. Once again the results are
consistent with the evidence that futures markets are relatively deep and liquid.
For robustness, I rerun regression (3.11) using the additional control variables em-
ployed in Baltas and Kosowski (2012), S&P 500, Fama-French SMB and HML, Gold-
man Sachs Commodities Index and Carhart (1997) momentum factor, UMD. Table 3.19
shows the results of this regression. Irrespective of the setup, I nd that the results do
not qualitatively change: there is no evidence of capacity constraints among systematic
CTAs whereas discretionary funds, driven by discretionary technical funds, some show
evidence of capacity constraints, conrming previous results.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I analyze the drivers of ows into the CTA industry and their eect
on the future performance of CTAs. The nonlinearity of the relationship is modeled
with a piecewise linear regression and applied to various CTA categories, fund size and
time horizons. I nd that at the yearly horizon money ows are linearly related to the
past relative performance of the CTAs. At the quarterly horizon, however, this rela-
tionship is linear for systematic funds, concave for discretionary funds and convex for
spread/relative value strategies across both discretionary and systematic CTAs. This
resonates with the earlier results in the literature on hedge funds. Furthermore, unlike
the results of Ding et al. (2009), I nd no evidence that share restrictions aect the
shape of the ow-performance relationship in the CTA industry. Instead, I argue that
dierences in the relationship can be observed for dierent fund strategies and fund
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size. Specically, the concavity of the relationship is driven by large CTAs, indicating
that large better performing funds attract less inows. Despite the deep liquidity of the
futures markets, many large CTAs still choose to close their funds to new investors in
order not to hinder future performance. This explains the concavity of the relationship
found in this research.
I also examine the eect of ows on the performance persistence of CTAs using quar-
terly and yearly data. I nd no evidence of performance persistence at the quarterly
horizon for any of the CTA strategies. However, I nd evidence of persistence at the an-
nual horizon. This eect is particularly driven by systematic rather than discretionary
CTAs. This resonates with the earlier ndings of this thesis that there is yearly but
not quarterly performance persistence among systematic CTAs. It appears that this
long-term performance persistence is not hindered by the additional inows of capital
and this points to the lack of capacity constraints amongst Systematic CTAs. On the
other hand, consistent with the conclusions of Berk and Green (2004), large inows seem
to compete away the performance persistence of Discretionary funds.
This chapter also addresses the issue of smart money in the CTA industry. Despite
some evidence of smart money in the hedge fund industry, I nd no signicant dier-
ences in performance between funds with inows and funds with outows. Although, in
the long-run post formation, there is some reversal in performance of funds with inows,
this out-performance is rather weak. These results are similar to the conclusions of Do,
Fa, Lajbcygier and Veeraraghavan (2010). It appears that, despite evidence that CTA
investors chase past performance, they are not able fully to exploit it in the short-term.
There appears to be no smart money eect in the CTA industry.
Motivated by the above results, I look at the issue of capacity constraints among
CTA strategies. My results imply that there are no statistically signicant capacity con-
straints among systematic CTAs but there is statistical evidence of capacity constraints
for discretionary CTAs, although it is not yet economically signicant. The ndings of
this study, therefore, have interesting implications for investors. CTAs provide greater
liquidity to their investors than hedge funds, thus investors can access many funds rela-
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tively quickly, yet it appears that they need to be more patient as to when they choose to
exit the funds since performance persistence particularly for systematic CTAs appears
to exist only in the long-term after a temporary reversal. The dataset used in this study
ends in December 2010, yet assets have continued to ow into the CTA industry. In
light of the ndings of capacity constraints, investors should consider overall industry




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: Average Flows, Returns and Aggregate AUM
Table 3.3 presents shows for each quarter average ow rates, aggregate AUM and average return for the period January
1994 to December 2010. Cash ows are computed as before.
Date Number of Cash ows Aggregate AUM Average
funds (Growth rates %) (in US$ millions) returns %
1994Q1 271 21.84 19046.45 -0.28
1994Q2 278 16.91 20202.25 6.57
1994Q3 285 9.57 18806.80 -2.50
1994Q4 293 8.07 18892.71 3.56
1995Q1 291 9.65 19830.09 8.61
1995Q2 304 9.38 19192.82 3.23
1995Q3 306 4.89 18069.99 1.90
1995Q4 300 6.14 19370.33 5.78
1996Q1 302 6.87 18407.61 0.05
1996Q2 312 7.55 18372.20 4.60
1996Q3 307 9.81 18930.65 2.48
1996Q4 306 11.12 20688.31 9.64
1997Q1 302 17.12 21932.03 7.63
1997Q2 309 15.09 23822.50 0.68
1997Q3 308 15.58 26349.25 4.24
1997Q4 312 9.25 26875.68 3.37
1998Q1 315 14.69 28178.16 2.46
1998Q2 328 13.91 28620.90 1.02
1998Q3 333 7.09 33748.79 11.66
1998Q4 328 13.72 33750.41 2.09
1999Q1 326 16.38 35266.35 1.09
1999Q2 338 11.11 37343.23 3.08
1999Q3 343 6.35 37999.67 -0.21
1999Q4 341 4.87 37450.60 -0.95
2000Q1 330 1.59 35275.18 0.67
2000Q2 328 0.05 34193.00 0.49
2000Q3 331 1.79 32210.17 0.24
2000Q4 337 1.58 34818.22 13.77
2001Q1 331 12.63 39443.14 5.15
2001Q2 336 13.60 38929.60 -2.41
2001Q3 335 4.40 43365.25 3.72
2001Q4 338 10.11 44333.67 -0.10
2002Q1 335 12.17 44383.45 -1.83
2002Q2 346 11.19 48211.28 10.23
2002Q3 351 12.87 54320.86 7.56
2002Q4 350 17.35 56187.28 1.06
2003Q1 359 22.61 64344.08 2.52
2003Q2 362 18.79 70549.55 4.96
2003Q3 365 20.87 79867.83 1.49
2003Q4 367 21.77 94078.45 4.45
2004Q1 375 22.37 112102.72 5.82
2004Q2 378 21.04 123782.93 -5.64
2004Q3 393 14.04 127081.28 0.64
2004Q4 410 11.31 140395.86 5.84
2005Q1 410 4.20 125683.37 -1.95
2005Q2 413 3.57 130277.98 2.84
2005Q3 420 11.09 135757.71 2.05
2005Q4 423 13.75 138176.03 3.01
2006Q1 417 15.01 159280.23 2.69
2006Q2 417 19.65 172673.96 2.29
2006Q3 418 10.41 180877.98 -1.02
2006Q4 423 9.87 192134.39 3.87
2007Q1 433 9.37 192705.54 -1.32
2007Q2 433 9.42 207789.78 5.68
2007Q3 428 9.97 214379.30 2.01
2007Q4 424 7.30 225162.41 4.76
2008Q1 420 15.74 258862.63 7.56
2008Q2 421 13.35 280715.79 3.54
2008Q3 418 6.19 263991.17 -1.65
2008Q4 407 -3.38 240124.17 7.91
2009Q1 398 4.90 222745.30 -1.87
2009Q2 384 7.44 224173.48 1.25
2009Q3 373 4.57 238207.31 1.47
2009Q4 361 4.37 242144.48 -0.86
2010Q1 354 0.49 241145.18 -0.22
2010Q2 336 -0.82 244184.11 -0.34
2010Q3 321 1.91 262611.13 4.26

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Restriction Parameter, 0, and Return Volatility
Table 3.5 presents results for unsmoothed/real return volatility for both restricted and
unrestricted funds for each of the CTA categories. Unsmoothed returns are obtained following
Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) procedure. Following their methodology only funds with
5-year return history are included in the calculation of 0 and therefore sample size in the
table below is smaller than previous. Restricted funds are dened as those with 0 below
median level and unrestricted funds are funds with above median 0. The dierence in means
between the two categories is computed. *** is signicant at the 1% level, ** is signicant at
the 5% level and * is signicant at 10% level. These signicance levels are calculated using a
two tailed unequal variance (heteroskedastic) test.
Restriction Parameter and Return Volatility
High Theta Funds Low Theta Funds
N Mean Median N Mean Median Di
ALL FUNDS 268 4.96 4.02 268 4.38 3.77 0.58*
SYSTEMATIC 189 5.11 4.34 189 4.25 3.69 0.86**
Trend 165 5.32 4.52 166 4.27 3.77 1.05***
Short-term 30 4.22 3.58 31 2.84 2.83 1.38**
Medium-term 105 5.18 4.53 106 4.48 3.68 0.70*
Long-term 29 7.27 6.66 30 4.74 4.67 2.52***
Spread/RV 13 3.86 3.45 14 3.37 3.43 0.49
Pattern Rec 8 4.60 4.47 9 4.65 4.93 -0.05
DISCRETIONARY 67 4.52 2.93 67 4.80 3.99 -0.29
Fundamental 20 4.16 3.19 20 4.79 4.23 -0.63
Technical 19 4.53 2.85 20 4.46 2.89 0.07
Fundamental & Tech 19 5.86 2.93 19 5.74 3.52 0.13
Spread/RV 8 2.54 2.14 9 3.28 3.04 -0.74
OPTIONS 12 5.54 3.75 12 3.53 3.03 2.01
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Table 3.6: Fund Flow-Performance Relationship for All CTAs
Table 3.6 presents results for Fama-MacBeth OLS estimates with net ow rate as the dependent
variable for all CTA funds in the database, as well as by separating all CTAs into those that are live
and defunct for the period January 1994 to December 2010. Panel A presents the results for quarterly
ow and panel B for yearly ow as the dependent variable. Flows are measured as a growth rate
relative to the fund's total net assets in the previous quarter. The independent variables include three
terciles of performance in the last quarter/year (Low Performance, Middle Performance and High
Performance) as dened in Getmansky (2005). Independent variables accounting for fund specic
characteristics include a fund's monthly standard deviation of returns, size (dened as the natural
logarithm of a fund's total net assets in the prior quarter or year), the log of a fund's age in months
since inception, past quarter/year ow. Live is a dummy variable dened as 1 if the fund is in the Live
database and 0 otherwise. HWM is a High Water Mark dummy which is equal to 1 if a high water
mark provision is present and 0 otherwise. Management Fee is the xed fee charged by the fund as a
percentage of funds under management and incentive fee is the percentage fee charged by the fund if a
fund's upside is above a certain threshold level. Style Eect measures the average ow at time t for a
particular category. All standard errors are computed using Newey-West's (1987) method with 2 lags.
* is signicant at 10%, ** is signicant at 5% and *** is signicant at 1%.
Panel A: Quarterly Fund Flow-Performance Relationship - All CTAs
All Funds Live Funds Dead Funds
Variable Estimate t-Stat. Estimate t-Stat. Estimate t-Stat.
Intercept 0.296*** 4.78 0.237*** 4.01 -0.429 1.39
Low Performance 0.201*** 6.58 0.201*** 5.22 0.149 0.83
Middle Performance 0.093*** 2.99 0.036 1.18 0.451** 2.63
High Performance 0.120** 2.51 0.138*** 2.68 -0.345** -1.89
Standard Deviation -0.134 -1.48 -0.243** -2.45 0.506 0.69
Log (AUM) -0.023*** -7.09 -0.016*** -5.87 -0.033*** -3.46
Flow 0.143*** 8.44 0.143*** 8.73 0.133** 2.06
Live 0.039*** 5.07
High Water Mark 0.004 0.59 0.006 1.00 0.026 0.89
Management Fee -0.115 -0.40 -0.062 -0.15 -1.015* -1.75
Incentive Fee -0.014 -0.17 -0.052 -0.6 -0.016 -0.03
Style Eect 0.296*** 4.78 0.366*** 8.53 0.482*** 4.45
Average no. of obs. 894 358 536
Adjusted-R2 10.08% 11.45% 8.60%
Panel B: Yearly Fund Flow-Performance Relationship - All CTAs
All Funds Live Funds Dead Funds
Variable Estimate t-Stat. Estimate t-Stat. Estimate t-Stat.
Intercept 4.041*** 4.03 3.122*** 3.39 1.329 0.26
Low Performance 1.506*** 3.83 1.441*** 3.63 1.383 1.37
Middle Performance 0.951** 2.13 0.678 1.56 1.164** 2.31
High Performance 0.336 0.50 0.509 0.78 0.244 0.28
Standard Deviation -2.855*** -3.14 -2.904*** -2.87 -1.037 -0.39
Log (AUM) -0.249*** -4.27 -0.187*** -3.64 -0.160 -0.64
Flow 0.084 1.48 0.101 1.48 -1.338 -1.00
Live 0.133* 2.03
High Water Mark 0.018 0.29 0.056 1.01 0.113 0.75
Management Fee -1.129 -0.44 -1.134 -0.22 -1.178 -0.33
Incentive Fee -0.097 -0.14 0.132 0.14 0.511 0.50
Style Eect 1.207** 2.76 0.782* 1.87 2.687*** 3.75
Average no. of obs. 894 358 536
Adjusted-R2 11.70% 8.73% 5.63%
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Table 3.7: Quarterly Fund Flow-Performance Relationship for All CTAs
above US$250 million
Table 3.7 presents results for Fama-MacBeth OLS estimates with net ow rate as the
dependent variable for all CTA funds that had reached at least US$250 million in assets under
management for the period January 1994 to December 2010. This table presents results for
quarterly data only. Flows are measured as a growth rate relative to the fund's total net assets
in the previous quarter. The independent variables include three terciles of performance in
the last quarter (Low Performance, Middle Performance and High Performance) as dened in
Getmansky (2005). Independent variables accounting for fund specic characteristics include
a fund's monthly standard deviation of returns, size (dened as the natural logarithm of a
fund's total net assets in the prior quarter), the log of a fund's age in months since inception,
past quarter ow. Live is a dummy variable dened as 1 if the fund is in the Live database
and 0 otherwise. HWM is a High Water Mark dummy which is equal to 1 if a high water
mark provision is present and 0 otherwise. Management Fee is the xed fee charged by the
fund as a percentage of funds under management and incentive fee is the percentage fee
charged by the fund if a fund's upside is above a certain threshold level. Style Eect measures
the average ow at time t for a particular category. All standard errors are computed using
Newey-West's (1987) method with 2 lags. * is signicant at 10%, ** is signicant at 5% and
*** is signicant at 1%.
Quarterly Fund Flow-Performance Relationship - All CTAs above US$ 250 million
All Funds Live Funds Dead Funds
Variable Estimate t-Stat. Estimate t-Stat. Estimate t-Stat.
Intercept 0.296*** 4.78 0.219*** 2.85 0.596*** 6.06
Low Performance 0.201*** 6.58 0.222*** 4.93 0.196*** 3.08
Middle Performance 0.093*** 2.99 0.087** 2.51 0.077* 1.74
High Performance 0.120** 2.51 0.085 1.29 0.136* 1.72
Standard Deviation -0.134 -1.48 -0.242 -1.40 0.068 0.46
Log (AUM) -0.023*** -7.09 -0.018*** -5.17 -0.043*** -7.49
Flow 0.143*** 8.44 0.176*** 4.95 0.128*** 6.40
Live 0.039*** 5.07
High Water Mark 0.004 0.59 0.001 0.15 -0.002 -0.26
Management Fee -0.115 -0.40 -0.659* -1.67 0.333 0.79
Incentive Fee -0.014 -0.17 0.151 1.03 0.085 0.93
Style Eect 0.296*** 4.78 0.355*** 6.23 0.376*** 6.39
Average no. of obs 894 224 670

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.10: Quarterly Persistence and Money Flows by Strategy
Table 3.10 presents results for quarterly performance persistence and investor ows for the period
January 1994 to December 2010. Each quarter funds are sorted into quintiles based on the preceding
quarter's Fung-Hsieh alpha as well as past ows. The middle three quintiles are grouped into one
portfolio resulting in three portfolios. Nine portfolios are then constructed at the intersection of both
performance and ow sorts. The performance of these portfolios is then evaluated in the next quarter
by equally weighting fund raw returns. Reported below are the time-series averages of the portfolio
returns over the sample period January 1994 to December 2010. Reported are also average ow
growth for each portfolio as well as the average number of funds in each quarter for each portfolio.
Standard errors of the time series averages are reported in parentheses.
QUARTERLY PERSISTENCE AND MONEY FLOWS - BY STRATEGY
All CTAs SYSTEMATIC
Panel A: Top Performers Panel A: Top Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 5.64 (5.27) 66.54 13.3 High Flows 4.93 (6.55) 59.68 9.3
Middle Flows 5.35 (5.92) 1.86 36.3 Middle Flows 4.87 (7.12) 1.56 26.0
Bottom Flows 9.62 (8.29) -24.58 9.3 Bottom Flows 8.51 (8.55) -22.47 7.2
High minus Low -3.98 (5.90) High minus Low -3.58 (5.52)
Panel B: Middle Performers Panel B: Middle Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 2.36 (2.45) 63.46 31.3 High Flows 2.47 (3.33) 57.41 22.1
Middle Flows 1.99 (3.48) 1.60 111.9 Middle Flows 2.10 (4.48) 1.52 80.1
Bottom Flows 3.04 (4.14) -26.81 36.3 Bottom Flows 3.56 (5.52) -26.41 26.2
High minus Low -0.68 (2.71) High minus Low -1.09 (3.38)
Panel C: Bottom Performers Panel C: Bottom Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows -0.67 (8.15) 60.97 5.95 High Flows -0.37 (1.95) 62.88 4.7
Middle Flows -0.63 (4.23) 0.78 36.5 Middle Flows -0.52 (5.02) 0.60 26.3
Bottom Flows 0.24 (4.62) -29.42 17.8 Bottom Flows 0.46 (6.04) -26.71 12.2
High minus Low -0.91 (6.78) High minus Low -0.83 (9.78)
DISCRETIONARY SYSTEMATIC TREND-FOLLOWERS
Panel A: Top Performers Panel A: Top Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 5.76 (8.83) 82.46 3.13 High Flows 5.04 (3.09) 60.26 8.3
Middle Flows 7.26 (6.43) 2.49 8.73 Middle Flows 4.93 (7.43) 1.45 23.1
Bottom Flows 9.90 (12.54) -26.43 2.30 Bottom Flows 8.62 (8.81) -21.61 6.4
High minus Low -4.14 (15.88) High minus Low -3.58 (2.03)
Panel B: Middle Performers Panel B: Middle Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 2.05 (2.17) 79.20 7.90 High Flows 2.44 (3.64) 54.62 19.6
Middle Flows 1.54 (1.75) 1.84 26.95 Middle Flows 2.17 (4.79) 1.30 71.0
Bottom Flows 2.21 (3.55) -27.61 8.97 Bottom Flows 3.64 (5.60) -25.75 23.6
High minus Low -0.16 (3.67) High minus Low -1.20 (3.60)
Panel C: Bottom Performers Panel C: Bottom Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 0.74 (5.57) 47.35 1.38 High Flows -1.35 (13.26) 61.66 4.5
Middle Flows -0.85 (4.21) 1.07 8.98 Middle Flows -0.50 (5.39) 0.64 23.8
Bottom Flows 0.48 (6.72) -35.84 4.66 Bottom Flows 0.96 (6.77) -26.41 10.3
High minus Low 0.26 (7.39) High minus Low -2.31 (9.43)
OPTIONS
Panel A: Top Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 2.85 (5.73) 26.57 37.7
Middle Flows 4.18 (7.45) 8.06 1.33
Bottom Flows 2.78 (8.37) -8.20 32.79
High minus Low 0.07 (10.37)
Panel B: Middle Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 1.09 (5.81) 47.33 1.07
Middle Flows 1.48 (7.45) 6.90 4.90
Bottom Flows 1.50 (4.88) -14.79 1.39
High minus Low -0.41 (6.42)
Panel C: Bottom Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows -0.54 (6.93) 8.68 1.90
Middle Flows 0.48 (8.71) 3.05 1.48
Bottom Flows 0.85 (10.79) -16.59 1.20
High minus Low -1.39 (12.88)
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Table 3.11: Yearly Persistence and Money Flows by Strategy
Table 3.11 presents results for yearly performance persistence and investor ows for the period Jan-
uary 1994 to December 2010. Each year funds are sorted into quintiles based on the preceding year's
Fung-Hsieh alpha as well as past year ows. The middle three quintiles are grouped into one port-
folio resulting in three portfolios. Nine portfolios are then constructed at the intersection of both
performance and ow sorts. The performance of these portfolios is then evaluated in the next year
by equally weighting fund raw returns. Reported below are the time-series averages of the portfolio
returns over the sample period January 1994 to December 2010. Reported are also average ow
growth for each portfolio as well as the average number of funds in each year for each portfolio.
Standard errors of the time series averages are reported in parentheses.
YEARLY PERSISTENCE AND MONEY FLOWS - BY STRATEGY
All CTAs SYSTEMATIC
Panel A: Top Performers Panel A: Top Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 31.49 (10.57) 451.3 13.6 High Flows 27.65 (13.15) 387.6 8.9
Middle Flows 22.67 (9.97) 16.7 35.4 Middle Flows 19.56 (11.90) 13.9 26.1
Bottom Flows 29.10 (17.99) -57.9 10.2 Bottom Flows 23.81 (16.87) -54.7 7.3
High minus Low 2.39 (8.06) High minus Low 3.84 (2.05)
Panel B: Middle Performers Panel B: Middle Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 11.5 (5.34) 379.2 31.9 High Flows 12.10 (6.01) 355.32 22.7
Middle Flows 9.69 (6.24) 13.6 112.1 Middle Flows 10.22 (8.27) 11.50 79.9
Bottom Flows 9.48 (6.27) -57.6 35.2 Bottom Flows 9.82 (8.34) -57.2 25.8
High minus Low 2.02 (4.55) High minus Low 2.28 (5.04)
Panel C: Bottom Performers Panel C: Bottom Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 9.31 (13.17) 300.5 5.4 High Flows 4.43 (11.30) 268.7 4.6
Middle Flows -0.65 (5.33) 5.01 36.6 Middle Flows 1.07 (6.47) 7.02 26.1
Bottom Flows 11.85 (5.42) -58.4 18.1 Bottom Flows 3.50 (7.89) -55.9 12.5
High minus Low -2.54 (9.31) High minus Low 0.93 (3.78)
DISCRETIONARY SYSTEMATIC TREND-FOLLOWERS
Panel A: Top Performers Panel A: Top Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 9.53 (21.78) 300.2 1.3 High Flows 27.83 (13.38) 397.7 7.9
Middle Flows 6.06 (6.81) 50.8 2.1 Middle Flows 19.68 (12.96) 13.4 23.4
Bottom Flows 10.95 (17.79) -23.0 0.9 Bottom Flows 24.64 (17.41) -53.8 6.4
High minus Low -2.47 (24.34) High minus Low 3.19 (1.89)
Panel B: Middle Performers Panel B: Middle Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 7.25 (20.23) 621.2 1.2 High Flows 12.35 (6.51) 350.6 19.9
Middle Flows 5.32 (6.81) 90.9 5.3 Middle Flows 10.31 (8.81) 11.03 70.3
Bottom Flows 27.05 (37.08) -53.9 2.2 Bottom Flows 9.28 (7.73) 56.7 23.7
High minus Low -17.83 (41.03) High minus Low 3.07 (5.01)
Panel C: Bottom Performers Panel C: Bottom Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no. Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds (%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 2.79 (8.20) 437.7 3.2 High Flows 3.88 (10.79) 266.2 4.3
Middle Flows 0.37 (13.15) 64.6 1.8 Middle Flows 1.72 (7.04) 6.03 24.0
Bottom Flows 17.62 (37.27) -42.3 4.5 Bottom Flows 4.03 (9.87 -55.5 10.3
High minus Low -14.83 (37.82) High minus Low -0.15 (3.56)
OPTIONS
Panel A: Top Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 2.17 (8.70) 10.6 6.3
Middle Flows 0.01 (11.70) -1.2 1.9
Bottom Flows 2.49 (18.37) -6.2 1.3
High minus Low -0.32 (20.61)
Panel B: Middle Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 7.61 (17.60) 1633.2 0.4
Middle Flows 6.99 (16.85) 184.3 1.6
Bottom Flows 4.80 (9.77) 1.50 0.5
High minus Low 2.81 (9.99)
Panel C: Bottom Performers
Raw Return Average Growth Average no.
(%) Rate (%) of funds
High Flows 0 (0) 0 0.00
Middle Flows 4.95 (12.94) 27.4 0.6
Bottom Flows 5.62 (9.18) -17.8 1.6
High minus Low -5.62 (9.18)
3.6. Appendix 249
Table 3.12: Quarterly & Yearly Persistence and Money Flows by Strategy
for Top AUM Funds
Table 3.12 presents results for quarterly and yearly performance persistence and investor ows
for funds with top assets under management for the period January 1994 to December 2010.
Each quarter/year funds are sorted into quintiles based on the previous year's Fung-Hsieh alpha
as well as past year ows and past assets under management. The middle three quintiles are
grouped into one portfolio resulting in three portfolios. Each quarter/year the funds in the top
AUM quintile are used to construct nine portfolios of both performance and ow sorts. The
performance of these portfolios is then evaluated in the next quarter/year by equally weighting
fund raw returns. Reported below are the time-series averages of the portfolio returns over
the sample period, January 1994 to December 2010.
QUARTERLY PERSISTENCE AND MONEY FLOWS - TOP AUM
Panel A: Top Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds 5.21 4.55 9.58 -4.37
Systematic 5.42 4.27 7.98 -2.56
Trend 5.41 4.23 8.06 -2.65
Discretionary 3.51 5.88 5.70 -2.19
Options 0.58 2.68 0.33 0.25
Panel B: Middle Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds 2.06 1.93 2.96 -0.90
Systematic 2.08 2.18 3.57 -1.49
Trend 2.22 2.19 3.86 -1.64
Discretionary 1.55 1.52 2.07 -0.52
Options 1.21 1.69 1.08 0.13
Panel C: Bottom Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds -0.53 -0.65 0.40 -0.93
Systematic -1.16 -0.75 0.55 -1.71
Trend -0.85 -0.68 1.04 -1.89
Discretionary 0.45 -0.68 0.99 -0.54
Options -0.35 0.73 1.34 -1.69
YEARLY PERSISTENCE AND MONEY FLOWS - TOP AUM
Panel A: Top Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds 28.39 19.42 23.48 4.91
Systematic 27.67 17.03 19.72 7.95
Trend 27.61 17.07 21.48 6.13
Discretionary 7.38 5.35 2.05 5.33
Options 2.17 -0.92 -1.68 3.85
Panel B: Middle Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds 11.38 9.42 10.58 0.80
Systematic 11.82 10.23 11.11 0.71
Trend 12.42 10.27 9.77 2.65
Discretionary -0.71 5.45 22.63 -23.34
Options 1.11 3.39 0.50 0.61
Panel C: Bottom Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds 7.98 0.54 2.87 5.11
Systematic 0.13 1.15 2.90 -2.77
Trend 0.01 2.14 3.46 -3.45
Discretionary 2.00 3.85 20.16 -18.16
Options 0 5.59 2.93 -2.93
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Table 3.13: Quarterly & Yearly Persistence and Money Flows by Strategy
for Bottom AUM Funds
Table 3.13 presents results for quarterly and yearly performance persistence and investor ows
for funds with the lowest (20%) assets under management for the period January 1994 to
December 2010. Each quarter/year funds are sorted into quintiles based on the previous year's
Fung-Hsieh alpha as well as past year ows and past assets under management. The middle
three quintiles are grouped into one portfolio resulting in three portfolios. Each quarter/year
the funds in the lowest AUM quintile are used to construct nine portfolios of both performance
and ow sorts. The performance of these portfolios is then evaluated in the next quarter/year
by equally weighting fund raw returns. Reported below are the time-series averages of the
portfolio returns over the sample period January 1994 to December 2010.
QUARTERLY PERSISTENCE AND MONEY FLOWS-BOTTOM AUM
Panel A: Top Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds 6.26 6.39 9.66 -3.40
Systematic 5.01 5.56 8.55 -3.54
Trend 4.76 5.58 8.46 -3.70
Discretionary 4.47 7.92 9.12 -4.65
Options 2.65 5.50 2.45 0.20
Panel B: Middle Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds 2.75 2.08 3.13 -0.38
Systematic 2.84 1.99 3.50 -0.66
Trend 2.62 2.15 3.43 -0.81
Discretionary 2.98 1.65 2.42 0.56
Options 0.10 1.81 1.04 -0.94
Panel C: Bottom Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds -0.67 -0.80 0.00 -0.67
Systematic -1.13 -0.51 0.16 -1.29
Trend -2.49 -0.67 0.81 -3.30
Discretionary 0.61 -1.02 0.00 0.61
Options -0.19 -0.24 -0.41 0.22
YEARLY PERSISTENCE AND MONEY FLOWS -BOTTOM AUM
Panel A: Top Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds 34.78 27.05 31.56 3.22
Systematic 28.17 22.34 23.08 5.09
Trend 26.97 22.24 24.01 2.96
Discretionary 2.15 4.20 8.91 -6.76
Options 0.00 1.02 4.17 -4.17
Panel B: Middle Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds 11.52 10.17 8.77 2.75
Systematic 12.54 10.19 8.54 4.00
Trend 11.43 10.28 8.34 3.09
Discretionary 9.40 4.77 16.63 -7.23
Options 6.49 6.22 4.30 2.19
Panel C: Bottom Performers
High Flows Middle Flows Bottom Flows High Minus Low
All funds 11.09 -2.32 1.44 9.65
Systematic 7.05 1.11 4.02 3.03
Trend 7.40 1.25 4.56 2.84
Discretionary 1.39 -3.53 7.76 -6.37





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.15: Portfolios Sorted on Flows
Table 3.15 reports portfolio sorts by quarterly ow for the period January 1994 to December
2010. Funds are sorted into three equal-size portfolios based on their ow in the prior quarter.
Portfolios are then equally-weighted and re-balanced monthly. Panel A reports the average
portfolio returns in excess of the three-month Treasury Bills. Columns two to four report the
average portfolio returns for low, middle and high ows, whilst the last column reports the
average return of the dierence portfolio between tercile 3 and tercile 1. Panel B presents
the same results but for risk-adjusted returns using BIC regression and Fung-Hsieh factors
augmented with the GSCI index. t-statistics are reported below each return in italics.
Panel A: Excess Returns
Lowest Flow Middle Flow Highest Flow High-Low Flow
ALL CTAs 1.90 2.04 1.57 -0.34
4.05 4.21 4.05 -1.65
SYSTEMATIC 1.83 1.91 1.61 -0.21
3.06 3.10 3.12 -0.85
TREND 1.81 2.00 1.72 -0.09
2.86 3.00 3.12 -0.36
Short-Term 1.97 1.50 1.16 -0.81
4.25 4.67 2.71 -1.51
Medium-Term 1.66 1.93 1.88 0.22
2.48 2.80 3.13 0.78
Long-Term 2.45 2.22 2.60 0.15
2.52 2.22 2.59 0.26
Pattern Rec 2.76 1.35 2.50 -0.33
2.64 1.66 2.76 -0.35
Spread/RV 1.43 1.48 0.31 -1.12**
2.66 3.44 0.89 -2.12
DISCRETIONARY 1.82 2.41 1.50 -0.32
6.21 5.76 5.49 -1.04
Fundamental 1.33 2.56 1.39 0.06
2.53 3.87 3.19 0.11
Technical 2.05 2.57 1.41 -0.64
4.89 5.16 3.12 -1.27
Fundamental &Technical 2.32 2.67 1.50 -0.82
3.78 3.62 3.40 -1.12
Spread/RV 2.30 1.60 0.61 -1.56
2.34 2.56 1.01 -1.30
OPTIONS 1.29 2.19 2.57 1.06
1.31 2.67 3.07 0.85
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Panel B: Fung-Hsieh Alphas
Lowest Flow Middle Flow Highest Flow High-Low Flow
ALL CTAs 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01
5.85 5.64 4.89 -1.72
SYSTEMATIC 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00
4.50 4.75 5.73 -0.61
TREND 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
4.17 4.63 5.74 -1.10
Short-Term 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01
6.13 6.22 4.62 -1.60
Medium-Term 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00
3.38 4.65 5.71 1.25
Long-Term 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00
3.27 2.61 2.83 -0.75
Pattern Rec 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.01
4.12 2.92 3.32 -0.50
Spread/RV 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01**
2.13 2.48 0.40 -2.64
DISCRETIONARY 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
5.78 6.75 6.04 -0.76
Fundamental 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
1.95 4.22 3.24 0.44
Technical 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00
4.44 5.62 2.75 -0.78
Fundamental &Technical 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01
3.19 3.86 4.01 -0.91
Spread/RV 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01
2.67 3.05 2.02 -1.24
OPTIONS 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.18: CTA Four-Factor Model Conditional on CTA Flows by Strategy
Table 3.18 presents regression coecients from regressing monthly returns of asset-weighted
strategy indices on the standardized sum of the past year's strategy ows, lagged aggregate
strategy log(AUM), the square of lagged aggregate strategy log(AUM) and lagged monthly
number of funds in the strategy. Strategies are shown in rows and respective coecients in
columns. The last column reports R2. I use Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrela-
tion consistent standard errors with 11 lags. * is signicant at 10%, ** is signicant at 5%
and *** is signicant at 1%.
Constant  AUM AUM2 No. of funds R2
All funds -1.412 -0.017* 0.116 -0.002 0.000 0.012
Systematic -1.293 -0.017 0.107 -0.002 0.000 0.012
Trend-followers -0.895 -0.022 0.078 -0.002 0.000 0.013
Short-Term Trend-Followers 0.716 -0.004 -0.058 0.001 0.000 0.149
Medium-Term Trend-Followers -0.118 -0.011 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.005
Long-Term Trend-Followers 2.086 -0.017 -0.176 0.004 0.000 0.010
Systematic Spread/RV 1.028*** 0.000 -0.093*** 0.002*** -0.001*** 0.044
Pattern Recognition -0.470 -0.006 0.051 -0.001 0.001 0.017
Discretionary -0.089 -0.011*** 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.014
Fundamental -0.825 -0.002 0.074 -0.002 0.000 0.016
Technical -2.015 -0.015*** 0.200 -0.005 0.001*** 0.030
Fundamental & Technical -1.349 -0.003 0.126 -0.003 0.000 0.003
Discretionary Spread/RV -0.473* 0.005 0.0490* -0.001* 0.000 0.036
Options 0.099 0.002 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.024
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Table 3.19: CTA Six-Factor Model Conditional on CTA Flows by Strategy
Table 3.19 presents regression coecients from regressing monthly returns of asset-weighted
strategy indices on the standardised sum of the past year's strategy ows, S&P 500, the
Fama-French size factor SMB, HML value factor, Goldman Sachs Commodities Index and
Carhart Momentum factor (UMD). Strategies are shown in rows and respective coecients
in columns. The last column reports R2. I use Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorre-
lation consistent standard errors with 11 lags. * is signicant at 10%, ** is signicant at 5%
and *** is signicant at 1%.
Constant  S&P 500 SMB HML GSCI UMD R2
All funds 0.012*** -0.010 -0.058 0.000 0.000 0.065* 0.001* 0.059
Systematic 0.012*** -0.010 -0.068 0.000 0.000 0.068* 0.001 0.052
Trend-followers 0.013*** -0.013 -0.079 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.001 0.053
Short-Term Trend-followers 0.002*** 0.007 -0.058 -0.001*** 0.000 0.062*** 0.000* 0.078
Medium-Term Trend-followers 0.011*** -0.003 -0.113 0.000 0.001 0.053 0.001 0.049
Long-Term Trend-followers 0.010*** -0.015 -0.030 0.001 0.001 0.207*** 0.001** 0.117
Systematic Spread/RV 0.007*** 0.001 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.031
Pattern Recognition 0.010*** -0.005 -0.113*** 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.001*** 0.079
Discretionary 0.010*** -0.010*** 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.065*** 0.000 0.133
Fundamental 0.007*** -0.003 -0.047 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.037
Technical 0.009*** -0.006** -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.048* 0.000 0.066
Fundamental & Technical 0.008*** -0.004 0.118*** 0.000 0.000 0.093*** 0.000 0.114
Discretionary Spread/RV 0.004* 0.005 -0.083** 0.000 0.000 -0.057** 0.000 0.095
Options 0.002 0.008** 0.110*** 0.001* 0.000 0.048* 0.001*** 0.133
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Figure 3.1: Number of CTA Funds vs. CTA AUM
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the number of CTAs (blue dashed line) as well as the total
Assets-Under-Management (AUM) in billions US$ (green solid line) for the entire CTA
industry.


































Figure 3.2: Cumulative Quarterly Flows for Systematic and Discretionary
CTAs
The X axis shows the dates for which cumulative ow index is plotted on a logarithmic Y
scale. The index begins in December 1993 at value 100 and successive values are each given
by multiplying by the next period compounded growth in equally-weighted quarterly ows.
Data are for December 1993 to December 2010 period.











Figure 3.3: Persistence and Money Flows for Systematic CTAs
Each quarter/year CTAs are sorted into quintiles based on past Fung-Hsieh alpha and fund
ows. Portfolios are constructed at the intersection of both sorts and nine portfolios are
formed. The middle three quintiles are grouped into one portfolio. Portfolio returns are
computed each quarter subsequent to ranking. Each bar represent a time-series average of
portfolio returns. Data are for January 1994 to December 2010 period.
Panel A: Quarterly Persistence and Flows
Panel B: Yearly Persistence and Flows
3.6. Appendix 262
Figure 3.4: Persistence and Money Flows for Discretionary CTAs
Each quarter/year CTAs are sorted into quintiles based on past Fung-Hsieh alpha and fund
ows. Portfolios are constructed at the intersection of both sorts and nine portfolios are
formed. the middle three quintiles are grouped into one portfolio. Portfolio returns are
computed each quarter subsequent to ranking. Each bar represents a time-series average of
portfolio returns. Data are for January 1994 to December 2010 period.
Panel A: Quarterly Persistence and Flows
Panel B: Yearly Persistence and Flows
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Figure 3.5: Quarterly Persistence and Money Flows for Top AUM
Systematic and Discretionary CTAs
Each quarter CTAs are sorted into quintiles based on past Fung-Hsieh alpha and fund ows
and assets under management. For the top quintile of assets under management portfolios are
constructed at the intersection of performance and ow sorts and nine portfolios are formed.
The middle three quintiles are grouped into one portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed
each quarter subsequent to ranking. Each bar represent a time-series average of portfolio
returns. Data are for January 1994 to December 2010 period.
Panel A: Systematic CTAs
Panel B: Discretionary CTAs
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Figure 3.6: Yearly Persistence and Money Flows for Top AUM Systematic
and Discretionary CTAs
Each year CTAs are sorted into quintiles based on past Fung-Hsieh alpha and fund ows and
assets under management. For the top quintile of assets under management portfolios are
constructed at the intersection of performance and ow sorts and nine portfolios are formed.
The middle three quintiles are grouped into one portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed
each quarter subsequent to ranking. Each bar represent a time-series average of portfolio
returns. Data are for January 1994 to December 2010 period.
Panel A: Systematic CTAs
Panel B: Discretionary CTAs
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Figure 3.7: Quarterly Persistence and Money Flows for Bottom AUM
Systematic and Discretionary CTAs
Each quarter CTAs are sorted into quintiles based on past Fung-Hsieh alpha and fund
ows and assets under management. For the bottom quintile of assets under manage-
ment portfolios are constructed at the intersection of performance and ow sorts and
nine portfolios are formed. The middle three quintiles are grouped into one portfolio.
Portfolio returns are computed each quarter subsequent to ranking. Each bar represent
a time-series average of portfolio returns. Data are for January 1994 to December 2010 period.
Panel A: Systematic CTAs
Panel B: Discretionary CTAs
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Figure 3.8: Yearly Persistence and Money Flows for Bottom AUM
Systematic and Discretionary CTAs
Each year CTAs are sorted into quintiles based on past Fung-Hsieh alpha and fund ows and
assets under management. For the bottom quintile of assets under management portfolios are
constructed at the intersection of performance and ow sorts and nine portfolios are formed.
The middle three quintiles are grouped into one portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed
each quarter subsequent to ranking. Each bar represent a time-series average of portfolio
returns. Data are for January 1994 to December 2010 period.
Panel A: Systematic CTAs
Panel B: Discretionary CTAs
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Figure 3.9: Time-Series Averages for Flow-Weighted and Equally-Weighted
Investment Portfolios of CTA returns for Dierent Holding Periods for All
CTAs
Panel A shows time-series averages for the portfolio of CTAs that invests each quarter
into funds that have received inows in the prior quarter. The Y axis shows quarterly
compounded returns evaluated over dierent holding periods up to eight quarters shown
on the X axis. The gure shows both equally-weighted as well as cash-ow weighted
portfolio returns. Panel B shows returns for the divestment portfolio which is the portfolio
formed of funds with negative cash ows. Data are for January 1994 to December 2010 period.
Panel A: Investment Portfolio























Equally weighted raw return
Cashflow weighted raw return
Panel B: Divestment Portfolio
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Figure 3.10: Time-Series Averages for Flow-Weighted and Equally-Weighted
Investment Portfolios for Systematic CTAs for Dierent Holding Periods
Panel A shows time-series averages of the portfolio of CTAs that invests each quarter
into funds that have received inows in the prior quarter. The Y axis shows quarterly
compounded returns evaluated over dierent holding periods up to eight quarters shown
on the X axis. The gure shows both equally-weighted as well as cash-ow weighted
portfolio returns. Panel B shows returns for the divestment portfolio which is the portfolio
formed of funds with negative cash ows. Data are for January 1994 to December 2010 period.
Panel A: Investment Portfolio
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Figure 3.11: Time-Series Averages for Flow-Weighted and Equally-Weighted
Investment Portfolios for Discretionary CTAs for Dierent Holding Periods
Panel A shows time-series averages of the portfolio of CTAs that invests each quarter
into funds that have received inows in the prior quarter. The Y axis shows quarterly
compounded returns evaluated over dierent holding periods up to eight quarters shown
on the X axis. The gure shows both equally-weighted as well as cash-ow weighted
portfolio returns. Panel B shows returns for the divestment portfolio which is the portfolio
formed of funds with negative cash ows. Data are for January 1994 to December 2010 period.
Panel A: Investment Portfolio
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Figure 3.12: Relative Performance and Asset Growth in the Mutual Fund
Industry - Convex Relationship - reproduced from Sirri and Tufano (1998)
Conclusion
In this thesis I use a novel CTA strategy classication to highlight the eects of pre-
viously documented `stylized facts' on CTA survival, performance, performance persis-
tence and the fund-ow performance relationship. I use the longest period studied in
the CTA literature and show that the `stylized facts' are sensitive to the particular CTA
strategy. I provide the rst comprehensive empirical evidence that there are indeed
many dierences between systematic and discretionary CTAs.
In the rst part of the thesis, I implement a survival analysis to examine the factors
determining CTA failure. By collecting missing information on the reasons for exit from
the database, I show that the attrition rate is not the same as the failure rate of CTAs.
In particular, I separate funds in the CTA graveyard database into those that are still
operating but stopped reporting, those that have liquidated for other reasons such as
fund merging and those that have truly failed. I show that the lters proposed in the
hedge fund literature to identify real failures are not always adequate and thus further
extend them. I re-examine the attrition rate in the CTA literature and show that the
real failure rate is not as high as previously documented, even when taking the recent
2008 crisis into account. I further nd that the failure rate of systematic CTAs is lower
than that of discretionary CTAs.
Following earlier literature on CTA survival, I progress the methodology by separat-
ing exit types in the survival analysis as well as incorporating time-varying covariates
into the Cox (1972) proportional hazards model. I thus clarify the roles of performance,
size, past asset inows, age, HWM and various risk measures in predicting CTA failure.
I nd that downside risk measures such as tail risk are superior to standard deviation
in predicting CTA failure. I also nd that past performance is always signicant after
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controlling for other variables such as risk, past ow, size, management and incentive
fees with a HWM provision. I nd that age has no eect on predicting CTA survival.
Moreover, these eects are strongest when exit is dened as real failure rather than exit
from the database. This underscores the need to separate the graveyard into dierent
exit types to avoid blurring the eect of predictor variables.
These results provide interesting implications for investors, database providers and
future academic studies. I show that it is important to determine the reasons CTA funds
exit from the database. Since I nd limited evidence of capacity constraints among CTAs
and I show that few funds choose to stop reporting to the database whilst continuing
to operate, this leaves then it is important to really identify reasons for exit. Database
providers should put more eort into collecting this information in the future. Although
CTAs are not legally required to provide any information, one way to circumvent this
problem is by an agreement whereby a fund can report to a database only on a condition
that it provides reason for exit once it chooses to no longer report. Secondly, investors
should be aware that not all funds in the graveyard are real failures. By separating the
graveyard into various exit types, it will allow investors to better estimate the expected
lifetimes of CTAs thereby improving investor outcomes. Thirdly, the proposed lters
will help future research on CTA survival.
In the second part of this thesis I study the performance, risk and performance
persistence of CTA strategies over the 1994 to 2010 period, the longest period studied
in the CTA literature. I nd that the returns of systematic CTAs are largely driven
by their exposure to the seven risk factors of Fung and Hsieh (2004a) model extended
with additional trend-following factors on interest rates and stocks and including excess
return on the GSCI index. I nd that this model leaves a large amount of unexplained
variance for discretionary funds indicating that it is systematic funds that indeed follow
futures-based trend-following strategies, a result that resonates with the conclusions of
Kazemi and Li (2009). I further nd that systematic CTAs have dierent structural
breaks than those identied previously in the hedge fund literature. In particular some
of these breaks are associated with changes in Federal Reserve's interest rate policy. I
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further nd that contrary to the previous arguments in the CTA literature, the average
CTA is able to deliver statistically signicant as well as economically signicant alpha.
These results are particularly contingent on the strategy of the CTA fund, with system-
atic trend-following CTAs delivering statistically signicant alpha in every sub-period
whilst the alpha of discretionary CTAs is only signicant in the last three years of data.
I further analyse the performance persistence across CTA strategies and nd results
to be contingent on the strategy of the CTA, time horizon employed and fund size. The
model proposed by Berk and Green (2004) suggests that performance persistence among
fund managers may be contingent on fund size. As investors chase good past perfor-
mance, thereby increasing ows to those funds and as funds face capacity constraints,
funds with above average past performance quickly reach optimal size, which results in
reduced performance persistence. In the hedge fund literature Boyson (2008) and Teo
(2010) nd empirical evidence to support the Berk and Green (2004) model: perfor-
mance persistence is driven by small funds. These results however are not relevant for
fund of hedge funds. Fung et al. (2008) nd a subset of fund of hedge funds that deliver
superior performance which persists. However, this performance persistence quickly dis-
appears with increased asset inows. In this study, I show that contrary to the ndings
in the hedge fund literature, performance persistence of systematic CTAs is driven by
large funds. However, results for discretionary CTAs are in line with the hedge fund
literature, in that performance persistence is driven by small funds. Furthermore, I nd
performance persistence for systematic CTAs at annual horizons but not quarterly. In
contrast, for discretionary CTAs, I nd no long-term performance persistence but only
evidence of short-term performance persistence. These results have important implica-
tions for investors: investors may improve their future performance by selecting large
systematic CTAs with strong past performance. For discretionary CTAs, they should
select small funds with good past performance. The fact that performance persistence
for systematic CTAs is driven by large funds is an interesting result, particularly as it
is contrary to previous conclusions in the hedge fund literature. Size may serve as a
proxy for research and development that is required for a successful systematic CTA.
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Developing and backtesting models requires substantive research which in turn requires
that a fund has adequate capital to hire suitable researchers and purchase data. Thus
large funds will have more resources dedicated to successful R&D.
There are several extensions for future research. Firstly it would be interesting to
improve the factor model for discretionary CTAs since using the F-H (2004) model for
these funds left a large proportion of variance unexplained. Secondly, it would be inter-
esting to see if fund age as well as size has an eect on the performance persistence of
systematic CTAs. In the survival model, fund age was not a signicant variable, only
fund size and fund ows. Boyson (2008), however, nds age inuencing the performance
persistence of hedge funds. Thirdly, I found some of the structural breaks to be related
to interest rate policy. It would be interesting to examine the eect of macroeconomic
variables on the performance of CTAs and this probably would relate to the wider issue
of why do CTAs perform particularly well during market downturns and why have CTAs
delivered disappointing performance in the last two years.
In the last part of this thesis, I examine the fund ow-performance relationship in
the CTA industry. In doing so, I use both quarterly as well as annual data, although
quarterly data is more suitable to the study of CTAs. I found that in the period 1994
to 2010, systematic CTAs received more inows than discretionary funds, indicating
that investors are able to discriminate between the two styles. Regarding the ow-
performance relationship, I nd that at a yearly horizon, past relative performance is
linearly related to ows, however, at the quarterly horizon, this relationship becomes
concave for discretionary funds and remains linear for systematic CTAs. Contrary, to
the conclusions of Ding et al. (2009) in the hedge fund literature, this relationship is
neither driven by Live or Dead funds nor by share restrictions. I further examine the
eect of past fund ows on future performance persistence. Sorting on size and inows
in addition to past performance, I nd evidence of long-term performance persistence
for systematic CTAs but no evidence of short-term performance persistence. This is an
interesting result for institutional investors that may be concerned with capacity con-
straints in the hedge fund and CTA industry. This suggests that the future long-term
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performance of systematic CTAs is unlikely to be hindered by large inows from insti-
tutional investors.
In the nal part of the thesis, I also address the issue of capacity constraints and
smart money in the CTA literature. To the best of my knowledge, the hypothesis of
either has not been extensively examined in the CTA literature. I test for the presence
of capacity constraints in the CTA literature using two methodologies. My results imply
that there are no statistically signicant capacity constraints for systematic CTAs, but
there may be some capacity constraints across discretionary funds: the lagged ows
for discretionary CTAs have a negative and statistically signicant coecient, although
it is not as large as for some hedge fund strategies reported in Naik, Ramadorai and
Stromquist (2007). Similar to the conclusions of Baquero and Verbeek (2009) in the
hedge fund literature, I nd no evidence of smart money in the industry. Thus despite
the fact that CTAs oer greater liquidity to investors than hedge funds, investors are
not able to fully exploit this advantage: I nd no signicant dierence in performance
between funds with inows and funds with outows using several methodologies. There
appears to be no smart money eect in the CTA industry. One caveat is that this study
covers the period up to December 2010. A possible extension to this study would be to
include the last two years of data over which time CTAs have continued to attract asset
inows.
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